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Comparable worth was one of the most hotly debated employment 
issues of the 1980s, and seems certain to provoke controversy into the 
1990s. Its supporters range from the National Organization for Women 
to the Association of Junior Leagues, from the AFL-CIO to the 
staunchly conservative Republican mayor of Colorado Springs, Colo 
rado. Opponents have called it "socialism in drag"; one Federal judge 
has contended that it is "pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the 
entire economic system of the United States of America." Several bills 
before Congress have called for studies of the federal civil service pay 
structure along comparable worth lines. The 1988 Democratic platform 
endorsed comparable worth; the Republican platform rejected it.
The basic notion underlying comparable worth is simple: jobs of the 
same worth should receive the same pay. (An obvious corollary is that 
jobs of different worth can legitimately receive different pay.) In a sense, 
the concept is long established: since the late nineteenth century, the 
"worth" of different jobs has been a concern of personnel managers, 
industrial psychologists, industrial engineers and others responsible for 
developing pay systems.
In a different sense, however, comparable worth is a relatively recent 
development stemming from concerns about the labor market status of 
women. Present day advocates of comparable worth (or "pay equity," as 
it is sometimes called) 1 readily agree that predominantly female jobs 
such as nursing, teaching or library work differ from predominantly 
male jobs such as plumbing, tree trimming or truck driving. However, 
they argue that predominantly female jobs are all too often paid consid 
erably less than predominantly male jobs that, although dissimilar in
I thank Cordelia W. Reimers and M. Anne Hill for comments and suggestions on previous drafts of 
this introduction.
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terms of their functions and duties, are nevertheless comparable in 
terms of a composite of factors such as skill, effort, responsibility and 
working conditions, and that such underpayment of women©s jobs is 
discriminatory. 2 Nor is this problem likely to be alleviated by other 
means, say the proponents: the average earnings of full time, year round 
female workers have remained at about two-thirds of the figure for 
similar male workers essentially unchanged for the past 20 or 25 
years and other kinds of antidiscrimination measures (e.g., Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, Executive Order 11246) can 
be expected to work slowly if at all in alleviating labor market discrimi 
nation. Hence the case for a new antidiscrimination remedy: compara 
ble worth.
Comparable worth received a degree of official recognition when, at 
the end of the Carter administration, the National Research Council©s 
Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis issued a report, 
commissioned by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
which endorsed the concept in measured but unequivocal terms 
(Treiman and Hartmann, eds., 1981, pp. 66-7):
The committee is convinced by the evidence, taken together, that 
women are systematically underpaid. Policies designed to promote 
equal access to all employment opportunities will affect the under 
payment of women workers only slowly. Equal access to employ 
ment opportunities may be expected to be more effective for new 
entrants than for established workers and more effective for those 
who have invested less in skills than for those who have invested 
more. Since many women currently in the labor force have invested 
years of training time in their particular skills (e.g., nursing, teach 
ing, librarianship, and secretarial work), access to other jobs (e.g., 
physicianship, plumbing, engineering, or sales) may not be pre 
ferred. For these reasons the committee believes that the strategy of 
"comparable worth," that is, equal pay for jobs of equal worth, 
merits consideration as an alternative policy of intervention in the 
pay-setting process wherever women are systematically underpaid.
Both before and after the NRC report, proponents of comparable 
worth attempted to advance the concept primarily focusing on state
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and local government employment both by litigation under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act and by lobbying (e.g., legislation, changes in union 
contracts, administrative revision of pay scales). The latter route has 
produced considerably more success for comparable worth advocates 
than the former.
Most court cases alleging discrimination against women on the 
grounds that predominantly female jobs were paid less than comparable 
male jobs have gone against female plaintiffs. In general, the federal 
courts have been unwilling to declare such situations to be discrimi 
natory, even when the plaintiffs could present evidence, based on job 
evaluations, 3 that the predominantly female and predominantly male 
jobs in question were indeed "comparable."
A relatively early example is Christensen v. Iowa (563 F.2d 353 (8th 
Cir. 1977)), in which predominantly female clerical workers at the 
University of Northern Iowa argued that they had been discriminated 
against because their jobs received lower pay than predominantly male 
physical plant jobs even though the university©s job evaluation system put 
the two job categories in the same labor grade and assigned equal point 
values to both. The university argued that the wage difference simply 
reflected different wage rates prevailing in the external labor market, 
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently agreed, saying, "We 
do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market 
in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications." Sim 
ilar cases (e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 4 in which nurses 
employed by the City of Denver argued that their jobs were paid less 
than predominantly male jobs tree trimmers, sign painters, real estate 
appraisers that required less training and skill) have met with the same 
fate. In 1983, a federal district judge ruled in AFSCME v. State of 
Washington (578 F.Supp. 846 (1983); 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), 
reh©g den., 813 F.2d 1034 (1987)) that the state had discriminated 
against its women employees by paying predominantly female jobs less 
than comparable predominantly male jobs, but in 1985 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court©s ruling on all counts, 
echoing its prior decision, which also rejected comparable worth 
claims, in Spaulding v. University of Washington (740 F2d 686 (1984),
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cert, denied, 105 S.Ct. 511 (1984)). 5 More recently, the federal courts 
have rejected comparable worth claims in lawsuits brought by state 
government employees in Michigan (International Union, UAW, v. State 
of Michigan, 673 F.Supp. 893 (ED Mich. 1987), affdsub nom., Interna 
tional Union, UAW, v. State of Michigan, no. 87-2228 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 
1989)) and in California (California State Employees© Association v. 
State of California, no. C-84-7275, U.S. District Court (ND Calif. 
October3, 1989)).
Developments on the lobbying front have generally been more suc 
cessful for proponents of comparable worth. No entirely comprehensive 
survey exists. It appears, however, 6 that about 30 state governments have 
at least begun to undertake formal job evaluation studies to determine 
whether compensation does reflect the "worth" of predominantly female 
as well as predominantly male jobs, and that over a dozen states have 
adopted changes to bring about a greater correspondence between jobs© 
pay and their assessed worth. Comparable worth wage adjustments have 
also been implemented at the local government level, either by negotia 
tion (Colorado Springs, Colorado), as the result of a strike (San Jose, 
California), by administrative decision (Los Angeles), or adoption and 
implementation of a charter amendment (San Francisco). The Ninth 
Circuit©s appellate decision notwithstanding, Washington State and the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) agreed in January 1986 to settle AFSCME v. State of 
Washington out of court. The settlement provided for pay adjustments 
for predominantly female jobs costing an estimated $482 million, and 
was hailed by the governor and the chief negotiator for the largest state 
employee union as a victory for comparable worth (New York Times 
1986).
Finally, comparable worth studies of federal employment are also a 
real possibility. On several occasions since 1984, the Congress has 
considered legislation calling for a study of the pay system in the federal 
civil service aimed (among other things) at determining whether the 
worth of predominantly female job classifications was reflected in pay 
rates; in each case, the legislation has passed the House of Represen 
tatives but has died in the Senate. 7
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In contrast, developments bearing on comparable worth in the private 
sector have been negligible (Wall Street Journal 1985a). Recent years 
have seen no comparable worth litigation in which private firms were 
defendants. Some firms, including telephone companies and other em 
ployers of electrical workers, are reported to have made some pay 
adjustments along comparable worth lines; these firms have not, how 
ever, publicly disclosed the cost of these adjustments (New York Times 
1989b). Advocacy groups have purchased stock in several companies 
(including Aetna, Cigna, Kimberly-Clark and J. P. Morgan) and have 
then introduced resolutions for the firms© shareholders© meetings calling 
for the companies to pay their employees on the basis of comparable 
worth. None of these resolutions has been approved, however (IRRC 
News for Investors 1988, p. 125; 1989a, p. 38; 1989b, p. 118). In 
Wisconsin, employer groups played a leading role in defeating legisla 
tion that would have required state government employee pay to be set 
along comparable worth lines; in neighboring Minnesota, employer 
groups said little about a 1982 law (discussed at length in chapter 4) 
requiring comparable worth for state government employees but have 
since mobilized against application of comparable worth to the private 
sector (Washington Post 1985). In 1988, the Province of Ontario, 
Canada, adopted a law requiring comparable worth in both the public 
and the private sectors. Reaction of business groups has been mixed: 
organizations representing small employers have remained stoutly op 
posed, but groups representing large employers have professed willing 
ness to wait a year before judging the law (Wall Street Journal 1988a,b). 
(For further discussion of developments in Canada, see New York Times 
1989a, Hutner 1986, pp. 41-58, and Gunderson and Riddell 1988, pp. 
458-467. Willborn 1989 discusses developments in Great Britain.)
At the national level, the Reagan administration actively opposed 
comparable worth, particularly during its second term (1985-89). Dur 
ing the 1984 presidential campaign, the ranking member of the Presi 
dent©s Council of Economic Advisers criticized comparable worth as "a 
truly crazy idea" and a "medieval concept," and the President©s press 
spokesman-saying he was expressing President Reagan©s views-said 
the concept was "nebulous" and would represent "an unprecedented
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intrusion into our private affairs" (New York Times 1984). In 1984, the 
U.S. Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the 
State of Illinois, which was being sued by the American Nurses© Asso 
ciation on comparable worth grounds; 8 and in 1988 it filed an amicus 
brief in support of the State of Michigan, which was being sued on 
similar grounds by the United Auto Workers. 9
Perhaps the most vociferous opposition to comparable worth within 
the Reagan administration came from the U. S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, whose former staff director, Linda Chavez, often criticized the 
concept and whose then chairman, Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr., called it 
"the looniest idea since Loony Tunes came on the screen." In June 1984 
the Commission held extensive hearings on the issue (U. S. Commis 
sion on Civil Rights, 1984); in April 1985, the Commission voted by a 
5-2 margin to urge Congress and government agencies to reject the 
doctrine of equal pay for jobs of comparable worth (New York Times 
1985a; U. S. Commission on Civil Rights 1985). The U. S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission followed suit in June 1985; its 
five commissioners voted unanimously that federal law does not require 
employers to give equal pay for different jobs of comparable worth (New 
York Times 1985b).
The Bush administration is unlikely to change the attitude of the 
federal government and its civil rights policy and enforcement agencies 
towards comparable worth: as noted earlier, the 1988 Republican plat 
form rejected the concept, and the then Vice-President©s campaign 
speeches on employment discrimination were limited to expressions of 
support for equal pay for equal work, presumably as embodied in the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963. 10
The volume of debate on comparable worth in the courts, Congress, 
government agencies, the news media, public forums and even scholarly 
journals has been considerable. On the whole, however, the quality of 
the debate has been sadly deficient. Two features of the public debate 
seem particularly unfortunate. First, in much of the controversy, both 
proponents and opponents have failed to define terms and concepts 
clearly even the concept of comparable worth itself. 11 Relatively little 
effort has been devoted to describing, in concrete terms, what would be
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involved in implementing and enforcing a policy of equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth. Still less attention has been devoted to the ways in 
which such a policy would resemble or differ from existing anti 
discrimination policies (e.g., under the Civil Rights Act).
A second problem with the public debate on comparable worth is that 
the protagonists have often been preoccupied with essentially ideologi 
cal and normative issues, to the almost total exclusion of important 
conceptual and empirical questions. 12 (Indeed, some of the protagonists 
seem to be concerned more with questions about how labor markets 
operate, e.g., whether labor markets are better described by neo 
classical or institutional models, than with questions about the merits of 
requiring "equal pay for jobs of comparable worth.") Both sides in the 
debate seem to agree that comparable worth is intended to serve as a 
means of redressing some of the economic effects of discrimination 
against (or labor market segregation of) women. The likely effects, 
however, of actual or potential comparable worth policies on labor 
market outcomes for women on wages, employment, etc. have re 
ceived relatively little attention. Even less thought has been devoted to 
comparing the likely impacts of comparable worth measures with the 
effects of other antidiscrimination measures (e.g., enforcement of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act).
The basic objective of this monograph is to contribute to the debate 
about comparable worth in two ways. First, I want to provide a clear 
statement of the definitional and conceptual issues surrounding com 
parable worth: although policy decisions are ultimately a matter of 
ideology and normative judgments, such choices can be shaped and 
informed in important ways by careful dissection of definitional and 
conceptual questions. Second, I want to analyze the actual or potential 
effects of comparable worth. One of the most important criteria in the 
evaluation of any proposed policy is the question of its actual (as 
opposed to its intended) impact on key "outcome" measures. By analyz 
ing economic models of how comparable worth might work in alter 
native labor market settings, and by performing empirical studies of the 
effects of comparable worth measures that have actually been imple 
mented, I hope to contribute significantly to understanding how com-
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parable worth (or comparable worth-like measures) would actually 
work in practice.
One general remark seems appropriate at the outset: since I am an 
economist, my discussion focuses on economic aspects of comparable 
worth. Other aspects of comparable worth (e.g., legal questions) have 
been discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Becker 1984, 1986; Blumrosen 
1979, 1986; Clauss 1986; Dean, Roberts and Boone 1984; Fischel and 
Lazar 1986a-b; Freed and Polsby 1984; Gold 1983; Heen 1984; 
Holzhauer 1986; Nelson et al. 1980; Stone 1985; Stone, ed. 1987; 
Weiler 1986; and Yale Law Journal 1981), and I have no special 
expertise in fields other than economics. Accordingly, it seems appro 
priate to exploit the principle of comparative advantage, and to focus on 
economic rather than other aspects of comparable worth.
The plan of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses definitions, 
concepts and analytical issues: the basic premises underlying compara 
ble worth and practical details of implementing it; the nature of labor 
market discrimination and the question of whether equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth is nondiscriminatory; analysis of how adoption of 
comparable worth might affect wages and employment of men and 
women. Chapter 3 is concerned with empirical questions: conventional 
economic and comparable worth studies of the actual magnitude of the 
female/male pay gap, and methodologies for analyzing the actual effects 
on wages and employment of adoption of comparable worth policies. 
Chapters 4-6 describe the adoption of comparable worth or comparable 
worth-like policies in three different settings  San Jose, California; 
Minnesota; and Australia and present analyses of the effects of these 
policies on wages and employment. Chapter 7 summarizes the work and 
presents the main conclusions.
NOTES
1 Some writers appear to use "comparable worth" and "pay equity" interchangeably; others 
appear to regard "pay equity" as synonymous with nondiscrimination in pay and "comparable 
worth" as one means (among others) to that end.
2 In principle, there is no reason why comparable worth is not as pertinent to minorities as it is
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to women. However, proponents of comparable worth appear, for the most part, to regard the 
problem of unequal pay for jobs of comparable worth as affecting women more than minority men 
(see, e.g., Treiman and Hartmann, eds., 1981, esp. pp. 9, 28). The Rev. Jesse Jackson©s speech to 
the 1988 Democratic National Convention referred to "working women seek[ing] comparable 
worth" (New York Times, 1988a); the Democratic platform referred to "pay equity for working 
women" (New York Times, 1988b).
3 See chapter 2 for a discussion of job evaluation methods. In brief, such evaluations assign 
"points" to jobs on the basis of characteristics (skill, effort, responsibility, working conditions, and 
the like), with jobs receiving many points (i.e., requiring much effort, involving onerous working 
conditions, etc.) being deemed to have a greater "worth" than jobs receiving few points.
4 17 FEP Cases 906 (D. Col. 1978), 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir., 1980), cert, denied, 449 U. S. 
888(1980).
5 As noted below, the parties ultimately agreed to settle out of court, rendering moot a request 
made by the plaintiffs for a rehearing en bane by the Ninth Circuit. For detailed discussions of the 
case, see Remick (1988) and Willborn (1989).
6 See Bureau of National Affairs (1981), Cook (1984), and (quoting a survey conducted by the 
National Committee on Pay Equity) The New York Times (1987).
7 For a summary of developments in Congress through 1988, see U. S. Congress, House 
(1988).
8 The ANA contended that nurses in state government employment were paid less than persons 
in predominantly male jobs that, according to Illinois©job evaluation results, were comparable in 
terms of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. The federal district court decision (606 
F.Supp. 1313 (1985)) dismissed the ANA©s suit on the basis of arguments similar to those used in 
Christensen. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit (783 F2d 716 (7th Cir, 1986)) reversed the district 
court and remanded the case for further proceedings on the grounds that although the ANA had 
alleged intentional sex discrimination, the state had answered only on the theory that plaintiffs 
entire claim was based on comparable worth. The appellate court made clear, however, that it also 
rejected the ANA©s complaint to the extent that it raised comparable worth issues, and intimated that 
the complaint might not surviye a future motion for summary judgment if plaintiffs failed to 
produce evidence that went beyond comparable worth.
9 See International Union, UAW, mentioned earlier in this chapter. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I should note that I served as a consultant and expert labor economist for the defendant 
(the State of Michigan) in this litigation.
10 For example, see the then Vice-President©s July 24, 1988, address to a convention of business 
and professional women©s clubs (The Vice President, Office of the Press Secretary, 1988), which 
expresses support for "equal pay for equal work" but does not mention "comparable worth" or "pay 
equity."
1 © The same comment applies even to discussions of the issue by neutrals interested primarily in 
reporting, rather than debating, the issue. For example, the Bureau of National Affairs (1981, p. 1) 
discusses "several interpretations of the ©comparable worth© doctrine," including (a) "the ©pure© 
comparable worth doctrine," according to which "discrimination exists when workers of one sex 
... in one job category are paid less than workers in a totally different job category . . . when the two 
groups are..., in some sense, of©comparable worth© to their employer" (emphasis added); and (b) 
"the ©common© comparable worth doctrine," according to which "discrimination exists when 
workers of one sex in one job category are paid less than workers of the other sex in the same
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general job classification... when the two groups are performing work that is not the same in content 
but that is of comparable worth to the employer in terms of requirements" (emphasis added). The 
circularity of both of these definitions is evident.
12 An exception is a 1986 symposium on comparable worth in the University of Chicago Law 
Review (Fischel and Lazear 1986a-b, Holzhauer 1986 and Becker 1986).
Comparable Worth: Definitions, 
Concepts and Analytical Issues
This chapter is concerned with definitional, conceptual, and analytical 
issues about comparable worth. What is "comparable worth"? How 
could (or should) the "worth" of jobs be measured? Is it discriminatory 
for employers to pay different wages for jobs of comparable worth? How 
would adoption of comparable worth i.e., requiring equal pay for jobs 
of comparable worth affect wages and employment of men and 
women?
2.1 What Is Comparable Worth?
Any labor market transaction involves both a buyer and a seller: for 
example, the wage paid by an employer is also the wage received by the 
employee. Likewise, the "worth" of jobs can be viewed from the per 
spective of either employers (the demand side of the labor market) or 
workers (the supply side of the market).© Thus, in principle, the worth of 
a particular job can be defined in either of two ways: as "value to the 
employer," or as "desirability to the employee." I will refer to the first of 
these definitions as the "marginal productivity" or MP definition of 
comparable worth, and to the second as the "compensating wage differ 
entials" or CD definition.
To understand the meaning of the MP definition, suppose that an
I thank Lawrence Kahn, Marlene Kim, David Neumark, Cordelia Reimers, Lawrence Summers, 
and participants in seminars at the Australian National University, Indiana University, the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Maryland, the 
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and Rutgers University for many helpful comments on previous versions of this chapter.
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employer has 100 workers who are all alike (have the same schooling, 
work experience, etc.) and can be placed into one of two jobs, A or B. If 
the increase in output that the employer would derive by assigning these 
workers to job A is equal to the increase that would result from placing 
them in job B, then the two jobs would be called "comparable" in this 
sense. In economic jargon, jobs of comparable worth under this defini 
tion are jobs in which the marginal product of a given type of labor is the 
same. 2
Although comparable worth has sometimes been defined in this way 
(see, for example, Bureau of National Affairs 1981, p. 1), and although 
proponents of comparable worth not infrequently use the terms "jobs of 
comparable worth" and "jobs of equal value to the employer" as if they 
were equivalent, most discussions of comparable worth explicitly define 
comparable worth differently. Two jobs are said to be of comparable 
worth if they are comparable in terms of a composite of four kinds of 
factors: skill (e.g., education and training requirements), effort, re 
sponsibility and working conditions. (For example, see Treiman and 
Hartmann, eds. 1981, p. 1.) Thus, whereas the MP definition in effect 
defines comparable worth from the standpoint of employers (i.e., the 
"worth" of jobs measured in terms of their contribution to the employer©s 
output), the second definition in effect defines comparable worth from 
the standpoint of employees (i.e., the "worth" of jobs measured in terms 
of the requirements that workers must satisfy in order to hold them, the 
conditions experienced by workers who perform them, etc.). 3
At least in general, the two definitions are different. For example, 
although working conditions may not usually have much to do with 
productivity, they will usually play an important part in workers© views 
of different jobs. 4 Moreover, the two definitions have quite different 
implications. To determine whether two jobs are comparable in the MP 
sense, one would need to measure the contribution each makes to the 
employer©s output; whereas an assessment of the comparability of two 
jobs in the CD sense requires an evaluation of the jobs in terms of skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions, or what the jobs ask of 
workers.
In almost all cases, proponents of comparable worth have either
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implicitly or explicitly used the second (CD) definition, so that is the 
focus of this monograph. I now consider several subsidiary (but still 
quite important) issues: coverage, compliance and determination of job 
comparability under a standard of payment based on job worth.
Coverage
Virtually all proponents of comparable worth specify that compara 
ble worth requirements would cover individual employers, and that job 
evaluations would be performed for particular employers rather than on 
any more general basis (e.g., labor market- or economy wide). Thus, 
comparable worth would entail an assessment of the comparability of 
the jobs of, say, tool mechanic and secretary at a given employer, and 
would require pay changes if the two jobs were found to be comparable 
but paid differently. Virtually all proponents agree, however, that com 
parable worth would not entail evaluations of these jobs across firms, 
would not set a uniform national wage for either job, and would not even 
necessarily require that any other employer adjust the pay of tool 
mechanics and secretaries. That would depend on whether, at any other 
such firm, the two jobs were found to be comparable.
Thus, determinations of job comparability would be conducted within 
individual firms. Other questions about coverage, however, have largely 
been neglected. For example, would coverage be limited to employers 
with at least some specified number of employees, as under provisions 
of fair labor standards laws? Would the same comparable worth stan 
dard be applied to all establishments of a given employer, regardless of 
geographic location or industrial classification? Such details have not 
yet been discussed systematically.
Compliance
Most discussions of comparable worth say little about compliance, 
i.e., about how wages would be adjusted if two jobs covered by com 
parable worth and deemed to be comparable nevertheless pay different 
wages. The possible compliance procedures are numerous: the wage of
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the low-paying job could be raised to equal that of the high-paying job; 
or the wage of the high-paying job could be reduced to equal that of the 
low-paying job; or one could split the difference, raising the wage of the 
low-paying job and reducing the wage of the high-paying job until they 
were equal; and so on. In practice, however, most proponents of com 
parable worth who address this question opt for wage increases for the 
low-paying job as either the only, or else the preferred, method of 
compliance. For example, laws proposed in state legislatures frequently 
specify that compliance with the standard of equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth shall in no event result in a reduction in the pay of any 
job (see Perrin 1985, esp. pp. 27-28). Similarly, comparable worth 
plans actually adopted by state and local governments have generally 
prohibited cuts in pay for employees or job categories (for example, see 
Orazem and Mattila 1989, p. 180).
Determining Comparability
The most important question confronting any attempt to develop a 
comparable worth policy concerns the determination of job com 
parability. Virtually all proponents of comparable worth advocate the 
use of job evaluation in assessing the "worth" of jobs. Job evaluations are 
often (though not always) conducted in the following stages. First, the 
evaluators describe the characteristics, requirements, duties, working 
conditions, etc., of the jobs to be evaluated and identify the specific 
"compensable factors" on which the different jobs are to be evaluated. 
Second, the evaluators assign scores or "evaluation points" to each 
compensable factor for each job. Third, the evaluators determine 
weights to be assigned to the different factors (e.g., whether skill is to be 
given greater or lesser weight than working conditions). Finally, the 
evaluators determine the total point score (or "worth") of each job by 
computing the appropriately weighted sum of the points awarded to each 
of the factors for that job. Jobs with the same (or very similar) total 
scores are then said to be "comparable."
Although there seems to be general agreement on these broad out 
lines, there is, perhaps not surprisingly, less uniformity on questions of
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detail. First, different job evaluation systems categorize the four basic 
compensable factors (skill, effort, responsibility and working condi 
tions) in different ways. For example, the evaluation of government jobs 
in the State of Washington by Norman D. Willis and Associates (1974, 
1976) assigned points for "knowledge and skills," "mental demands," 
"accountability," and "working conditions." Hay Associates assigned 
points to municipal government jobs in San Jose, California, on the 
basis of the "know-how," "problem-solving," "accountability" and 
"working conditions" involved in each job (U.S. Congress, House 1983, 
p. 340). The U.S. Office of Personnel Management©s Factor Evaluation 
System of Position Classification (FES) considers nine factors: "knowl 
edge required by the position," "supervisory controls," "guidelines," 
"complexity," "scope and effect," "personal contacts," "purpose of con 
tacts," "physical demands" and "work environment" (U.S. Civil Service 
Commission 1977, pp. 13-31; Werwie 1987). Industry groups such as 
the National Metal Trades Association, the National Electrical Manu 
facturers Association and the American Association of Industrial Man 
agement have developed systems with 11 factors.
A second source of variation among different evaluation procedures 
concerns whether the same job evaluation, with the same set of compen 
sable factors, is used to evaluate all jobs at a given firm. Not infre 
quently, different job evaluations are applied to different job "families." 
For example, the Cooperative Wage Study (CWS), initiated in 1944 by 
12 of the largest steel corporations at the direction of the War Labor 
Board, uses 12 compensable factors in evaluating hourly jobs, and 7 in 
evaluating nonexempt office and technical positions. For a considerable 
period of time, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation maintained sepa 
rate scales for its predominantly male and predominantly female jobs. 
As explained in its 1939 Industrial Relations Manual5 ©.
The occupations or jobs filled by women are point rated on the 
same basis of point values for Requirements of the Job and Respon 
sibility, with the same allowance for Job Conditions, as are the jobs 
commonly filled by men....
The gradient of the women©s wage curve, however, is not the same 
for women as for men [sic] because of the more transient character
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of the service of the former, the relative shortness of their activity in 
industry, the differences in environment required, the extra services 
that must be provided, overtime conditions, extra help needed for 
the occasional heavy work, and the general sociological factors not 
requiring discussion herein.
The rate or range for Labor Grades do not coincide with the 
values on the men©s scale. Basically, then, we have another wage 
curve or Key Sheet for women below and not parallel with the men©s 
curve.
Finally, job evaluations differ in the extent to which they incorporate 
information about labor markets, both internal and external to the 
enterprise at which the jobs are being evaluated. Most commercial job 
evaluation systems rely, at least to some degree, on such labor market 
information. In contrast, many comparable worth proponents advocate 
"bias-free" job evaluations, which explicitly avoid using such informa 
tion on the grounds that the labor markets that generate it are distorted 
by discriminatory behavior.
Commercial job evaluations. Although it is difficult to be certain, it 
appears that job evaluation has been in use since at least the late 
nineteenth century6 and has been extensively developed and imple 
mented since the 1930s and, in particular, 1940s (Schwab 1985, p. 37). 
Evaluation methods may be grouped under two main headings: "whole 
job" methods, and "compensable factor" methods. As their names 
imply, the former approach considers individual jobs "as a whole," 
whereas the latter is concerned with identifying attributes or charac 
teristics of work that different jobs possess in different degrees. 7
The simplest (and probably oldest) form of whole job evaluation is 
commonly known as "job ranking": one simply compares all jobs at an 
enterprise with each other and ranks them from most to least important, 
with pay rates revised as necessary to reflect the ranking. A variant, 
known as "market pricing," entails several steps: (1) match the jobs 
under review with similar jobs in the relevant external labor market(s); 
(2) determine the wages paid to these reference jobs in the relevant 
external labor market(s), and (3) when necessary, adjust pay rates for
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the jobs under review so as to match the rates paid externally. Finally, 
under the "market pricing guideline method," the jobs to be evaluated 
and their rates of pay are initially linked to external labor market 
"reference" jobs, but pay rates for the reference jobs are only a guide 
line: the evaluators may change the rank of the jobs to be evaluated, and 
further change pay rates, within specified limits if it is decided that the 
initial ranking of the enterprise©s jobs and/or the initial matching of these 
jobs with external reference jobs was inappropriate.
Compensable factor job evaluations identify qualities or features 
common to many (ideally, all) jobs in an organization, and quantify the 
degree to which each job possesses those. The first step under this 
approach is to identify all qualities or features  "factors" to be com 
pensated, by examining job descriptions, administering questionnaires 
to workers and supervisors, etc. Some evaluations of this kind simply 
describe, in qualitative and narrative terms, how an enterprise©s jobs 
differ in terms of such factors, 8 but most compensable factor evaluations 
are quantitative: evaluators assign points for each factor to each job, 
based on the extent to which each each job entails each factor. (For 
example, jobs requiring much skill or training might receive 10 points 
for the "skill" factor, whereas jobs requiring minimal skill might receive 
1 or 2.) In awarding points to jobs, some quantitative plans9 use jobs 
identified as "benchmark" or "key" jobs as a reference point. These are 
jobs judged to be especially sensitive to external labor market condi 
tions, to be "standardized (employed by many organizations) and [to 
possess] stable content" (Schwab 1980, p. 55). The number of such key 
jobs should be "sufficient... to cover the entire range of difficulty or 
importance of each [compensable] factor" (Henderson and Clarke 1981, 
p. 17).
One of the most popular quantitative procedures is the "Factor Guide 
Chart Method" or, more simply, "Hay Plan," named after its chief 
progenitor, Edward N. Hay. This plan considers three basic factors, 
"know-how," "problem solving," and "accountability," although a fourth, 
"working conditions," can be included if desired, and each basic factor 
is divided into various subfactors (Hay and Purves 1951, 1954). Charts 
are used to determine points to be awarded for different combinations of
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the factors and subfactors. A hallmark of the Hay method is its capacity 
for substantial modification so as to be applicable to different organiza 
tions. Although the Hay approach is not tied explicitly to particular "key 
jobs" (unlike some other methods), it appears to be intended primarily 
for evaluation of a given job family (or set of related job families) within 
an organization, rather than of the entire set of jobs at an organization. 
In principle, then, an enterprise would use not one Hay plan but several 
to evaluate its entire range of jobs. 10
Once evaluators have assigned points to factors under methods such 
as those just discussed, the next task is to combine them for each job to 
arrive at a total point score, i.e., a measure of the total "worth" of each 
job. In general, job evaluations compute total worth as a weighted sum 
of the points awarded to each of the different factors; differences among 
evaluation methods in this regard have to do with how the weights are 
determined. In the main, commercial job evaluations derive weights 
using the so-called "policy-capturing" approach (Treiman and 
Hartmann, eds. 1981, p. 74). Under this approach, weights are con 
structed to reflect the existing relationship (as determined by statistical 
procedures such as regression analysis), at the enterprise in question, 
between each individual compensable factor and pay.
To see what this means in practice, consider the following simple 
hypothetical example. An employer evaluates jobs on the basis of two 
compensable factors, physical demands and mental demands. Points are 
awarded to all jobs reflecting the extent of each of these two factors 
possessed by each job. The employer then analyzes the relation between 
actual current compensation and the points awarded for these two 
factors, and finds the following: (1) among jobs with the same evalua 
tion points for physical demands, each extra evaluation point for mental 
demands is associated, on average and other things being equal, with $3 
per hour in extra pay; and (2) among jobs with the same evaluation 
points for mental demands, each extra evaluation point for physical 
demands is associated, on average and other things being equal, with $4 
per hour in extra pay. Then the weight given to mental demands evalua 
tion points would be 0.75 ( = 3/4) the weight given to physical demands. 
Thus, a job with 1 mental demand point and 2 physical demand points
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might have a composite score or total "worth" of (3xl)+(4x2) = 11 
points, whereas a job with 2 mental demand points and 1 physical 
demand points might have a worth of (3 X 2) + (4 X1) = 10 points. ! *
Bias-free job evaluations. Although most proponents of comparable 
worth accept indeed, advocate the general concept of job evaluation 
as a means of determining job worth, they are often critical of the way in 
which commercial job evaluations are carried out. 12 According to these 
comparable worth proponents, bias against predominantly female jobs 
can (and, all too often, actually does) creep into each stage of the 
evaluation process.
The first problem is that the compensable factors chosen to be 
included in the evaluations may tend to be those prevalent in predomi 
nantly male jobs and/or that factors typical of predominantly female 
jobs may be excluded or deemphasized: "for example, physical effort/ 
exertion is often [included in commercial job evaluations], while fine 
motor skill usually is not" (Beatty and Beatty 1984, pp. 73-4).
A second set of problems involves the assessment of each factor. One 
difficulty is that existing evaluation procedures may not fully elicit the 
degree to which predominantly female jobs do in fact possess relevant 
characteristics. For example, one questionnaire administered to incum 
bents to gather information about compensable factors asked, "How 
important is setting up or adjusting equipment (setting up a lathe or drill 
press, adjusting an engine carburetor, etc.)?" As those responsible for 
analyzing data generated by this questionnaire (Pierson, Koziara and 
Johannesson 1984, p. 123) note:
A person in a female job might not respond to [this question], 
because the examples relate only to traditionally male-held jobs. 
This item was changed by adding behaviorally similar examples that 
were less sex-biased and became: "How important is setting up or 
adjusting equipment (attaching devices to patients, setting up a lathe 
or drill press, adjusting office equipment)?"
Even if the questions asked about jobs are neutral, the responses may 
not be:
20 The Economics of Comparable Worth
Male tree trimmers for the city of Denver, interviewed for a televi 
sion report on the efforts of nurses in that city to raise their wages 
[via Lemons v. City and County of Denver}, repeatedly said that they 
thought tree trimmers deserved a higher salary because their work 
was more "difficult," "dangerous," and "dirty."... It would seem 
fair to conclude that the tree trimmers are referring to the physical 
difficulty of climbing trees and ladders, the danger of physical labor 
at heights and with certain machinery, and the dirt of outdoors work. 
They, and many others, do not see the difficulty of work in intensive 
care units, the danger of dealing with disease and psychotic patients, 
or the dirt of vomit.... Many nurses I have talked to see their job as 
clean, in part because of the constant effort to make the environment 
sterile, in spite of their exposure to vomit, urine, feces, blood, pus, 
dead people, disease and so on. Garbage collectors do dirty work, 
while food service workers, producing the garbage, do clean work. 
(Remick 1984, p. 114.)
Thus, assessments of the skill requirements, difficulty or working con 
ditions of jobs may be a function of general cultural perceptions and, in 
particular, of the sex composition of the jobs© incumbents, regardless of 
whether those performing the assessments are outside evaluators, super 
visors or even the incumbents themselves  a notion that has received 
some confirmation in the research literature (McArthur 1985).
A final problem with commercial job evaluation, in the view of many 
comparable worth proponents, concerns the way in which evaluation 
points are combined into a total point score and then converted into pay 
rates. The main concern here stems from the belief that the existing 
wage structure is contaminated by discriminatory employment prac 
tices. Thus, reliance on it in commercial job evaluations is highly 
undesirable.
Comparable worth proponents are especially critical of the practice, 
commonly followed in commercial evaluations, of conducting different 
evaluations for different groups or families of jobs within the same 
enterprise. For example, as noted above, many evaluation systems 
evaluate clerical and production worker jobs separately. Since the sepa 
rate job families considered tend to be demarcated along sexual and/or
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racial lines, comparable worth proponents are critical of this approach. 
At best, the resulting final evaluation will be incomplete (since it will not 
evaluate all jobs, in all families, on the same basis). At worst, it may be 
biased against predominantly female job families (to the extent that it 
sanctions, or does not prohibit, pay differences between predominantly 
female and predominantly male job families that might have been found 
comparable had they been evaluated on the same basis).
Not infrequently, commercial evaluations not only reflect the existing 
distribution of the workforce by sex and occupation, but also rely on 
information about the existing wage distribution. As noted earlier, some 
evaluations use information on wages paid for "key" or "benchmark" 
jobs (ones deemed to be especially sensitive to external market forces), 
or (more generally) surveys of local area labor market wage rates, to 
convert evaluation points into pay for all jobs. Others use "policy- 
capturing" analyses of the association between evaluation points and the 
existing structure of wage rates within the firm in question to derive the 
weights that will be applied to the points awarded to individual compen- 
sable factors in determining the total "worth" of individual jobs. Either 
way, advocates of comparable worth point out, the resulting relation 
between total evaluation points and proposed pay levels generated by the 
evaluation procedure will "necessarily reflect in turn any biases that 
exist in market wages." 13
Thus, most comparable worth proponents are, at best, skeptical about 
the merits of such methodology as a means of adequately assessing the 
worth of different jobs, in particular predominantly female vs. predomi 
nantly male jobs. Accordingly, they prefer the use of "bias-free" job 
evaluation methodology in determining the worth of different jobs. "A 
bias-free evaluation system probably does not yet exist" (Remick 1984, 
p. 100), so operational details of bias-free evaluations are necessarily 
somewhat vague. Most comparable worth proponents who have ad 
dressed this question (e.g., Remick 1984; Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 
1981), however, appear to agree that a bias-free procedure would have 
most if not all of the following features.
(1). Determination of the compensable factors, and of the points
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awarded for each such factor for any given job, on scrupulously sex- 
neutral grounds.
(2). Application of a single uniform evaluation methodology to the 
entire set of jobs (rather than of different procedures for different job 
families) at the enterprise under evaluation.
(3). Deemphasis, or even complete avoidance, of information on the 
existing structure (external and/or internal) of wage rates by combining 
points awarded to individual compensable factors using weights derived 
on a priori grounds without reference to market wage rates 14 rather than 
via policy-capturing techniques (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, pp. 
72, 80).
It seems clear, then, that bias-free job evaluations of the kind pro 
posed by comparable worth advocates would differ at least to some 
extent from the commercial job evaluations currently in use in most 
enterprises in the private or public sectors. In terms of underlying 
philosophy, however, both comparable worth and commercial evalua 
tion methodologies have one essential point in common: both take the 
compensating differentials or CD approach described earlier, since the 
basic objective of each is to assess jobs in terms of skill, effort, responsi 
bility and working conditions. As Schwab (1980, p. 64; emphasis 
original 15), speaking of commercial job evaluations, remarks:
These factors appear to conform rather closely to the components 
articulated in net-advantage discussions going back to Adam 
Smith©s Wealth of Nations [footnote omitted]. That is, they represent 
requirements that the employee must bring to the job (e.g., skill), or 
characteristics of the job (e.g., working conditions) that may make 
the job onerous or attractive.
Adam Smith©s discussion of these factors 16 is, at least to economists, 
one of the best-known and most celebrated passages in The Wealth of 
Nations©.
The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I 
have been able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in 
some employments, and counter-balance a great one in others: first, 
the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments them-
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selves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and 
expence of learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of 
employment in them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be 
reposed in those who exercise them; and fifthly, the probability or 
improbability of success in them.
Smith laid the foundations for what economists now call the theory of 
"compensating wage differentials." In its simplest version, the theory 
implies that, other things being equal and in the absence of artificial 
constraints, jobs that ask much of workers in terms of requirements or 
working conditions will typically have to pay a premium or "compensat 
ing differential" in order to attract enough workers to them (see chapter 
3 for further discussion).
There is a seeming irony here. Economists who have discussed 
comparable worth (e.g., Lindsay 1980; O©Neill 1984b; Raisian, Ward, 
and Welch 1985) usually react negatively to it because they perceive it as 
antithetical to the concept of wage determination by market supplies and 
demands; and comparable worth proponents are not infrequently skep 
tical about the outcome of wage determination by supply and demand. 
Yet in an important sense one can trace the rationale for comparable 
worth directly back to Adam Smith, whose language is strikingly 
similar to that used by present day comparable worth advocates. In 
economic jargon, comparable worth would appear to amount simply to 
an insistence that the theory of compensating wage differentials be taken 
seriously. If two jobs are indeed comparable in terms of skill ("the 
easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expence of learning them"), 
responsibility ("the small or great trust which must be reposed..."), 
effort and working conditions ("agreeableness or disagreeableness," 
etc.) but pay very different wages, can the wage differential really be 
said to be simply "compensating," i.e., justifiable? If, in addition, the 
wage differential is related to sex, can an inference of sex discrimination 
reasonably be ignored? Comparable worth advocates emphatically an 
swer both questions in the negative; in the remainder of this chapter, I 
consider these issues in detail.
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2.2 Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination
Much of the motivation for comparable worth is related to women©s 
disadvantage in the labor market. For example, advocates frequently 
cite the sizeable pay gap the fact that, on average, year-round full time 
women workers make less than 70 percent of what men make and note 
that, as shown in table 2.1, it has changed relatively little in the past 30 
years or so, despite adoption of major antidiscrimination laws and 
programs. 17
Beyond the relative stability of the pay gap, some of the most striking 
stylized facts about women©s disadvantage in the labor market are the 
following:
(1) Unequal pay for equal work. Women typically earn less than men in 
the same job or occupational category (e.g., teacher), even when 
other things (education, years of work experience, etc.) are the same. 
(See, for example, Ashenfelter and Pencavel 1976.)
(2) Unequal access to better work. Relative to men, women are more 
likely to work in lower paid jobs or occupations (e.g., clerical as 
opposed to managerial), even when other things are the same. (See, 
for example, Malkiel and Malkiel 1973.)
(3) "Femaleness" associated with low pay. On average and other things 
remaining the same, "overrepresentation" of women in a job or 
occupational category the more "female" it is is associated with 
lower pay in that occupation, on average, for all employees (men and 
women) taken together. (See, for example, Treiman and Hartmann, 
eds. 1981, esp. chapter 2.)
(4) "Femaleness" more strongly associated with low pay for men than for 
women. On average and other things remaining the same, "overrepre 
sentation" of women in a job or occupational category appears to be 
associated with greater wage differentials among men than among 
women: pay is lower in predominantly female jobs than in predomi 
nantly male jobs for both women and men; but the negative effect on 
pay of being in such jobs is greater for men than it is for women. (See, 
for example, Roos 1981; Johnson and Solon 1986.)
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series 
P-60 (money income of families and persons in the United States), various issues. All figures refer 
to median earnings of year-round full-time workers. For 1956-66, "earnings" includes wage and 
salary earnings only; for 1967-87, "earnings" is "total money earnings," including earnings from 
self-employment as well as wage and salary earnings. For 1956-78, figures refer to persons age 14 
and older; for 1979-87, figures refer to persons age 15 and older.
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Figure 2.1 Discrimination
©If 0 \
Advocates of comparable worth usually argue that such patterns are 
caused by labor market discrimination, and that comparable worth can 
offset them.
Can labor market discrimination account for the stylized facts just 
noted? Are patterns of this kind due exclusively to labor market discrimi 
nation? To address these and similar issues, it is useful to consider a 
simple model of an economy with two jobs: a high-wage job, //, and a 
low-wage job, L. 18 To focus initially on questions about labor market 
discrimination, suppose to begin with that, on average, men and women 
are equally productive at, and equally interested in doing, either kind of 
job. 19 In the absence of labor market discrimination, relative demands 
and supplies for these jobs will appear as shown in figure 2.1.
In figure 2.1, W is the wage paid to workers in a j ob (either H or L) and 
JVis the number of workers in a job. Thus, WH/W^ is the relative wage
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(i.e., the wage in H relative to that in L), with W^IW^ > 1 to reflect the 
fact that His the high-wage job; and NH/NL is relative employment (i.e., 
employment in H relative to that in L).
Now consider relative supplies and demands in this market. Employer 
relative demands are downward-sloping: if//must be paid a high wage 
(relative to L), less //will be employed (relative to L). 20 It is equivalent, 
but, particularly in terms of what follows, much more helpful to think of 
the aggregate relative demand curve D0 as indicating the (aggregate) 
relative wage employers are willing to pay at different (aggregate) 
relative employment levels: if employment in His high relative to that in 
L, then productivity of H relative to L would be low and so employers 
would be willing to pay only a low wage for H relative to L. The 
aggregate supply curve 50 slopes upward: to raise the aggregate number 
of workers wanting to work in //(relative to L), it would be necessary to 
raise pay in H relative to that in L. 21
In figure 2.1, equilibrium occurs (aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand are equal) at the aggregate relative wage w0 , at which point 
aggregate relative employment is «0 . The quantities w0 and n0 refer to 
the overall average wage (of men and women combined) and to total 
employment (of men and women combined), respectively. What does 
this equilibrium imply for men and women, considered separately?
As regards demand, note first that, by assumption, there is no labor 
market discrimination. Thus, the relative wage will be w0 not only in the 
aggregate but also for each sex group: in other words, in the absence of 
discrimination, the relative wage W^IW^ that employers are willing to 
pay to women at a given aggregate relative employment level NH/N^ is 
the same as the relative wage they are willing to pay men at the same 
aggregate relative employment level. In this "offered wage schedule" 
sense, D0 is not only the aggregate relative demand curve but also the 
relative demand curve for both men and women; note that for both men 
and women as well as in the aggregate, offered (relative) wages as given 
by D0 depend on aggregate relative employment.
As regards supply, note that, by assumption, men and women have 
identical qualifications and interests, on average. 22 At any given relative 
wage, then, male and female relative supplies would be the same. In this
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sense, S0 is not only the aggregate relative supply schedule (showing 
aggregate relative supply forthcoming at a given relative wage), but also 
the relative supply schedule of each sex group (showing relative supply 
of that group forthcoming at a given relative wage).
It follows that, in the nondiscriminatory equilibrium e0 , relative 
wages will be vv0 and relative employment will be n0 not only in the 
aggregate but also for each sex group. Hence, under the conditions 
depicted in figure 2.1, women and men will receive the same wage 
within a given job (H or L); will receive the same relative wage 
w= WH/W^ and have the same relative employment levels; and so will be 
represented to the same extent in both jobs (e.g., the proportion female 
will be the same in H as it is in L).
To determine the effects of labor market discrimination, first consider 
demand. To introduce discrimination, assume that employers favor men 
in filling the high-wage job H in the sense that, at given wages, employer 
demand for male workers in //exceeds that for female workers. Equiv- 
alently, assume that employers are now willing to pay a higher wage to 
men in job //than to women in the same job. Then although the (relative) 
demand curve for women is still D0 =Dlf, the demand curve for men is 
now D lm , where the vertical distance between the two curves, d, 
indicates the relative wage premium employers now are willing to give 
men in //.
It is important to note that, even in the presence of discrimination, 
employer demand for persons of a given sex still depends only on 
aggregate relative employment (exactly as in the nondiscriminatory 
labor market just discussed). This is because, in a simple discriminatory 
two-job labor market of the kind described here, the relative wage a firm 
is willing to offer a worker depends on only two things: his or her sex, 
and the relative marginal productivity of the job he or she is doing. The 
latter depends only on aggregate relative employment (of men and 
women combined) in the two jobs, not on relative employment of 
persons of either sex. It follows that, at any given aggregate relative 
employment level, employers still are willing to pay relative wages to 
women as they used to; but that at the same aggregate relative employ 
ment level, employers are now willing to pay higher relative wages to
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men. The aggregate relative demand (or "wage offer") schedule (for 
men and women combined) must therefore lie in between the schedules 
D lm and D lf ; it is shown as D,. Note that the new aggregate relative 
demand or wage offer schedule £>,, like both the old one D0 and the new 
sex-specific ones £> ls , s = m or f, shows the relative wages that employ 
ers are willing to offer workers (overall, or of a specific sex) at a given 
aggregate relative employment level.
As in the nondiscriminatory case, the aggregate supply schedule 
(showing the aggregate relative wage necessary to elicit each aggregate 
relative supply level) is still 50 , and, in the absence of any sex difference 
in job qualifications or job preferences, the relative supply schedule of 
each sex (showing the relative wage necessary to elicit each relative 
supply level for that sex) is identical to S0 . Equilibrium occurs where 
aggregate supply 5, ( = 50) equals aggregate demand £>,, at the new 
aggregate equilibrium relative wage rate w } and aggregate relative 
employment level n { .
To work out wage and employment levels for men and women in this 
discriminatory equilibrium, note that, in equilibrium, 23 (1) men in H 
must receive a relative wage premium of d, and (2) relative supply for 
each sex group is set by the relative wage received by that sex group, 
subject to the condition that aggregate demand must also equal aggre 
gate supply. The discriminatory equilibrium entails aggregate relative 
employment of n^ ; by definition of the wage offer or demand curves for 
each sex, at this aggregate relative employment level employers are 
willing to pay relative wages of w lf and w]m to women and men, 
respectively, with w lm  w lf=d>0 (the vertical distance between D lm 
and D If), as required for equilibrium. Since the supply schedules of 
both groups (giving their relative supplies at different relative wages) are 
given by 5,, it follows that, at these equilibrium wages wlf and w lm , the 
relative supplies (and, thus, relative employment levels) of women and 
men are rc lf and n lm , respectively. (Note also that, since aggregate 
demand must equal aggregate supply at the equilibrium aggregate wage, 
appropriately weighted sums of sex-specific wage rates and employ 
ment levels must equal the aggregate wage and the aggregate employ 
ment level, respectively.)
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Thus, compared with a nondiscriminatory setting, discrimination 
favoring men in the high-wage job H entails lower (higher) relative 
wages and employment levels for women (men): w, f < w0 < w, m and n , f 
<«0 <tt, m . Intuitively, employer preference for men in the high-wage 
job raises the demand for men and reduces the demand for women in that 
job; this leads to a male/female pay gap within the high-wage job, 
greater representation of men in that job, and a greater difference in pay 
for men than for women between the high-wage job and the low-wage 
job. On the other hand, since women now find it harder to be employed 
in the high-wage job, they crowd into the low-wage job, reducing the 
wage there (Bergmann 1971; Edgeworth 1922).
Since d> 0 (i.e., employers favor men in the high-wage job), there is 
unequal pay for equal work: the only way women can get a high-wage 
job is by working for less in that job than do men. Since n lf < n lm , there 
is unequal access to better work: women are underrepresented (relative 
to men) in the high-wage job, H; equivalently, the proportion female is 
smaller among high-wage workers than among low-wage workers. This 
also means that the higher the proportion female, the lower the (overall) 
rate of pay in a job: the "femaleness" of jobs is negatively related to wage 
rates. Finally, since w lf < w lm , pay differentials among jobs are smaller 
among women than among men: the relation between pay and 
"femaleness" of jobs is stronger for men than it is for women. In sum, the 
simple model of labor market discrimination illustrated in figure 2.1 can 
account for all of the "stylized facts" about women©s labor market 
disadvantage discussed earlier in this chapter.
Is such discrimination the only source of the pay and employment 
differences shown in figure 2.1, however? Having examined demand- 
side causes (i.e., employer discrimination), it is natural to consider 
supply-side causes (e.g., sex differences in job preferences and/or job 
qualifications) as well. Figure 2.2 reproduces the original aggregate 
demand and supply curves (D0 and 50 , respectively) of the initial 
nondiscriminatory setting. Now suppose that employers do not discrim 
inate (in the sense used in discussing figure 2.1) but that for any of a 
variety of reasons differential socialization, sexual role differentiation, 
unequal access to education-women prefer and/or are better qualified
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for job L than are men. In this case, the relative supply of women to job 
H will be lower, at any given relative wage, than that of men. Thus the 
female relative supply curve now becomes 5lf, whereas the male rela 
tive supply curve remains at 50 =5lm .
The overall or aggregate supply curve Sl is now a kind of average of 
the female and male relative supply curves. 24 In the absence of labor 
market discrimination, the overall or aggregate demand curve is un 
changed and is the same for both men and women. As before, equi 
librium requires that aggregate demand equal aggregate supply. This 
occurs at the aggregate relative wage wl and aggregate relative employ 
ment level «,. Since employers do not discriminate, equilibrium also 
requires that both men and women receive the same relative wage, i.e., 
w l . Supplies of the two sex groups at this common relative wage may 
then be determined from their relative supply schedules, 5lf and S]m : at
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w,, women supply rc lf, less than the male relative supply of n lm at the 
same relative wage (w,). 25
Intuitively, the now-greater preference of women for the low-wage job 
(or their now-lower qualifications for the high-wage job) reduces aggre 
gate supply to the high-wage job, raising the relative wage (of /f to L), 
w, and reducing relative employment (in H relative to L), n. Thus, in 
equilibrium, there is "equal pay for equal work" and the pay differential 
between the two jobs (that is, the relative wage, w,) is the same for both 
men and women. Overall, however, there is (1) a male female pay gap, 
(2) the appearance of unequal access to better work-women are under- 
represented in the high-wage job (n , f < n , m) - and (3) a negative relation 
between "femaleness" of jobs and their pay.
2.3 Pay Differentials for Jobs of Comparable Worth
The preceding analysis suggests that a negative relation between 
"femaleness of job" and pay may not be due to labor market discrimina 
tion. I now consider a related question: will a nondiscriminatory labor 
market generate equal pay for jobs of comparable worth? I first present 
some general analytic results, and then turn to some examples involving 
specific jobs.
General analytics
To analyze the question of whether there will be equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth in the absence of discrimination, it is helpful to 
analyze the question of market supply to different occupations (e.g., the 
relative supply schedule S of figures 2.1-2.2) in more detail.
Consider a labor market with two jobs, A and B. As implied earlier 
(see especially note 21), it would be surprising if literally every worker 
viewed these two jobs in precisely the same way. Worker preferences for 
the two jobs may be summarized by a preference distribution such as the 
one shown in figure 2.3. The height of the preference curve at any given 
relative wage w— WA/WB shows the proportion (more precisely, proba-
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bility density) of workers who are indifferent between A and B at that 
relative wage; the area underneath the curve and to the left of any given 
relative wage w shows the proportion who prefer A to B at that relative 
wage. Clearly, the higher the relative wage (that is, the higher the wage 
in A relative to that in B), the greater the proportion of workers who 
prefer A to B; but even at very high relative wages, some workers still 
prefer the lower-paying job, B, to the higher-paying job A.
To highlight the nature of comparable worth job analyses, assume that 
(1) a job evaluation has found that the two jobs, A and B, are comparable 
in terms of a composite of skill, effort, responsibility and working 
conditions; and that (2) this evaluation is in fact congruent with worker 
preferences, in the sense that if pay were the same in both jobs, the 
average or "representative" worker would in fact be indifferent between 
them. This means that the median worker is indifferent between the two
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jobs at a relative wage of unity; and that at this point, half the workers 
prefer A whereas the other half prefer B.
Now consider the relative supply curve under these assumptions. 
Relative supply (i.e., n=NA/NB , the number desiring to do A relative to 
those desiring to do B at any given relative wage w= WA/WB) is positive- 
sloped: the higher the A wage is relative to B, the larger the number of 
workers who want to do A relative to those preferring B. Since the 
representative (more precisely, median) worker is indifferent between 
the two jobs at a relative wage of 1, the relative supply curve also passes 
through the point (1, 1).
Although (by assumption) the jobs are comparable in terms of both 
the job evaluation and the representative worker©s preferences, it is 
nevertheless not possible to say anything about either relative wages or 
relative employment in the absence of information about the relative 
demand curve. In particular, suppose that employers do not discriminate 
and that technology and product market conditions are such as to entail 
high demand for A relative to B, with demand curve DH as shown in 
figure 2.4. Then equilibrium will occur at eH with relative wage WH and 
relative employment «H . On the other hand, if demand for A relative to B 
is low, as with demand curve DL in figure 2.4, then, even in the absence 
of employer discrimination, equilibrium will occur at e^ with a lower 
relative wage WL and a lower relative employment «L .
In sum, even though (by assumption) the two jobs are comparable, 
they will not necessarily pay the same wage, even in the absence of 
employer discrimination. In general, there will be "equal pay for work 
of equal value" (i.e., for jobs of comparable worth, A and B) only if the 
demand curve (whose shape depends on technology, product market 
conditions, etc.) as well as the supply curve passes through the point
(1,1).
The one exception to this general rule highlights the key assumption 
implicit in comparable worth: the case in which all workers have 
identical job preferences. In this case, the preference distribution of 
figure 2.3 collapses to a vertical straight line and the relative supply 
function of figure 2.4 collapses to a horizontal straight line. For exam 
ple, if all workers regard the two jobs as comparable, the preference
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distribution of figure 2.3 would be a vertical straight line intersecting the 
w axis at w=l, and the relative supply schedule would become a 
horizontal straight line intersecting the w axis of figure 2.3 at w=l. 
Similarly, if all workers would be indifferent between the two jobs if A 
paid 10 percent more than B, and would all prefers! (B) if A paid a wage 
that was more (less) than 10 percent above the B wage, then the 
preference distribution and relative supply schedule would again be 
straight lines, intersecting the w axis at w= 1.10.
In cases such as these, in which preferences are homogeneous, the 
wage differential between the two jobs is purely supply-determined and 
the position of the relative demand curve (whether demand is as depicted 
by DL or DH in figure 2.4) is irrelevant: the relative supply schedule 
alone is sufficient to determine equilibrium relative wages. The diffi 
culty with this as a justification for comparable worth is that it is only
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under the special condition of identical worker preferences that even a 
nondiscriminatory labor market would generate equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth. 26 In the more general case, in which worker prefer 
ences are heterogeneous, relative wages are both supply- and demand- 
determined; the relative supply schedule alone is not sufficient to deter 
mine relative wages; and there is no basis for expecting equal pay for 
jobs of comparable worth, even if employers do not discriminate.
Of course, nothing in this discussion of figures 2.3-4 can explain the 
"stylized fact" of a negative relation between "femaleness" of jobs and 
pay. That is, however, merely because figure 2.3 assumes that, although 
different individuals have different job preferences, there are no sex- 
related differences in job preferences (recall note 22). Allowing for sex- 
related differences in job preferences would entail not one but rather two 
preference distributions in figure 2.3, and would lead directly back to 
the discussion of figure 2.2, i.e., to a negative relation between 
"femaleness" of jobs and the pay of jobs  even those of "comparable 
worth." It should be noted that the term "job preferences" has no 
normative implications here: for present purposes, it does not matter 
whether sex differences in job preferences are inherent and biological, 
or culturally imposed. All that matters is that they be independent of 
employer behavior that, for whatever reasons (sexual role differentia 
tion, cultural stereotyping or anything else) other than employer ac 
tions, women are more likely to seek the low-paying job L at a given 
relative wage than are otherwise identical men. In sum, a central 
analytical difficulty with comparable worth is that it ignores the impor 
tance of heterogeneity in job preferences in general, and the importance 
of sex-related differences in job preferences in particular.
Adam Smith©s comments on butchers© wages provide an instructive 
example of the importance of heterogeneous tastes in generating wage 
differences (and of why equal pay for jobs of comparable worth need not 
arise, even in the absence of discrimination, when job preferences are 
heterogeneous). As noted earlier, Smith©s discussion of wage differen 
tials includes all of the factors considered in job evaluations, and 
suggests (inter alia) that "dishonourable" or "disagreeable" work will 
tend to be better paid than other kinds of work, other things (e.g., skill
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and effort requirements) being equal. As a case in point, Smith re 
marked that the trade of butcher was a "brutal and odious business," and 
suggested that the disagreeableness of butchering explained why butch 
ers© pay exceeded that of many other "common trades" (1937, p. 100). 
As modern writers have pointed out, however, this reasoning tacitly 
assumes that preferences are homogeneous and, in particular, that all 
would-be butchers in eighteenth century Britain shared Smith©s fastidi 
ous tastes. In the more general case of heterogeneous preferences, a 
wage differential favoring butchers need not arise even if large numbers 
of persons find the notion of butchering unpleasant. As Rees (1976, p. 
340) notes, if enough people have no strong feelings about or actually 
enjoy butchering, "it would then clearly be possible to fill all positions 
for butchers without any compensating wage differential."27
Another example is provided not by Adam but rather by Sharon Smith 
(cited in Gold 1983, pp. 43-44). Consider an employer with only two 
jobs: French-English translator, and Spanish-English translator. A pri 
ori, it would seem that neither job involves more skill, effort or responsi 
bility than the other; and they would presumably entail the same work 
ing conditions. The jobs would therefore be determined to be 
comparable and, hence, to merit the same pay. If the French translators 
were predominantly male and better paid than the Spanish translators 
who, let us suppose, are predominantly female, is this not convincing 
evidence of discrimination? Perhaps, but now add one more "fact" to this 
hypothetical example, says Smith: suppose the employer in question is 
located in Miami. Is there still any reason to suppose that, (even) if the 
firm does not discriminate, it would necessarily pay the two groups of 
translators the same wage? Clearly not.
Indeed, it is not even possible to say, a priori, which of the two jobs 
would be better paid. True, many Spanish-speaking persons live in the 
Miami area, which would presumably raise the relative supply and 
reduce the relative wage of the Spanish translators; but Miami is also a 
center of U.S.-Latin American commerce, which would presumably 
raise both the relative demand for and the relative wage of the Spanish 
translators. Even under the assumption of no labor market discrimina 
tion, there is no obvious basis for saying which one of these two forces
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will be stronger or, therefore, for determining whether, on balance, the 
wage of the Spanish translators will exceed or be lower than that of the 
French translators. 28
The essential point of the butchers and translators examples is that 
wage determination need not entail equal pay for jobs of "comparable 
worth" even in the absence of discrimination. In response, a number of 
writers have criticized the notion, embodied in figures 2.1-2.4, that 
supply and demand determine wage rates. For example, Weiler (1986, 
p. 1723, n. 133) argues that "no simple logic of supply and demand... 
explains the operation of the labor market; rather, the labor market is 
shaped by a complex, often counterintuitive set of principles...." 
Similarly, some writers note that real-world labor markets are charac 
terized by such phenomena as implicit or explicit long-term employ 
ment contracts, unions, and segmented labor markets. 29 The fact that 
real-world labor markets are complex, however, is clearly not sufficient 
to establish that such markets would generate equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth in the absence of discrimination. 30 Moreover, if even 
the simple nondiscriminatory labor market depicted here does not entail 
equal pay for jobs of comparable worth, that hardly supports the claim 
that the more complex labor markets of the real world would do so 
absent discrimination.
A final argument, developed by Aldrich and Buchele (1986, esp. pp. 
77-79, 112), amounts to a reformulation of the comparable worth 
principle. They argue that a nondiscriminatory market ought to entail 
the same marginal return (in terms of additional pay) to productivity- 
related characteristics (e.g., education or training) in all jobs, whether 
predominantly female, predominantly male or "mixed." This refor 
mulation of comparable worth, however, like the original version, is 
valid only under rather special conditions. 31 As one example, provided 
by Ronald G. Ehrenberg, note that there is no obvious reason why the 
marginal return to either education or physical strength should be the 
same in both secretarial work and stevedoring even in a non- 
discriminatory labor market.
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Some specific examples
Some readers may have little difficulty accepting this section©s general 
analytic discussion of the conceptual flaws inherent in comparable 
worth. Since tastes are heterogeneous, however, other readers may find 
some specific examples of interest. For this purpose, the findings of 
Raisian et al. (1985, esp. pp. 75-88; 1988) are particularly instructive.
Raisian et al. focus on job "scores" developed by the National Re 
search Council©s Committee on Occupational Classification and Analy 
sis (Miller et al., eds. 1980, esp. appendix F) for most of the "detailed" 
or three-digit occupational categories developed by the U.S. Census 
with respect to four factors: substantive complexity; motor skills; phys 
ical demands; and undesirable working conditions. 32 For selected jobs, 
Raisian et al. tabulated not only these scores but also the average hourly 
wage and proportion of employment that is female; their results appear 
in table 2.2.
Since many comparable worth job evaluations consider jobs© total 
point scores, it is interesting to consider, first, jobs that have the same 
total number of points under the Committee©s methodology. Such jobs 
are at least arguably "of comparable worth" according to the total point 
scores generated by the Committee©s procedures. Those jobs, however, 
sometimes make strange bedfellows. For example, the Census occupa 
tion categories of Physician (Census three-digit code 065), Athlete 
(code 180) and Roofer (code 534) each received a total score of 19.6 
points, even though their hourly wage rates were between $6.48 and 
$15.88 as of 1981. Similarly, the following two jobs both received a total 
point score of 10.9 and, thus, would presumably be deemed "compara 
bly worthy": University teacher (code 140) and Dishwasher (code 913). 
Gardeners (code 755) and Computer programmers (code 003) both 
received a total point score of 12.0, and so are presumably also of 
comparable worth. Likewise, Garbage collectors (code 754) received 
0.1 more points than, and so are presumably worth at least as much as, 
Real estate agents (code 270).
The basic reason why quite different jobs such as these can neverthe-




























































































































































































Elementary school teachers (142)




Sales managers  non-retail (233)
Public administrators NEC (222)
Misc. operatives (694)
Machine operatives NS (692)
Operatives NS (695)
Typists (391)
Examiners and inspectors  manufacturing (610)
Garbage collectors (754)
Real estate agents (270)
Textile operatives  spinners (672)
Sales clerks -retail (283)
Mail superintendents (224)





























































































































































Notes: "Points" components are substantive complexity, motor skills, physical demands and undesirable working conditions. NEC = "not elsewhere 
classified"; NS = "not specified." "Percent female" refers to proportion of workers in the occupation as of 1982 who were female. "Wage per hour" refers to 
mean, for workers in the occupation, of ratio of 1981 earnings to product of weeks worked in 1981 and usual hours worked per week.
Sources: Raisian et al. (1984, Table 24, pp. 82-83; 1988, Tables 8.3-4, pp. 190-191).
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less receive the same total point score is simple: low (or high) scores on 
some factors, e.g., "substantive complexity," are offset by high (or low) 
scores on others, e.g., "undesirable working conditions." Many actual 
attempts to implement "equal pay for work of equal value" (including 
those in Minnesota and San Jose, described in chapters 4 and 5, respec 
tively) have been based on this use of total, unweighted point scores. As 
this review of table 2.2 suggests, however, some rather dubious conclu 
sions follow when "worth" of jobs is defined in this way.
Of course, one might argue contrary to the approach adopted in 
several attempts actually to implement comparable worth that the 
points awarded for different job attributes should not all be given equal 
weight: that, say, points awarded for undesirable working conditions 
should receive only half the weight given to points for substantive 
complexity. This leaves plenty of room for argument about (and no 
objective basis for resolving) the question of what the weights should 
actually be. Indeed, Evans and Nelson (1989, p. 57) note that both male 
and female workers have criticized some a priori evaluation systems for 
giving insufficient weight to working conditions. Likewise, Orazem and 
Mattila (1989, p. 180) report that, in conducting its a priori evaluation 
of state government jobs, Iowa changed the factor weights twice after 
examining the impact on the final results.
Although the "strange bedfellows" problem in the Committee©s total 
point scores is partly a consequence of weighting, the problem persists 
even when one considers jobs that score the same in terms of each of the 
four factors developed by the Committee.
For example, Bank tellers (Census code 301), Medical secretaries 
(code 371), Legal secretaries (code 370) and Secretaries NEC (code 
372) have nearly identical point scores for all four attributes. Under a 
comparable worth standard, they would almost certainly be deemed 
"comparably worthy." Yet Bank tellers (at 89.9 percent female, the "least 
female" of the four) received an average of $4.98 per hour in 1981, about 
23 percent less than pay of Legal secretaries (virtually all of whom are 
female). Machine operatives (code 692), Miscellaneous operatives 
(code 694) and Operatives NS (code 695) are all about 38 percent 
female, and all received identical scores in terms of each of the four
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factors derived by the Committee. Although they would therefore be 
deemed comparably worthy, average pay in these jobs in 1981 ranged 
from $6.32 to $7.18 per hour. Similarly, Sales representatives whole 
sale (Census code 282) and Teacher aides (code 382) differ by only 0.1 
of a point in terms of substantive complexity, motor skills and physical 
demands, and are identical in terms of undesirable working conditions. 
Yet average hourly earnings of Sales representatives are more than twice 
those of Teacher aides.
A final set of comparisons concerns jobs that at least in terms of the 
Committee©s evaluation are unambiguously superior or inferior to oth 
ers. Carpenters (Census code 415) received more points than Sales 
representatives wholesale (code 282) for each of the four factors 
considered by the Committee. Thus, Carpenters (less than 2 percent of 
whom are female) are presumably of greater "worth" than Sales repre 
sentatives (over 16 percent of whom are women), yet the latter are in fact 
paid 25 percent more than the former. Likewise, Electricians (code 430) 
receive at least as many points for each of the four factors as do Mail 
superintendents (code 224), and so are presumably of greater "worth." 
Yet the average hourly wage of Electricians (less than 3 percent of whom 
are female) was about 12 percent lower than that of Mail superintendents 
(30 percent of whom are women).
The somewhat dubious comparisons highlighted in table 2.2 cannot 
easily be dismissed. The point scores used in these comparisons are not 
the product of the political infighting and log-rolling that seem to 
characterize real-world attempts to evaluate jobs, or of the limited 
expertise of a single researcher. Rather, they came from an extensive and 
thorough analysis undertaken by a committee of the National Research 
Council. True, one could argue that "outliers" and anomalies crop up in 
any study, no matter how sophisticated. This, however, misses a crucial 
point. The purpose of the National Research Council©s study was to 
measure the "worth" of different jobs. The anomalies and outliers 
produced by this analysis suggest not only that the "worth" of particular 
occupations can be seriously mismeasured, but also that the very notion 
of measuring the "worth" of individual jobs is suspect.
These doubts are reinforced when one asks whether the "job worth"
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factors identified by the National Research Council©s committee (which 
are similar to those used in actual attempts to implement comparable 
worth) are related to jobs© pay. This frames the question in a way that is 
particularly favorable to comparable worth. One now asks not whether 
the factors accurately reflect the worth of individual jobs, but, rather, 
whether, on average, the factors are related to the "worth" of jobs as 
reflected in their pay. Even the answer to this general question is 
equivocal at best. In their regression analysis of 499 wage and salary 
occupations based on 1970 Census data, Hartmann et al. (1980) found 
that neither "physical demands" nor "undesirable working conditions" 
were statistically significantly related to pay of jobs at conventional test 
levels. Similarly, Raisian et al. (1988) performed a regression analysis 
of 247 occupations using 1982 Current Population Survey data, and 
found that of the four factors considered by the National Research 
Council©s committee, only one ("substantive complexity") was statis 
tically significantly related to jobs© pay at conventional test levels. 33
Other studies find a similar (absence of) pattern. For example, 
Pierson et al. (1984, esp. pp. 130-131) derived scores for nine factors 
(cognitive judgment, people orientation, complexity, physical demands, 
machine tending, working conditions, word and paper processing, and 
reading and listening) and regressed pay of individuals in both predomi 
nantly male and predominantly female jobs on their jobs© scores for 
these factors. Working conditions, word and paper processing, and 
reading and listening were not statistically significantly related to re 
ported wages in the regression for incumbents of either female or male 
jobs; in addition, physical demands were not statistically significant in 
the regression for persons in female jobs.
Similarly, Ehrenberg and Smith (1987b, esp. pp. 256, 260, 264) 
analyzed pay rates in relation to job evaluation scores for limited sets of 
jobs in state employment in Minnesota, Washington State and Connecti 
cut. For Minnesota (which awards points to jobs for know-how, problem 
solving, accountability and working conditions using the Hay system), 
monthly maximum salary of predominantly male jobs was statistically 
significantly related only to know-how points, whereas pay of predomi 
nantly female jobs was not significantly related to points for either
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problem solving or accountability. For Washington State (which awards 
points for knowledge and skill, mental demands, accountability and 
working conditions using the Willis system), minimum salary of male 
jobs was not significantly related at conventional test levels to any of the 
four factors, and minimum salary for female jobs was significantly 
related at conventional levels only to knowledge and skill points. For 
Connecticut (which also used the Willis system), annual salary of male 
jobs was not significantly related to mental demands or accountability, 
whereas for female jobs pay was significantly related only to knowledge 
and skill points.
2.4 Consequences of Adopting Comparable Worth
The argument thus far may be summed up as follows: Supply-side 
factors (societal discrimination, sexual role differentiation, etc.) as well 
as demand-side employer discrimination can lead to a concentration of 
women in low-paid jobs; jobs of comparable worth would not neces 
sarily receive the same pay even if employers did not discriminate. 
Thus, concentration of women in low-paid jobs is not necessarily evi 
dence of employer discrimination; and equal pay for jobs of comparable 
worth is not necessarily an appropriate standard for evaluating pay 
differences among jobs. Contrary to what some of its proponents assert 
(see, e.g., note 38 below), equal pay for jobs of comparable worth is not 
necessarily fair, and unequal pay for jobs of comparable worth is not 
inherently discriminatory.
Thus, comparable worth does not provide useful information about 
discrimination. Likewise, neither the bias-free approach (favored by 
most proponents) nor the policy-capturing approach (favored by Ferber 
1986, pp. 273-274) to job evaluation provides meaningful information 
on what wages would be, or should be, in the absence of discrimination: 
even if one could be certain that concentration of women in low-wage 
jobs were a result of discrimination rather than supply-side factors, and 
even if the low-wage jobs received the same number of evaluation points 
as higher-paid predominantly male jobs, it would not necessarily follow
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that the two sets of jobs would receive the same rate of pay in the absence 
of discrimination, or that rates of pay for the two sets of jobs should be 
equalized. "Job worth," as measured by a job evaluation, is unlikely to 
provide a meaningful guide to what jobs would be paid in the absence of 
discrimination, and may well be seriously misleading.
From an economic standpoint, then, the basic concepts underlying 
comparable worth are flawed. To some advocates of comparable worth, 
however, all this is, ultimately, beside the point. The empirical evidence 
(discussed in chapter 3) suggests clearly that discrimination by employ 
ers is responsible for a significant part of the male/female pay gap, even 
though supply-side factors, including societal discrimination, are not 
unimportant. Moreover, societal discrimination is discrimination too. 
Thus, even if literal adherence to a policy of equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth is unwarranted, increases in pay for low-wage pre 
dominantly female jobs moving pay in such jobs closer to levels 
prevailing in higher-wage but comparable (and predominantly male) 
jobs  will complement conventional antidiscrimination measures (e.g., 
equal opportunity and affirmative action laws), help close the pay gap 
and help redress some of the effects of societal as well as employer 
discrimination. In this view, the ultimate test of comparable worth is a 
pragmatic one: can it deliver the goods? Can it raise women©s pay and 
close the male/female pay gap without serious adverse side effects?
The obvious difficulty here is that, precisely to the extent that it raises 
pay in predominantly female jobs, comparable worth will make it more 
expensive to employ workers (male or female) in such jobs without, 
however, creating additional employment opportunities in either those 
or other occupations. As with increases in the minimum wage, there will 
be winners from comparable worth wage increases, but there will also 
be losers.
To work out the effects of comparable worth wage increases in detail, 
consider the simple two-job model discussed earlier. A wage increase 
for the low-wage job, L, imposed pursuant to comparable worth will 
reduce the pay differential between it and the high-wage job, H. Thus, it 
reduces total employment (and employment of men and of women, 
considered separately) in L. It does so for two reasons: a substitution
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effect, and a scale effect. First, since L labor is now more expensive, 
employers have less reason to use it in place of H labor in situations 
where the two can be substituted, so employment of L falls for this 
reason. 34 Second, the rise in labor costs causes the employer©s scale of 
operations to contract, leading to further declines in the demand for L 
labor. 35
The comparable worth wage increase for L will also affect both wages 
and employment in the high-wage job, H, but here the outcomes cannot 
readily be determined. The substitution effect increases demand for H to 
the extent that it is possible to use H workers in place of the now more 
expensive L workers (although, as indicated in note 34, this effect may 
be small or even zero if the H and L jobs are truly different). On the other 
hand, since the scale effect causes the entire scale of operations to 
contract, it reduces demand for H as well as L. Thus the net effect on H 
employment depends on which of the two effects is stronger. Unless the 
two jobs can easily be substituted, however, demand for H will fall on 
balance.
This decrease in demand for H tends to reduce the wage of H labor. 
On the other hand, some workers will be attracted towards L and away 
from H due to the rise in the L wage, 36 so supply to H is reduced; that 
tends to raise the wage in H. Thus, the net effect on pay in //depends on 
whether the effect of the reduction in supply to H exceeds that of the 
reduced demand for //.
In sum, requiring comparable worth wage increases for predomi 
nantly female jobs is akin to putting a tax on employment in such jobs: it 
makes it more expensive to employ predominantly female labor. How 
ever, there is a major difference between an employment tax and a 
comparable worth wage increase: under comparable worth, the "reve 
nues" from the "tax increase" go not to the Treasury but, rather, to those 
workers in predominantly female jobs who are able to remain employed 
after the "tax" takes effect. 37
Thus, there will be both "winners" and "losers" from comparable 
worth wage increases. Relative to what would prevail in the absence of 
such increases, some workers in predominantly female jobs will enjoy 
higher wages, but others will be unemployed. Depending on one©s point
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of view and in the absence of conceptual objections such as the ones 
discussed above, the merits of comparable worth depend on demand 
elasticities, i.e., on whether the gains from higher wages are enough to 
offset the losses from reduced employment. 38
To some extent, then, the case for or against comparable worth 
depends on empirical questions: How much of the pay gap is demand- 
side rather than supply-side in origin? Would comparable worth pay 
adjustments lead to large employment losses, or would they have only 
modest effects on employment? I discuss these questions in the next 
chapter.
NOTES
1 Since some noneconomists (and, for that matter, some economists) misunderstand the 
meaning of the terms "supply" and "demand," I want to emphasize at the outset that, at least at the 
present level of generality, there is not much analytical content, and literally no normative 
significance, in the concept of "wage determination by supply and demand." Employer demand for 
labor may be affected by many factors (e.g., discriminatory attitudes towards prospective employ 
ees, the wage required, collusion with other employers, the likely impact on sales revenues), and so 
can the supply of labor (which may be affected by, e.g., trade unions, the wage offered, cultural 
norms, and sexual or other kinds of role differentiation). Thus, at the present level of generality, 
reference to supply and demand simply summarizes the potentially quite lengthy list of motives 
underlying the decisions of the two sides of labor market transactions, i.e., firms and workers. (In 
particular, the notion of wage determination by supply and demand does not entail any assumption 
that labor market transactions are free from coercion, that both sides of such transactions enjoy 
complete information, etc.) Hence, the statement that wages are "determined by supply and 
demand" has literally no normative significance: given the lengthy list of factors (just noted) that 
could in principle affect supply and demand, it is clear that the process of wage determination by 
supply and demand may entail outcomes that, at least in the eyes of some, are clearly unjust and 
inequitable. Indeed, in the most general sense, comparable worth is an attempt to determine 
whether the result of wage determination by supplies and demands is in fact unjust or inequitable.
2 This definition focuses on one particular motive underlying employers© demand for labor (the 
effect of employing labor on production, and hence on sales and profits) and ignores others (e.g., 
discriminatory motives towards potential workers, collusion between employers, etc.); I say more 
about this below. One technical point about this definition is that it measures the "worth" of jobs in 
real terms (i.e., in terms of jobs© marginal productivities), and so would entail a comparison 
between job worth and the real wage (i.e., the ratio of the money wage to the product price) paid for 
that job. An alternative definition with the same substantive meaning would measure the "worth" of 
jobs in nominal terms (i.e., the dollar value of the jobs© contribution to output, or "marginal revenue 
product" in economic jargon), which entails a comparison between job worth and the money 
("nominal") wage per se.
3 Indeed, some discussionsy?m define "comparable" to mean, "of equal value to the employer,"
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and then assert that, as a practical matter, "comparable" would mean "comparable in terms of skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions." (See, e.g., Bureau of National Affairs 1981, p. 1.) 
Thus, such discussions treat the two definitions as similar or equivalent, although they are at least 
potentially quite different.
4 Of course, there may be exceptions to this general rule. For example, the productivity of 
work performed in extreme heat or cold may be less than the productivity of work performed under 
normal climatic conditions.
5 Cited in Heen (1984, p. 214); see also Newman and Vonhof (1981).
6 Treiman (1979) traces the concept to studies undertaken by the U.S. Civil Service Commis 
sion in 1871 and Frederick W. Taylor©s "scientific management" studies of 1881.
7 Part of the following discussion is based on the work of Henderson and Clarke (1981), who 
provide a useful review of different kinds of commercial job evaluation methodologies.
8 For example, see the "Time Span of Discretion" method (Jaques 1964) and the "Broadband- 
ing" method (Paterson and Husband 1970).
9 Early examples include the "Point-Factor Method" (Lott 1926) and the "Factor-Comparison 
Method" (Benge 1946). These and similar procedures led to numerous methods, sometimes called 
"point-factor-comparison methods," developed by firms such as the Western Electric Co. and 
industry groups such as the National Metal Trades Association, the National Electrical Manufactur 
ers Association, and the American Association of Industrial Management.
10 For detailed discussion of actual implementation of the Hay methodology at an Australian 
college of education, see Burton et al. (1987). Dr. Alvin O. Bellak, general partner in the Hay 
Group, described the Hay philosophy as follows (U.S. Congress, House 1983, p. 345):
. . . scales of job value, which are one of the ways to measure comparable worth and 
pay equity, are most acceptable in relation to jobs within a single establishment 
utilizing a limited range of different occupational skills. That is, the scales are most 
acceptable for establishing pay equity among job classes within related job families. 
Scales may have one factor or multiple factors, independent factors or redundant 
factors, emphasis on measurement precision or emphasis on credibility and accep 
tance of results. Consistently, however, it can be observed that the scales will not be 
accepted if they are imposed by fiat, without explanation or communication. They 
must be adopted through widespread organizational consensus. Only through sub 
stantial efforts to introduce flexibility in processes of deliberation and judgment is it 
possible to apply such scales to increasingly broad ranges of job families, of 
establishments within an organization, or of organizations within an industry or an 
economy.
The Hay Group has, however, been willing to consider various approaches to job evaluation. 
For example, as discussed in chapter 5 of this book, Hay used a single scale to evaluate different 
"job families" in municipal employment in San Jose", California, and contended in a "Client 
Briefing" (Hay Associates 1981, p. 2) that the Hay Guide Chart-Profile Method of job measurement 
is "the appropriate methodology" for use in implementing comparable worth. As some astute 
observers have noted, Hay has thus expressed "strong agreement on every side of the question" 
(Aldrich and Buchele 1986, p. 72, n. 2; see in particular the statements cited therein).
1 © In actual applications, this approach can become considerably more complex than the simple 
hypothetical example outlined here. One version begins with a "structured job analysis question 
naire" (in some variants, a Position Analysis Questionnaire or PAQ) that analyzes jobs in terms of a 
total of 187 job elements (e.g., "operates keyboard devices," "works under high-temperature
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conditions"). Factor analysis and stepwise regression analysis are then used to reduce these 187 
elements to a much smaller number, which are then used in a regression analysis of the association 
between job elements and pay. (See Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, esp. pp. 119-26; McCor- 
mick 1979, pp. 147-9; and McCormick, Jeanneret, and Meacham 1972.)
12 The discussion in the text focuses on problems with commercial job analyses with a direct 
bearing on assessments of predominantly female vs. predominantly male jobs. Brief mention 
should also be made of more general problems with commercial (or for that matter any) job 
evaluation. One is inter-rater reliability: different evaluators using the same evaluation system often 
may not produce similar evaluations of the same set of jobs. Another is inter-system reliability: 
different job evaluation systems may not yield similar rankings of the same set of jobs. For further 
discussion of these issues, see Beatty and Beatty (1984), McArthur (1985) and Schwab (1985). A 
final problem concerns the information content of the separate elements used in job evaluations; 
several writers (e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith 1987b; Aaron and Lougy 1986, esp. p. 33, quoting 
Remick) have noted that the correlation among the scores on each pair of job attributes considered 
in such evaluations (e.g., between "skill" and "working conditions") is very high sometimes in 
excess of 0.9. This raises questions about the extent to which the measures of the different attributes 
actually incorporate genuinely different information about the jobs being evaluated.
13 Treiman and Hartmann, eds. (1981, p. 76); see also p. 72 and Remick (1984, p. 100). The 
comment cited in the text refers to the use of policy-capturing methods to derive weights for 
individual compensable factors, but it applies equally to the use of key or benchmark jobs and area 
wage surveys.
14 For example, such a priori weights could be derived by union-management negotiation, 
committees consisting of employees and/or outside consultants, etc. As Evans and Nelson (1989, 
p. 56) note, "most comparable worth supporters" favor an a priori approach that does not refer to 
market wage rates; and numerous comparable worth job evaluations conducted for state and local 
governments have explicitly avoided using external labor market wage data. (For example, see 
Orazem and Mattila 1989, p. 179, on Iowa; Willis and associates 1974, p. 1, on Washington State; 
Chapter 4, on Minnesota; and Chapter 5, on San Jose.)
15 The footnote refers to Kerr and Fisher (1950), who make the same point.
16 Smith (1937, p. 100); see Rees (1976) for a bicentennial appreciation of Smith©s analysis in 
light of subsequent economic analysis.
17 Changes (or lack of change) in the pay gap (or in the ratio of female to male earnings) may be 
due to changes in discrimination, in enforcement of antidiscrimination measures, and in workers© 
characteristics. These changes may be mutually reinforcing or offsetting. For example, Smith and 
Ward (1984) argue that the decline in the ratio of female to male average earnings during the 1960s 
and constancy in the 1970s is attributable to an influx of relatively unskilled women (some of whom 
were returning to the workforce after a spell of childbirth and childrearing) that more than offset 
improvements in wages of women (relative to men) with given characteristics. Similarly, other 
researchers some of whose work is surveyed by Brown (1982)-argue that, abstracting from 
effects such as those described by Smith and Ward, enforcement of antidiscrimination measures 
tended to raise the ratio of female to male earnings for workers with given characteristics. The 
relative importance, however, of each of these factors e.g., antidiscrimination efforts vs. changes 
in worker characteristics and/or in the extent of discrimination in explaining the behavior of the 
pay gap remains controversial.
18 The following discussion is based on Killingsworth (1987), which provides further details.
19 Note the "on average" here: this means that, although some women may be more interested in
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and/or better qualified for one job rather than another relative to some men (and relative to other 
women), there is no systematic difference related to sex in either job interests or job qualifications.
20 Equivalently, a higher relative wage for //induces lower relative employment for //. To some 
extent, demand for H falls when the wage in H rises because of a substitution effect: firms may 
substitute L labor for H labor when the H wage rises. However, even if no such substitution is 
possible (as in the case of a "fixed-coefficients" or "Leontief" production technology that requires 
that inputs must be used in fixed proportions, e.g., one secretary per typewriter), demand for H 
falls when the H wage rises because of a scale effect: a rise in the H wage raises the firm©s marginal 
costs and thus reduces the optimal scale of the firm©s operations and its use of all inputs, including H 
labor. (Analogously, a rise in labor costs causes public sector employers to reduce use of labor 
inputs generally because the same personnel budget can now buy less labor.) Of course, a rise in the 
H wage induces a decline in demand for H relative to that for L only if the substitution effect is 
nonzero, as assumed in figures 2.1-2.
21 Since the relative supply curve has a positive (rather than a zero) slope, I am assuming that 
some workers would want to work in the "high wage" job //even if pay in it were lower than in the 
"low wage" job L; and, similarly, that some workers will want to work in the low wage job L even 
though pay in it is less than pay in H. The basic reason is that Hand L will have non-wage attributes 
(e.g., working conditions) that different workers will evaluate differently. For example, H might 
entail outdoor work, which some workers would (would not) want to do even if it were very badly 
(well) paid.
22 Note the "on average" here. This model allows for differences among individuals in terms of 
(e.g.) job interests (see note 19 above); in the absence of such differences, the relative supply 
schedule would be horizontal. For the time being, however, I also assume that, on average, the 
distribution of men©s job preferences is the same as the distribution of women©s job preferences; and 
that, at given wage levels, the average woman is no more or less likely to prefer job //to job L (or 
vice versa) than the average man.
23 Note that equilibrium does not imply (and is not implied by) intersection of 5, with D ls , s = m 
or f. 5, shows the relative wage that must be offered to a given sex group to elicit specified levels of 
relative supply from that sex group. D, s shows the relative wage that employers are willing to offer 
to sex group s at specified levels of aggregate relative employment.
24 Note, however, that whereas 5, s , s=m or f, shows the relative supply of sex s at different 
relative wages, the aggregate relative supply schedule 5, shows aggregate relative supply (a kind of 
weighted average of the two sex groups© relative supplies) at different relative wages.
25 Note that the condition S| S =£>, (=£>0)> s=m or f. does not imply (and is not implied by) 
equilibrium. 5,j denotes the relative supply of sexs, whereasD, refers to aggregate relative demand 
(of both sexes combined). Even though they do not lie on Dt , the points e tf and e lm in figure 2.2 are 
equilibria (exactly as in figure 2.1), since they merely indicate the implications for each sex group 
of the aggregate equilibrium e t . On the other hand, equilibrium is impossible except at e { : w t is the 
only (aggregate) wage rate at which (aggregate) relative supplies equal (aggregate) relative 
demands.
26 For example, Bergmann and Gray (1984) and Bergmann (1985) consider a two-job model 
under the assumption that all workers have identical tastes and abilities and conclude that, absent 
discrimination, the two jobs would receive the same pay. This is said to establish the economic case 
for comparable worth, although Bergmann (1985, p. 81) asserts that "a considerably weaker 
assumption" would do so also: that "just enough women need to be willing and able to change 
occupations so that the ©crowding© of labor in the women©s occupations would be relieved if 
employer-enforced segregation were relaxed." However, if "relieving" the effect of "©crowding© of
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labor in the women©s occupations" simply means making the proportion female the same in the two 
jobs, this clearly does not establish that wages in the two occupations would be equal in the absence 
of such crowding. And if "relieving" the effect of crowding means equating wages in the two jobs, 
then the argument is circular.
27 Smith also remarked (1937, p. 100) that "the most detestable of all employments, that of 
public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common 
trade whatever." However, my colleague, Michael K. Taussig, reminds me that when the convicted 
mass murderer Gary Gilmore was to be executed, numerous individuals telephoned the prison in 
which Gilmore was held in order to volunteer their services gratis. Perhaps state prisons might 
auction the rights to execute prisoners to the highest bidder! Again, the essential point is that tastes 
are heterogeneous: what one individual might be unwilling to do even at unimaginably high rates of 
pay, another individual might be willing to do at very low (or even negative!) rates of pay.
28 Several writers have questioned this "translators" example, but their arguments are uncon 
vincing. For example, Aaron and Lougy (1986, p. 36, n. 46) contend that excess supply of, say, 
Spanish translators would ultimately mean that "the jobs of Spanish translator and French translator 
would cease to be the same" because employers, having less incentive to economize on the time of 
Spanish translators, would provide them with less advanced equipment and secretarial assistance, 
require them to perform more menial tasks, etc. However, this possibility reinforces Sharon Smith©s 
original point: if excess supply of Spanish translators led to (among other things) a deterioration in 
their working conditions relative to those of French translators, as Aaron and Lougy are effectively 
arguing, then a comparable worth standard would presumably require that Spanish translators© 
wages be greater than French translators© wages. Similarly, Weiler (1986, p. 1762, n. 133), who 
erroneously infers that "the greater demand for Spanish translation in Miami" would necessarily 
entail higher pay for Spanish translators than for French translators, asserts that provided there is 
no difference in training or skill required to become a translator in either language, "one would 
expect the compensation rates for these two jobs to move together" in the long run. This ignores the 
possible influence of heterogeneous preferences for geographic location (which might well entail a 
wage differential between the two jobs even in the very long run) and does not, of course, mean that 
pay for these two "comparable" jobs must necessarily "move together" all the way to equality.
29 For example, see Aaron and Lougy (1986, esp. pp. 16-24) and Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 
(1981, esp. chapter3).
30 Indeed, one might even suspect that, precisely because they are complex, real world labor 
markets would be quite unlikely to entail any simple relation between job worth and job pay even if 
it were possible to eliminate all vestiges of employer discrimination from the pay structure.
31 The Aldrich-Buchele proposition is based on an assumption of arbitrage: workers who found 
that a given skill (e.g., college education) paid a higher return in one occupation rather than another 
would switch into the occupation in which it was paid more. However, as Aldrich and Buchele 
themselves note (1986, p. 101, n. 1), equal marginal returns to a characteristic in different jobs 
requires constant returns to the characteristic: for example, if there were "strongly increasing or 
decreasing returns to training" and if "different groups of workers differed widely in the amount of 
training they had, nondiscriminatory differences in returns to training between different groups of 
workers could exist." For more general discussions of this issue, see Heckman and Scheinkman 
(1987), Rosen (1983), and Welch (1969). One factor that tends to prevent returns to given 
characteristics (e.g., education) from being the same in different jobs is that workers must usually 
work in only one job and cannot "unbundle" their characteristics using their education in one job 
and their physical strength in another, say  in order to engage in arbitrage across jobs.
32 The "detailed" or three-digit U.S. Census occupational taxonomy is the most detailed
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categorization of occupations available for analysis of national survey data; whereas the Census© 
"broad" or one-digit classification consists of broad groupings (e.g., professional, clerical, craft), 
its detailed or three-digit classification refers to much more homogeneous groups of jobs (e.g., 
lawyer, file clerk, plumber). The Committee©s four-factor scores for Census occupations were later 
used by another analysis undertaken for the National Research Council of the extent of unequal pay 
for work of equal value (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, esp. pp. 24-31).
33 See Hartmann et al. (1980, table 3, "all occupations" regression II) and Raisian et al. (1988, 
p. 194, table 8.5, specification 2). Hartmann et al. (1980, table 3) also studied "mixed" and male 
and female "dominated" occupations separately. In these further analyses, undesirable working 
conditions were never statistically significantly related to pay; physical demands were not signifi 
cant for male occupations; motor skills were significant only for female occupations; and substan 
tive complexity was not significant for female occupations. Parcel (1989) finds similarly tenuous 
connections between pay and job content variables in an analysis of 1980 Census data.
34 Of course, to the extent that the two jobs are "different" say, if H refers to tree trimmers or 
zoo keepers and L refers to nurses or file clerks-they are more or less by definition not easily 
substitutable. If so, the substitution effect may be small or even zero, as in the case of a fixed- 
coefficients (Leontief) production function.
35 For-profit employers find that the wage increase raises the marginal cost of production; 
unless they can pass all of the cost increase on to consumers, this rise in marginal cost induces a 
decline in production, and hence in demand for inputs. Nonprofit employers (e.g., government) 
find that the wage increase reduces the purchasing power of their employment budget; unless they 
can increase their budget (e.g., via higher taxes or spending cuts elsewhere) to offset this fully, this 
leads to decreases in employment.
36 Proponents of comparable worth sometimes suggest that, if pay in predominantly female 
occupations were raised via comparable worth, more men would be attracted to them and they 
would therefore become more integrated (for examples, see Gold 1983, p. 56; and Steinberg 1986, 
esp. p. 122). Mary Hatwood-Futrell, secretary-treasurer of the National Education Association, 
testified at Congressional hearings (U.S. Congress, House 1983, p. 264) that "I think you would see 
more men coming into the [teaching] profession" if wages were adjusted along comparable worth 
lines. However, this overlooks the distinction between supply and demand: although comparable 
worth pay increases may attract more men to predominantly female jobs, such pay increases will 
also reduce the number of such jobs. Whether the jobs will, on balance, be more or less integrated is 
therefore unclear.
37 Thus, a full accounting of the gains and losses from adoption of comparable worth on an 
economywide basis will require a general equilibrium approach (see Beider et al. 1988, for an 
example). See Oi (1986) for further discussion of labor market effects of comparable worth.
38 Hartmann (1986, p. 175, emphasis original) appears to assign zero weight to employment 
effects: "Once unequal pay [for jobs of comparable worth] is understood as sex-based wage 
discrimination, even arguments that redress would be costly or might lead to some unemployment 




This chapter is concerned with empirical issues related to comparable 
worth. Since comparable worth is usually regarded as a remedy for the 
male/female pay gap, I first discuss both conventional economic and 
comparable worth analyses of the empirical magnitude of the pay gap, 
with special reference to methodological and conceptual differences 
between these two types of analyses and their likely empirical conse 
quences. I then discuss methodologies for analyzing the empirical 
effects on wages and employment of adopting the principle of equal pay 
for jobs of comparable worth.
3.1 Conventional Economic Analyses of the Pay Gap
The discussion of chapter 2 may be briefly summarized as follows. 
Labor market (demand-side) discrimination can lead to concentration of 
women in low wage jobs, a negative relation between "femaleness" and 
pay among different jobs, and a male/female pay gap. But various 
supply-side factors (sex differences in job preferences and/or job qualifi 
cations, due to sexual role differentiation, societal discrimination, etc.) 
can also do so. Unequal pay for jobs of comparable worth is not 
necessarily discriminatory; equal pay for jobs of comparable worth is 
not necessarily nondiscriminatory.
For these reasons, economists usually stress the importance of "other-
I thank Paul Decker, Cordelia W. Reimers, and participants in seminars at Indiana University, Johns 
Hopkins University, Princeton University, the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the University 
of Maryland for many helpful comments on previous versions of this chapter.
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things-being-equal" (ceterisparibus) comparisons in empirical analyses 
of pay, i.e., ones that allow explicitly for the effects on pay and on the 
overall pay gap of male/female differences in job preferences and job 
qualifications. Typically, studies of this kind are based on regression 
analyses of individual workers© pay, controlling for individual workers© 
characteristics ones that are related to job preferences and job qualifi 
cations (e.g., level of education, college major, years of work experi 
ence and the like). Economists are willing to infer the existence of labor 
market discrimination only if pay is systematically related to sex on an 
other-things-being-equal basis, i.e., only if pay is related to sex among 
workers who are the same in terms of these other personal 
characteristics.
To discuss these issues, it is useful to write down a simple explicit 
statistical model of pay. Let pay of worker /, Yit be given by
Y^bXi+dMi+ei (3.1)
where Xt refers to measured personal characteristics of worker / (vari 
ables denoting fs job qualifications and job preferences); 1 M, is an 
indicator or dummy variable equal to 1 if i is male and equal to 0 if i is 
female; and e{ denotes unobserved or unmeasured characteristics perti 
nent to fs pay. To simplify exposition with no loss of generality, assume 
that the coefficients on X, b, are positive, i.e., b>0; this simply means 
that the Xt are defined as factors that are positively associated with pay 
(so that factors that are negatively related to pay have all been multiplied 
by   1). The main object of interest in empirical analysis of (3.1) is, of 
course, the magnitude of d, the coefficient on the male indicator vari 
able; d measures the adjusted pay gap i.e., the extent to which, on 
average and other things (the X) being equal, men receive more (if d is 
positive) or less (if d is negative) pay than women. 2
Since they play an important role in the following discussion, several 
points are worth noting at the outset. First, the overall or "total" or "raw" 
pay gap the simple difference in average pay of men vs. average pay of 
women  may be due either to male/female differences in observed 
personal characteristics, the "X" of (3.1); or to male/female differences 
in unobserved personal characteristics, the V of (3.1); or to labor
Comparable Worth: Empirical Issues 57
market discrimination, the "d" of (3.1). In turn, a positive d, signifying 
discrimination favoring men and against women, can arise due to 
unequal pay for equal work (i.e., women receiving less pay than men 
who have the same Xand who are doing the same job) and/or to unequal 
access to better work (i.e., women having a lower chance of holding a 
highly paid job than men with the same X).
Finally, a key statistical point: empirical estimates of d, the coefficient 
on M, will be biased upwards (downwards) if the error term e and the 
indicator variable M are positively (negatively) correlated at given X. 
For example, the estimate of the adjusted pay gap will overstate the 
extent of pay discrimination favoring men and adverse to women if men 
possess "more" unobserved factors, e, than do women who are the same 
in terms of observed characteristics (X). To see in intuitive terms why 
this is the case, note that d is supposed to measure the effect on pay of 
being male, other things being equal, and that being male is measured, 
whereas unobserved characteristics by definition are not. If men have 
more of these unobserved characteristics e than do women with the same 
measured characteristics X, then some of the pay difference between 
men and women with the same X is not really due to the difference in sex 
but rather to the difference in unobserved characteristics; yet, because 
the unobserved characteristics that are positively related to being male 
are unobserved whereas being male is observed, conventional statistical 
analysis will end up crediting all of the pay difference to being male, 
i.e., will reflect not only the "true" sex difference in pay for people with 
the same characteristics, d, but also the effect of unobserved charac 
teristics e, to the extent that e and M are correlated among persons with 
the same observed characteristics X.
The extent to which the male/female pay gap is in fact attributable to 
labor market discrimination rather than differences in personal charac 
teristics remains controversial. Most studies find that no more than 
about two-thirds of the pay gap can be "explained" by (i.e., is associated 
with) differences in personal characteristics. (See Cain 1986, esp. pp. 
743-759, for a methodological overview and summary of results ob 
tained in numerous studies of the pay gap.) In the view of many 
economists, the rest of the pay gap can reasonably be attributed to labor
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market discrimination. Economists often call this "unexplained" portion 
of the pay gap the "adjusted" gap, since it has been adjusted for (and thus 
does not incorporate) the effects of male/female differences in measured 
personal characteristics. Since the adjusted gap is one-third (or more) of 
the total gap, the extent of labor market discrimination would appear to 
be sizeable.
Numerous economists question this reasoning, however. O©Neill©s 
remarks (1984b, p. 263) are typical of this skeptical view:
After adjusting for the different proxy variables that social scientists 
use to measure productivity differences, studies have explained 
varying proportions of the wage gap.... Among those studies that 
have used broad national samples, perhaps the central finding has 
been that about half of the gap is accounted for by a few key 
variables: schooling, years of work experience, years out of the 
labor force, and job tenure. The unexplained residual, however, 
cannot be taken as a measure of discrimination. It is more correctly 
described as a measure of our ignorance. Work experience and 
qualitative aspects of schooling are usually measured crudely, and 
variables that may be important are omitted because of lack of data. 
Chief among these is the intensity and motivation with which a 
career is pursued. The intangible qualities that affect training, job 
search, and job advancement are likely to be related to the extent to 
which one©s energies must be shared between home responsibilities 
and a career.
Similarly, Roback (1986) notes that cross-section analyses of pay have 
"explained" no more than 40 to 50 percent of the overall variation in 
wages (i.e., the value of/?2 in such analyses is no more than about 0.50) 
among white men: due to data limitations, it was not possible to include 
many factors that are relevant to pay among white men and that could 
account for some or even all of the remaining wage variation among 
white men. The same "missing variables" problem hampers attempts to 
estimate the portion of the male-female pay gap attributable to discrimi 
nation. She argues (1986, p. 29) that
... it seems quite likely that residual earnings disparities are not 
really an index of discrimination; in fact, the possibility that there is
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no discrimination whatsoever cannot be ruled out. Unmeasurable 
factors account for some 60 percent of the variation in white male 
earnings, while unexplained earnings differences between the sexes 
amount to somewhere between 13 and 34 percent. So it is possible 
that men and women have widely different amounts of unmeasured 
characteristics, at least enough so that if they could be measured, 
there might be no significant wage differential at all.
This "missing variables" argument has dominated discussion of con 
ventional economic analyses of the pay gap. In a nutshell, it asserts that, 
if it were possible to measure and include variables which have not been 
included in regression analyses of pay because of data limitations, then 
the fraction of the overall pay gap attributable to discrimination in such a 
revised study might be smaller perhaps substantially smaller than 
the figure implied by most current research.
Stated in these carefully qualified terms, the missing variables argu 
ment is unexceptionable. In terms of equation (3.1), it is simply saying 
that if unobserved characteristics (e) are positively related to M (male 
sex) among persons with the same observed characteristics (X), then the 
estimate of the adjusted pay gap, d, will be overstated (or upward 
biased, in statistical terms). It should be noted, however, that precisely 
because the missing variables in question are not now included, there is 
no way to be certain what their inclusion would do to the results. 3 In 
particular, and contrary to what O©Neill and Roback appear to be 
suggesting, even if women "score" less "well" in terms of such missing 
variables than do men, inclusion of these variables will not necessarily 
reduce the remaining pay gap. In other words, in terms of equation 
(3.1), d need not be biased simply because unobserved factors are 
positively correlated with M. Rather, for inclusion of unobserved factors 
to reduce the remaining pay gap, the variable in question must be 
correlated with sex "at the margin," i.e., be related to sex among persons 
who are the same in terms of all of the variables already included in the 
analysis: in terms of equation (3.1), e must be correlated with M among 
persons with the same X.
As a simple example, suppose one analyzes pay using a regression 
analysis that does control for educational attainment but does not control
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for years of work experience, and obtains a sizable estimate for the 
adjusted male/female pay gap. Even if women have, on average, fewer 
years of work experience than men, it does not follow that omission of 
the experience variable produces an overstatement of the estimated pay 
gap (or that inclusion of this missing variable will reduce the estimate of 
the adjusted gap). That will occur only if women with the same educa 
tional attainment as men nevertheless have less work experience, on 
average. Indeed, if work experience and education are perfectly corre 
lated, omission of the work experience variable will not affect the 
estimated pay gap at all: in that case, the work experience variable 
would add no information not already provided by the education 
variable.
Likewise, even if women are less "motivated" or "career-oriented" 
than men, omission of a variable denoting "motivation" or "career 
commitment" would bias the estimate of the pay gap obtained in the 
studies O©Neill discusses only if women who are the same as men in 
terms of all previously included factors (education, years of work 
experience, etc.) are nevertheless less motivated or career-oriented, on 
average. 4
Thus, different economists put different weights on the potential 
importance of the omitted-variables issue heterogeneous tastes once 
again!  and so are not equally willing to accept the results of conven 
tional economic analyses of male/female pay differences as evidence of 
labor market discrimination. This important difference notwithstand 
ing, there is fairly broad agreement on methodological issues. Conven 
tional economic analyses of labor market discrimination focus on char 
acteristics of individual workers, and, provided a suitable set of 
variables measuring these characteristics could be obtained, economists 
would treat the "adjusted" pay difference i.e., the pay difference be 
tween men and women who are the same in terms of these charac 
teristics as a measure of labor market discrimination. How does the 
methodology of comparable worth pay analyses differ from this 
approach?
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3.2 Comparable Worth Analyses of the Pay Gap
Unlike conventional economic analyses, which focus on people, 
comparable worth analyses of the pay gap focus on jobs. Studies taking 
this approach fall into two categories: first, analyses of specific employ 
ers, usually state or local governments; and, second, studies of national 
survey data.
Most of the studies in the first category were prepared for or by 
administrative bodies, e.g., state or local government agencies. Perhaps 
the earliest examples are the studies by Willis and associates (1974, 
1976) of state government employees in Washington State. Similar 
procedures have been used in subsequent studies of state government 
employment in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Michigan, 
and of municipal government employment in New York City and San 
Jose, California. 5 Pierson, Koziara and Johannesson (1984) took basi 
cally the same approach in studying a private-sector firm, as did Baron 
and Newman (1989) in studying California state government.
In these studies, the unit of analysis is the job (often called "class" or 
"job classification"). Generally, an administrative pay construct estab 
lished for each job (e.g., the maximum of the pay range) is regressed on 
its evaluation score (e.g., the points assigned to it by a job evaluation) 
and a variable denoting the sex composition of employment in the job. In 
some cases, the sex composition variable is the proportion of employ 
ment in the job that is female; in others, it is an indicator denoting 
whether the job is female-dominated (i.e., denoting whether a high 
proportion the usual cutoff is 70 percent or more of those in the job 
are women). 6
Thus, as regards the question of analyzing pay at a specific employer, 
the procedures required for comparable worth studies are much simpler 
than those necessary for conventional economic analyses. The em 
ployer under study may have many employees with quite diverse charac 
teristics (e.g., educational background); data on some potentially 
important employee characteristics (e.g., education) may not even be 
available; and analysis of these employees along conventional economic
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lines can require substantial computer programming and data process 
ing work. In contrast, comparable worth analyses of this kind require 
data for a much smaller number of objects jobs, rather than indi 
viduals; the necessary variables e.g., salary maxima, comparable 
worth evaluation points and "femaleness" for each job may well be 
readily available. It is not surprising, then, that many state and local 
governments, with hard pressed personnel staff who may not have much 
experience doing conventional economic analyses, opt instead for com 
parable worth analyses of pay.
Comparable worth studies of national survey data include those by 
Aldrich and Buchele (1986), Treiman and Hartmann, eds. (1981, pp. 
28-31), and Treiman, Hartmann and Roos (1980). Although prepared 
by academic researchers using national survey data sets the U.S. 
Census Public Use Sample (Treiman and Hartmann, eds.; Treiman, 
Hartmann and Roos) or the National Longitudinal Surveys (Aldrich and 
Buchele) they clearly were inspired by the first kind of comparable 
worth analysis, and appear to some extent to be attempts to apply the 
same kind of methodology to national survey data. The differences of 
approach are largely imposed by the differences in data. National survey 
data sets provide no information on workers© job titles as such, on 
administrative pay constructs (e.g., the maximum pay rate) or job 
evaluation points for workers© jobs. Instead, the unit of analysis is the 
"occupation" (e.g., the "detailed" or three-digit occupations defined by 
the U. S. Census© occupational taxonomy), and the measure of pay is 
usually the average (e.g., mean or median) hourly earnings of workers 
in the occupation. In lieu of a job evaluation point variable, these studies 
use a set of variables denoting characteristics of the occupation (e.g., 
measures of its complexity, the extent to which it requires working with 
machines or making cognitive judgments, etc.), derived from the Dic 
tionary of Occupational Titles. 1 The measure of pay is then regressed on 
the occupation characteristics variables and a variable measuring the sex 
composition of employment in the occupation.
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3.3 What Do Comparable Worth Analyses Measure?
It is clear from the foregoing that conventional economic and com 
parable worth analyses of male/female pay differences use different 
methodologies and procedures. These differences raise an even more 
important issue: whether the two kinds of analyses are even addressed to 
the same set of questions. The basic question considered in conventional 
economic analyses is reasonably clear: do individual workers with the 
same characteristics (reflecting, e.g., productivity and job preferences) 
receive the same pay, on average, regardless of sex? In contrast, and 
somewhat surprisingly, the nature of the basic issue addressed in com 
parable worth analyses is less clear.
On the one hand, it could be argued that comparable worth analyses 
are addressed to essentially the same question considered in conven 
tional analyses: whether identical workers receive the same pay re 
gardless of sex. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that, 
because they focus on jobs rather than individual workers as the unit of 
analysis, comparable worth analyses are concerned with questions 
about discrimination that are fundamentally different from those ad 
dressed by conventional economic analyses.
Comparable worth analysis as a form of 
conventional economic analysis
According to some of its proponents, there is nothing particularly 
novel about comparable worth analysis: like the conventional economic 
approach, the comparable worth approach is concerned with measuring 
the extent of discrimination, defined as different treatment (with respect 
to pay for the same work or access to better-paid work) of otherwise 
identical men and women. In this view, methodological differences 
among studies embodying the two approaches are relatively unimpor 
tant: such differences merely reflect practical problems encountered in 
different settings (e.g., lack of data on individual worker characteristics 
or, alternatively, on jobs© assessed "worth") rather than major conceptual 
differences. 8
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If this view is correct, then comparable worth and conventional 
economic analyses of pay should yield essentially similar results despite 
their methodological differences. Is this likely to occur, however? Here I 
consider the possible consequences of the three major methodological 
differences between the two kinds of analyses: the nature of the depen 
dent variable (pay); the nature of the independent variables (measures of 
either individual or job characteristics); and the difference in the unit of 
analysis (individuals or jobs). As will become clear shortly, the effect of 
these methodological differences on estimates of the male/female pay 
gap will depend, in general, on the relative importance of the various 
phenomena underlying the gap: male/female differences in skills and 
job preferences; unequal pay for equal work; and unequal access (via 
differences in either assignment at hire or rates of promotion) to better- 
paid work.
Use of an administrative pay construct. The first major difference 
between conventional economic and comparable worth studies of pay is 
that, in the former, the dependent variable (pay) is generally the actual 
rate of pay received by the individual worker, whereas in comparable 
worth studies it is frequently an administrative pay construct, e.g., the 
maximum rate of pay in the worker©s job classification. 9 Use of such an 
administrative pay construct instead of an actual rate of pay may 
generate an errors-in-variables problem that can bias the estimate of the 
adjusted male/female pay gap.
To see why, let Ai denote the administrative pay construct pertinent to 
worker fs job, Ait and consider the effect of using Ai rather than the 
worker©s actual pay, Yit when estimating the model (3.1) by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) while following conventional economic meth 
odology in all other respects. 10 The relation between A and Fis simply
r,=4+«, (3.2)
where at is the difference between the worker©s actual pay and the 
administrative construct. For example, if A is the minimum (maximum) 
rate of pay for the worker©s job, then a is the amount, if any, by which the 
worker©s actual pay is above the minimum (below the maximum) for his
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or her job; thus, a>0 (<0) always. In econometric parlance, A mea 
sures Y with error, where the magnitude of the error is a. Now combine 
(3.1)-(3.2) and rearrange to get
A{ = bX{ + dMf -He,-*, where ef* = ef -a^ (3.3)
Suppose first that the administrative construct A is the minimum rate 
of pay for the employee©s job, so that a is the amount by which his or her 
pay exceeds the minimum. The coefficient on M, d, will be biased if the 
composite error term e* and M are correlated at given X. The potential 
problem introduced by use of A in place of Fis that the presence of a in 
the composite error term may induce a correlation between it and M, 
even at given values of X. Under what conditions will this occur? If there 
is "unequal pay for equal work" favoring men, then, on average, men 
receive more pay in excess of the minimum for their job than do women 
with the same characteristics (X): at given X, a (the amount paid above 
the minimum) will be positively correlated with M. Then, at given X 
(and even in the absence of any correlation between unobservables e and 
the male indicator variable M), both the negative of the amount paid 
above the minimum, —a, and the composite error term e* = e — a will be 
negatively correlated with M.
Thus, to the extent that there is unequal pay for equal work, OLS 
regression that uses the administrative pay construct rather than actual 
pay will understate the extent of discrimination favoring men and 
disfavoring women. Moreover, it appears unlikely that this would be 
affected by "unequal access to better-paid work" because of discrimina 
tion in initial assignment (i.e. , differential treatment of equally qualified 
men and women with respect to job assignment at hire). Such initial 
assignment discrimination will mean that, relative to women with the 
same qualifications (X), men will receive higher pay (Y) and will hold 
jobs with higher maximum and minimum rates of pay (A). At least to a 
first approximation, raising both YandA (for men relative to women at 
given X) is unlikely to affect their difference (the measurement error a 
= Y—A), or, therefore, the correlation (if any) between the composite 
error term e* = e-a and sex (M) at given X.
That is not necessarily the end of the story, however. If there is
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"unequal access to better work" due to differential rates of promotion for 
equally qualified men and women, then, on average and relative to men 
with the same X, women are trapped in lower-paid jobs and are "maxed 
out" earning the highest rate paid for their low-level job. Conversely, 
men will move rapidly to successively better-paid jobs, earning less than 
the highest rate for the jobs they hold (i.e., receiving small "excess 
payments" a) but occupying jobs with substantially higher salary min 
ima A and thus receiving substantially higher salary levels, 7. 11 In this 
case, a (the amount paid above the minimum) will be negatively corre 
lated with M at given X; and so at given X (and even in the absence of any 
correlation between unobservables e and the male indicator variable M), 
both the negative of the amount paid above the minimum, —a, and the 
composite error term e*=e—a will be positively correlated with M. 
Thus, to the extent that differential treatment of equally qualified men 
and women with respect to promotion causes unequal access to better- 
paid work, OLS regression that uses the administrative pay construct 
rather than actual pay will overstate the extent of discrimination favor 
ing men and disfavoring women.
Similar conclusions apply when A is the salary maximum. In this 
case, a is the amount by which one©s actual pay (Y) falls short of the 
maximum for one©s job, and so will be either negative or zero. To the 
extent that women suffer from unequal pay for equal work, men will be 
closer to (and more likely to be at) the salary maximum than women 
with the same X. If so, a will be larger in absolute value ("more 
negative") for women than for men with the same X; M will be positively 
correlated with a, and negatively correlated with both -a and the 
composite error term at given values of X. Hence, to the extent that 
women suffer from unequal pay for equal work, OLS regression that 
uses the salary maximum for employees© job classifications rather than 
their actual pay will understate the extent of discrimination favoring 
men and disfavoring women. (Again, unequal access due to discrimina 
tion in initial assignment appears unlikely to change this conclusion.)
On the other hand, to the extent that women suffer from unequal 
access to better-paid work due to differential promotion rates, they will 
"max out" more often than men with the same X; i.e., M will be
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negatively correlated with a and positively correlated with both —a and 
the composite error term at given values of X. Hence, to the extent that 
women suffer unequal access via promotion, use of the salary maximum 
for employees©job classifications rather than actual pay in OLS regres 
sion generates an errors-in-variables bias that overstates the extent of 
discrimination favoring men and disfavoring women. 12
In sum, use of an administrative pay construct can induce two differ 
ent errors-in-variables biases, of opposite signs, in the estimate of 
discrimination. A priori statements about which of the two biases will in 
fact be stronger, and thus about the net bias, are inevitably speculative. 
However, to the extent that comparable worth advocates are correct in 
arguing that concentration of women in low-paid occupations is a 
serious problem, and to the extent that this can be regarded as unequal 
access to better paid work due to differential promotion rates, overstate 
ment of the female salary disadvantage in comparable worth analyses of 
the pay gap is likely to be a serious problem.
Use of job characteristics. A second major difference between con 
ventional economic and comparable worth studies of pay is that, 
whereas the former control for actual differences in characteristics 
(e.g., education or years of work experience) of individual workers, 
comparable worth studies control for differences in characteristics of 
jobs. As noted earlier, in some cases a job©s characteristics are summa 
rized by a set of variables denoting its skill requirements, complexity, 
etc., whereas in others, there is a single composite variable, the job©s 
"evaluation point score" (e.g., Hay or Willis job evaluation points), 
which effectively collapses a set of characteristics pertaining to the 
job  skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions  into a single 
number.
On first consideration, this difference between the two kinds of pay 
studies might appear relatively minor. Could it not be argued that both 
kinds of studies control for skill  conventional economic analyses, by 
including measures of individual workers© education, years of work 
experience, etc.; and comparable worth analyses, by including mea 
sures (either explicitly and separately, or else as part of composite point
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score) of the skills required for the jobs the workers are doing? However, 
the two kinds of studies do not, in fact, treat skills in a similar way. The 
skill variable(s) used in comparable worth analyses effectively imputes 
exactly the same amount of "skill" to all workers in a given job. In 
contrast, since they use variables that measure skills of individual 
workers, conventional economic analyses do not suppress the variation 
in skills typically observed even among workers who are doing the same 
job. The two kinds of analyses, conventional economic and comparable 
worth, would be equivalent in this respect only if all workers in each job 
had the same amount of skill (e.g., education, manual dexterity).
To the extent that comparable worth analyses impute minimum skill 
levels to all workers and ignore variation in skills, they may induce 
additional errors-in-variables biases that arise from two distinct phe 
nomena: unequal access to better-paid work; and sex-related "supply- 
side" differences in actual worker characteristics. To see this, think of X 
as the actual skill level of the worker; let X* denote the minimum skill 
level required for one©s job; and consider the effect of using X* rather 
than actual skill level X when estimating the model (3.1) by OLS while 
following conventional economic methodology in all other respects. 
(Thus, as in the previous case, one aspect of comparable worth analyses 
is considered in isolation from the others; see note 10.) The relation 
between X and X* may be written as
X^Xf+Xt (3.4)
where xi (> 0) is i's "excess" skill, i.e., the amount of skill he or she has 
in excess of the minimum level X{* required for his or her job. Since X{* 
is used in place of X{ in comparable worth analyses of the pay gap, 
substitute (3.4) into (3.1) and rearrange terms to obtain
Yi=bX{*+dMf + ef*, where e* = et+bxt . (3.5)
Note that the composite error term, e*, now consists of unobservables 
(e) and of "excess" skills, bx.
To assess possible bias in OLS estimates of (3.5), first consider the 
implications of unequal access to better-paid work. "Unequal access" 
due to differences in either initial assignment or rates of promotion
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typically means that women are less likely to be in better-paid jobs than 
are men with the same actual skill, X. More or less equivalently, it 
means that, on average, women must have more skill in excess of the 
minimum (greater x) than men with the same minimum skill level (the 
same X*). M will therefore be negatively related both to x and to the 
composite error term, e*=e+bx; and so unequal access will induce a 
negative bias in the estimate of d, i.e., will result in an understatement of 
the male salary advantage (female salary disadvantage).
An alternate route to the same conclusion starts with the observation 
that most comparable worth analyses use one or more variables denot 
ing job evaluation points of workers©jobs, P, rather than measures of 
(minimum or actual) skill levels (X* or X) as such. To the extent that P 
amounts to an index of the "level" of workers© jobs (with, e.g., higher 
values of P denoting higher-paid jobs), analyses of this kind amount to 
analyses that estimate only the extent of unequal pay for equal work: that 
is, they estimate the difference in pay between men and women who are 
in jobs with essentially the same (overall average) pay. If so, analyses of 
this kind necessarily understate the overall male salary advantage 
(female salary disadvantage), which includes not only an unequal pay 
for equal work component but also a component attributable to unequal 
access to better paid work.
On the other hand, supply-side differences in worker characteristics 
(job qualifications and job preferences) may generate sex differences in 
actual "skills" (or, more generally, job skills and/or job preferences), X. 
In particular, to the extent that men©s actual skill levels generally exceed 
those of women, men will possess "excess" skills to a greater extent 
(their x will be larger, on average) than will women, both overall and 
within given job categories. To the extent that this is so, .M will be 
positively related both to x and to the composite error term, and so 
neglecting the greater actual skill levels of the male workers will induce 
a positive bias in the estimate of d— i.e., will overstate the male salary 
advantage (female salary disadvantage).
To see why, consider the simple example illustrated in figure 3.1. A 
sex-blind company has two jobs, A and B. Minimum skill requirements, 
X*, and pay, Y, are higher in A than in B. All employees have at least
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XB*, the minimum skill level required for B (otherwise, they would not 
have been hired); let XB* be normalized to zero without loss of gener 
ality. Let XA* be the minimum amount of skill necessary (and sufficient) 
for an employee to be assigned to the high-wage job, A. Next, suppose 
that the skill distributions of the men and women at this company have 
the same variance but that, because of supply-side factors noted pre 
viously, the mean of the skill distribution for men exceeds that for 
women. Then, as shown in figure 3.1, the mean skill level and pay of 
men will exceed that of women within both the low-skill job (B) and the 
high-skill job (A). 13 Thus, x will be positively correlated with Mat given 
levels of X*; and so the OLS estimate ofd will be upward-biased, giving 
the appearance of a male salary advantage when none in fact exists. In 
such cases, comparable worth analyses such as (3.5) effectively ignore 
both (i) the extent to which, because of supply-side reasons, men©s actual 
skill levels exceed those of women and (ii) the fact that these differences 
in actual skill levels explain some of the pay gap. Thus, such analyses 
may overstate the extent of the gap that is due to labor market 
discrimination.
In sum, using minimum instead of actual skill levels can induce two 
different errors-in-variables biases, of opposite signs, in comparable 
worth analyses of discrimination. A priori statements about the net 
direction of the two biases are inevitably speculative. To the extent that 
supply-side differences in skill levels are an important source of the 
overall pay gap, however, upward bias in the male salary advantage 
(overstatement of the female salary disadvantage) induced by the use of 
minimum skill level measures in comparable worth analyses of the pay 
gap is likely to be a serious problem.
Use of job as the unit of analysis. A third major difference between 
conventional economic and comparable worth studies of pay is that, 
whereas the former take the individual worker as the unit of analysis, in 
the latter the job is the unit of analysis. On first consideration, this 
difference might also appear of relatively minor importance: could one 
not argue that the job-level regressions used in comparable worth 
analyses are simply the aggregated or grouped-data equivalents of the
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Figure 3.1 Mean Skill Levels by Sex and Job
female skill distribution
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individual-level regressions used in conventional economic analyses? 14 
Although grouped-data regression is less desirable in some respects 
than individual-level regression, standard econometric results (see, 
e.g., Kmenta 1971, esp. pp. 322-336, or other econometrics textbooks) 
do suggest that grouping or aggregating does not generate statistical bias 
under conventional econometric assumptions. Thus, it could be argued, 
so long as the primary concern is avoiding statistical bias in estimates of 
discrimination, it makes relatively little difference whether one uses 
individual-level regression, as in conventional economic analyses, or 
grouped-data (job-level) regression, as in comparable worth analyses.
The problem with this argument is that standard econometric as 
sumptions on grouped-data estimators do not necessarily hold when 
jobs define the groups to be considered. In particular, the usual conclu 
sions about the unbiasedness of grouped-data estimators apply only if 
the variable determining the grouping is independent of the individual- 
level error term. Here that is unlikely to hold: the individual-level error 
term the e of (3.1) refers to unobservables that affect pay, given 
observed characteristics; and the variable determining the grouping is 
the job. Are unobservables that affect one©s pay (e.g., motivation) 
independent of the job one holds, given observed characteristics? If not, 
application of conventional grouped-data techniques to job-level regres 
sions, as in comparable worth analyses, is inappropriate.
In particular, under plausible conditions, taking the job rather than the 
individual worker as the unit of analysis, as in most comparable worth 
analyses of the pay gap, is likely to overstate the magnitude of the 
adjusted male/female pay gap. In intuitive terms, using the job as the 
unit of analysis induces a form of selection bias in OLS estimates of the 
relation between pay and (average) skill level. Even in a sex-blind 
environment, this bias understates the extent to which differences in 
(average) pay among jobs are attributable to differences in (average) 
skill levels among jobs. To the extent that men have higher skill levels 
than women, they will be concentrated in high-paying jobs (for reasons 
that have nothing to do with discrimination by the employer), so that the 
understatement of the importance of skill differences will turn into an 
overstatement of the importance of the proportion male in generating
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pay differences among jobs, even at given (average) skill levels. Thus, 
even when the employer©s pay practices are sex-neutral, comparable 
worth analyses will imply that males enjoy a salary advantage at given 
skill levels a spurious effect due entirely to selection bias induced by 
taking job as the unit of analysis.
To see the essential ideas underlying this notion, 15 note that, by (3.1), 
a regression that uses within-job means (as in a comparable worth 
analysis) is concerned with estimating
Yj=bXj+ej, j=l,2,...,J (3.1©)
where Yjt Xj and €j are the mean values of the variables Y, X and e, 
respectively, for those individuals / who are actually in job./; and where 
there are J total jobs. (3.1©) is an explicit model of (average) pay within 
jobs; at least implicitly, there is also a process of some kind that 
determines selection into the different jobs. Let ujt denote unobserved 
characteristics (e.g., "motivation") that affect individual fs probability 
of being selected into job j. If these unobserved "selection" charac 
teristics Uji are uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics that affect 
individual fs pay, et , then e^— the average value of et among those 
individuals actually in any job j—will be zero (in expected value). In this 
case, conventional grouped-data methods raise no problems of bias.
However, what if the uj{ are positively correlated with the et — that is, 
what if unobservable factors that affect selection into any job j are 
positively related to unobservables that affect payl If so, then, on 
average, individuals who are in high-paying jobs will enjoy high pay not 
only because they have high X, but also because they have a high Uj for 
the job they hold and thus (because of the positive correlation between e 
and Uj) a high e. In other words, on average, jobs that score high (or low) 
in terms of X will also do so in terms of e. In this case, (3.1©) will suffer 
from an omitted variables problem: the nature of the job selection 
process induces a positive correlation between average within-job mea 
sured skill Xj and the within-job error term e^ Note also that if, for any 
reason (e.g., supply factors), men have more measured skill X than 
women, on average, then Cj in (3.1©) will also be positively correlated 
with Mj, the "maleness" of jobs.
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The consequences for comparable worth pay analyses are now appar 
ent. Consider the prototype comparable worth regression equation:
Yj=bXj+dMj+qJt j=A,B (3.6)
where q is an error term. If men have a higher average skill level than 
women, then, for entirely nondiscriminatory reasons, (1) men will be 
overrepresented in the high-X job and underrepresented in the low-X 
job; (2) the 6j of (3.1©) will be positively correlated with the "maleness" 
of jobs; (3) the expression dMj -\-qj in (3.6) is therefore essentially the 
equivalent of the ^ of (3.1©); and so (4) the estimate of d, the coefficient 
on Mj in (3.6), will be positive.
A positive estimate of d in the "job aggregate" regression (3.6), in 
these circumstances, is simply a statistical artifact. It would, however, 
normally be treated as evidence of discrimination favoring men. Thus, 
aggregating by job, as in comparable worth analyses, can produce the 
appearance of discrimination favoring men even at a sex-blind 
employer.
In sum, because of the three features noted above use of an adminis 
trative pay construct, use of minimum rather than actual skill levels and 
use of jobs rather than individuals as the unit of analysis estimates of 
sex differences in pay obtained in comparable worth analyses are likely 
to differ from those obtained in conventional economic analyses of pay. 
It should be noted at once that these results on the potential for bias(es) 
in comparable worth analyses are not necessarily conclusive. The 
preceding discussion has considered each of the three major features of 
comparable worth analyses in isolation from the other two, but of course 
in actual comparable worth analyses all three features appear simul 
taneously and may interact with each other. Determining the net effect 
on the statistical results of using all three features together is therefore a 
much more complicated question to which the preceding discussion 
provides only tentative answers.
Despite this caveat, however, it seems clear that there is no basis for 
the notion that estimates yielded by comparable worth analyses are 
likely to be the same as, or even similar to, those derived using conven 
tional economic methodology. Depending on the relative importance of
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unequal pay for equal work, unequal access to better work (via both 
initial assignment and promotions) and male/female differences in skills 
and job preferences, comparable worth analyses may produce upward- 
or downward-biased measures of the adjusted male/female pay gap, 
relative to what conventional economic analyses would suggest. In 
particular, to the extent that job evaluation points simply index workers© 
actual jobs, comparable worth analyses will measure only the extent of 
unequal pay for equal work (i.e., work in the same job), and will 
therefore understate the adjusted pay gap relative to conventional analy 
ses (which reflect not only unequal pay for equal work but also unequal 
access to better work). On the other hand, comparable worth analyses 
are likely to overstate the adjusted pay gap relative to conventional 
economic analyses to the extent that male/female skill or job preference 
differences and/or unequal access to better work via unequal promotion 
rates are especially important.
Comparable worth analyses and "systematic underpayment 
of women's jobs"
To some proponents, comparable worth analyses have essentially the 
same purpose and ask essentially the same questions as conventional 
economic analyses. However, to other proponents, the focus of com 
parable worth analyses on jobs rather than on individuals reflects an 
outlook on the labor market generally and on discrimination in particu 
lar that is fundamentally different from the one underlying the conven 
tional economic approach, providing a "new doctrine of sex discrimina 
tion" (England and Norris 1985).
Based on what might be called "institutional analysis," this alternative 
view emphasizes "the importance of institutional features and their 
relative inflexibility in determining wages and other conditions of em 
ployment," and asserts that this emphasis "offers a more fruitful per 
spective from which to understand the existence and the persistence of 
wage differentials between men and women" than does conventional 
economic analysis (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, p. 45). Jobs and 
related concepts (e.g., job families, job ladders, salary ranges for jobs,
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the distinction between entry-level jobs and jobs filled internally by 
transfer or promotion, internal labor markets, segmented labor mar 
kets) are heavily stressed indeed, reified. In this view, individuals are 
of less interest than jobs for analytical (though certainly not normative) 
purposes, since all that individuals can do is to try to fit into the job 
structure as best they can: "Workers do not operate as individuals in the 
labor market, but rather as members of groups defined by their rela 
tionship to labor market structures, and labor market structures effec 
tively limit the choices open to them" (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 
1981, p. 52).
A general difficulty with this view is that it does not always distinguish 
satisfactorily between cases in which jobs and related concepts play an 
independent role in labor market outcomes, and cases in which such 
concepts are merely the surface manifestations of underlying processes 
whose outcomes are actually determined by individual worker charac 
teristics and actions. 16 As regards specific issues related to sex differ 
ences in pay, there are further difficulties. Do labor market structures 
generate such pay differences independently of other phenomena, high 
lighted by conventional economic analysis? If so, how? In particular, 
apart from unequal pay for equal work and unequal access to better 
work, which the conventional economic view also identifies as mecha 
nisms for discrimination, are there other mechanisms, resulting from 
labor market structures rather than from causes identified by the con 
ventional economic approach, that may give rise to such pay differ 
ences? The institutional literature has generally not provided clear 
answers to such questions.
In the present context, the best example of these difficulties has to do 
with one of the stylized facts noted in chapter 2: even with "other things" 
(e.g., education and years of prior work experience) held constant, 
workers of either sex in predominantly female jobs earn less, on aver 
age, than workers of either sex in predominantly male jobs. As shown in 
section 2.2, this stylized fact (and others) can readily be explained in 
terms of a simple conventional economic model of a two-job labor 
market with discrimination (in particular, exclusion from, or more 
generally unequal access to, the high-wage job H of figures 2.1-2). In
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contrast, after citing sex-related differences in job choices and exclusion 
of women from high-paying jobs as possible explanations, two promi 
nent institutionalists offer a third and presumably distinct explanation 
"for the lower pay rates of jobs held mainly by women": "women©s work 
is underpaid because women do it that is, that the same work would be 
paid more if it were done by men" (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, 
p. 56). But this is less an "explanation" than a tautology; moreover, the 
subsequent discussion of how firms manage "to implement an explicit 
decision to pay women or minority workers less than men or whites" (p. 
57) turns out to rest heavily on exclusion, i.e., unequal access to better 
work (pp. 58, 62-63). The unanswered questions remain: What mecha 
nisms in particular, what institutional factors—other than exclusion 
make it possible for employers to engage in "systematic underpayment 
of jobs held mainly by women" (p. 65)? Will such systematic underpay 
ment be overlooked or understated by conventional economic analyses, 
and yet be accurately measured by comparable worth analyses?
The answers to these questions are somewhat surprising. Systematic 
underpayment of predominantly female jobs relative to predominantly 
male jobs need not require exotic job structures (as in the institutionalist 
view) or exclusion (as in the conventional economic view). Although 
such systematic underpayment will be entirely overlooked by conven 
tional economic analyses of pay, comparable worth analyses of pay are 
quite unlikely to measure it accurately. The way to avoid mismeasure- 
ment of such systematic underpayment is to analyze not compensation, 
but rather vacancies and shortages.
Two examples help illuminate the basic ideas. First, consider how 
comparable worth and conventional economic analyses would be used 
to determine whether a university discriminates against female faculty 
relative to male faculty. The conventional economic approach would 
entail regressing individual faculty members© pay on an indicator 
variable denoting sex and on variables measuring personal charac 
teristics highest degree, years since highest degree, age, field of aca 
demic specialization (social work, sociology, statistics, etc.), years of 
university service, prior work experience, etc. The unit of analysis 
would be the individual faculty member. The question to be investigated
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would be whether men are paid more than women, other things (per 
sonal characteristics related to qualifications and preferences) being 
equal.
In contrast, a comparable worth analysis would take "job" as the unit 
of analysis, and would start with an evaluation of the worth of each job. 
In a university setting, "job" might mean academic department, or 
possibly cells constructed by academic rank and department: that is, 
sociology faculty would be treated as doing one job and statistics faculty 
another; alternatively, associate professors in sociology would be 
treated as being in one job and associate professors in statistics would be 
treated as being in another. Presumably, all faculty jobs (or, more 
narrowly, all faculty jobs at the same academic rank), regardless of 
academic department, would be assessed as requiring the same skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions: in other words, jobs 
(perhaps at the same academic rank) in social work, statistics, etc., 
would be assessed as "comparable." 17
Taking jobs (either departments, or department-rank cells) as the unit 
of analysis, one would then regress an administrative pay figure (e.g., 
the maximum or midpoint of a pay range) or a summary statistic for pay 
(e.g., mean pay) on the proportion female in each job. Since all jobs 
(e.g., departments) would be assessed as comparable, it would be 
unnecessary to include any measure of job evaluation points, since these 
would be the same for all departments. 18 Moreover, it would be inap 
propriate to include any indicators denoting the academic field (statis 
tics, sociology, etc.) of each job, for that would amount to treating 
interfield pay differences as "legitimate" despite the job evaluation©s 
conclusion that all fields are comparable. 19
Predicting the likely results of such a comparable worth evaluation of 
faculty pay is straightforward. Pay of faculty in predominantly male 
disciplines such as economics or engineering usually exceeds that of 
faculty in predominantly female (or less heavily male) disciplines such 
as humanities or nursing. Thus, one would almost certainly obtain a 
negative relation between pay and "proportion female," even with fac 
ulty rank held constant (as a means of allowing for differences across 
ranks in skill, effort and responsibility).
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Clearly, then, an analysis of this kind is different from a conventional 
economic analysis of discrimination, and is likely to lead to different 
conclusions. In particular, if women and men with the same personal 
characteristics (degrees, years of service, fields of academic specializa 
tion, etc.) enjoy the same access to better-paid academic ranks (pro 
fessor, associate professor, etc.) and receive the same pay in the same 
academic rank, conventional economic analysis would find no differ 
ence in pay by sex. In contrast, even if similar individuals enjoy both 
equal pay in the same rank and equal access to better-paid ranks, a 
comparable worth evaluation would obtain a negative relation between 
average pay and "proportion female" in different jobs (e.g., departments 
or rank-department cells). This would be due entirely to the fact that, 
relative to men, women who are otherwise similar (in terms of degrees, 
years of service, etc.) are more likely to be in relatively low-paid 
academic specialties (e.g., humanities or nursing as opposed to eco 
nomics or engineering). But would it be correct to infer from this that 
the university being studied discriminates against women?
In terms of conventional economic analyses, such an inference would 
be warranted only if, relative to male faculty with the same training, the 
university locked female faculty out of high-paid specialties and kept 
them instead in lower-paid disciplines. Since the notion of "training" 
encompasses field of academic specialization, that seems very unlikely. 
It would seem most implausible that anyone with training in engineer 
ing, regardless of sex, would be "kept" in any discipline other than 
engineering; and equally implausible that anyone, regardless of sex, 
with training in the humanities would be able to gain access to a position 
on the engineering faculty. 20 A relation between proportion male and 
average pay among different disciplines would appear, rather, to be a 
consequence of supply-side differences beyond the university©s control, 
whereunder because of differential socialization or other prelabor 
market factors - women seek training in and enter low-paying fields to a 
greater extent than otherwise identical men. 21 To the extent that these 
differences exist, a negative relation between proportion female and 
average pay by discipline will arise even at an entirely sex-blind univer-
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sity, but would be treated as evidence of discriminatory employment 
practices in a comparable worth analysis.
None of this, however, addresses the question of "systematic under 
payment." What if the university is not sex-blind, but rather has decided 
systematically to underpay predominantly female disciplines (or over 
pay predominantly male disciplines)? Conventional economic analyses 
of pay will effectively ignore this possibility, because they would typ 
ically include "academic discipline" (e.g., a set of discipline indicators) 
among the X in expressions such as (3.1). The alternative comparable 
worth analysis of pay requires the dubious assumption that, in the 
absence of discrimination by the university, everyone, regardless of 
discipline, would receive the same pay (on average and other things, 
such as years of service, being equal). Thus, neither conventional 
economic nor comparable worth analysis of pay will provide a suitable 
basis for estimating the extent of discrimination via such systematic 
underpayment.
As a second example, suppose that an employer or a group of 
employers decides to exercise monopsony power over (workers in) a 
predominantly female job, e.g., nurses or clerical workers. 22 Conven 
tional economic analysis of pay at such a monopsonistic employer 
would generally include (if possible) one or more indicators for type of 
skill possessed, e.g., training in nursing or prior experience in clerical 
work. Thus, the employer©s systematic underpayment (via exercise of 
monopsony power) of its nurses or clerical workers would be subsumed 
into the coefficient on the relevant skill indicator(s) and would not affect 
the estimated sex difference in pay (the coefficient d in expressions such 
as (3.1)) in any way. As in the previous example, although conventional 
economic analysis of pay would clearly be unsatisfactory in a setting of 
this kind, comparable worth analysis of pay here would be equally 
unsatisfactory, for it would require the dubious assumption that a job 
evaluation will accurately measure the wage differential between nurses 
(or clericals) and other jobs that would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination.
In sum, neither conventional economic nor comparable worth analy 
ses of pay are adequate for assessing the question of systematic under-
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payment (or overpayment) of jobs based on the sex composition of the 
persons who do them. Fortunately, however, this question can be ad 
dressed by analyzing other employment practices using quite conven 
tional concepts, such as vacancies and waiting lists (Fischel and Lazear 
1986a). Systematic underpayment of women©s jobs  social work or 
nursing will inevitably lead to systematic shortages: chronic vacan 
cies, unfilled positions, etc. Systematic overpayment of men©s jobs  
engineers or tree-trimmers will inevitably lead to systematic sur 
pluses: a chronic excess of applicants relative to available positions, 
long waiting lists of qualified persons seeking a small number of vacant 
jobs, etc. 23
Development of a methodology for empirical analysis of the presence 
(and, even more so, the magnitude) of systematic underpayment (or 
overpayment) of jobs according to sex composition is beyond the scope 
of this book. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that although 
conventional economic analyses of pay are not a satisfactory means for 
addressing this question, neither are comparable worth analyses of pay.
3.4 Analyzing the Effects of Comparable Worth Wage Adjustments
Many discussions of comparable worth focus on conceptual issues of 
the kind examined in chapter 2, e.g., whether unequal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth is necessarily discriminatory and whether it is appro 
priate to require equal pay for jobs of comparable worth. To a lesser 
extent, analysts have considered technical issues such as the ones dis 
cussed in this chapter, e.g., the statistical merits and demerits of com 
parable worth analyses of pay. To many observers, however, the most 
important issues regarding comparable worth have to do with its likely 
effects on wages, employment and other labor market outcomes. In this 
view, the acid test is not whether the concept of comparable worth is 
analytically sound or whether comparable worth pay analyses yield 
statistically unbiased measures of discriminatory pay practices. Rather, 
the crucial issue is an entirely pragmatic one: whether actual implemen-
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tation of comparable worth can raise the pay of women workers, reduce 
the pay gap, etc., without serious adverse side effects.
Prior research
To date, analyzing the empirical consequences of actually adopting 
comparable worth has been difficult: comparable worth has not yet been 
adopted on a widespread basis. Consequently, most assessments of the 
effects of comparable worth have attempted to work out what would be 
likely to occur //"wage adjustments were made along comparable worth 
lines. Studies of this kind have focused on the effects on wages and on the 
male/female pay gap. In most cases, 24 the starting point is a comparable 
worth wage regression, with jobs as the unit of analysis, that regresses 
jobs© pay Yj (e.g., maximum or minimum pay rates) on one or more 
variables denoting the jobs© characteristics Xj (e.g., Haypoint or other 
evaluation scores, measures of working conditions, etc.) and a sex 
composition variable M- (e.g., the proportion male in the jobs, or 
whether the jobs are predominantly male or female, etc.). Thus, such 
analyses start with a relation such as (3.6).
The next step in these analyses is to use the estimate of d, the 
coefficient on the sex composition variable M, to work out the wage 
effects of full implementation of a comparable worth standard. For 
example, if M measures the proportion of incumbents in a job who are 
male, so that M ranges between zero (for an all-female job) and one (for 
an all-male job), then the estimate of d in (3.6) is treated as an estimate 
of the male salary advantage. In order to ensure that (average) pay in all- 
female jobs equals that in all-male jobs of the same "worth" (that is, the 
same value of Xj), one would have to raise pay for each all-female job by 
d. More generally, comparable worth would require raising pay for a job 
j that is PJ percent female by 0.0 Ipjd. 25 The total cost of these pay 
increases can be then derived by multiplying the pay increase for each 
job, Q.Qlpjd, times the number of incumbents in that job, Nj, and then 
summing over all jobs).
Analyses of this kind are not without interest, but they are inevitably 
limited. At best, they indicate the maximum potential effect of compara-
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ble worth on wages rather than the actual consequences of a politically 
and budgetarily feasible set of wage adjustments. Indeed, to the extent 
that comparable worth pay adjustments are adopted through labor 
management bargaining and/or the exercise of administrative discre 
tion, analyses of this kind do not necessarily indicate even the relative 
magnitudes of the wage increases given to different jobs. (For example, 
a given job might receive either more or less than the amount Q.Qlpjd 
required under a strict implementation of a comparable worth standard 
depending on whether the union representing workers in that job was 
strong or weak.) Also, such analyses usually do not consider the 
potential effects of comparable worth wage increases on employment.
Analyses for this book: an overview
The alternative, adopted here, is to analyze the empirical effects of 
adoption of comparable worth in actual settings rather than under 
hypothetical assumptions. Chapters 4-6 present studies of: the State of 
Minnesota, which passed legislation requiring equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth in state employment; San Jose, California, which 
adjusted pay of municipal employees along comparable worth lines; and 
Australia, which since the early part of this century has had a national 
wage arbitration system that has several comparable worth features. 
These analyses of the effects of actual adoption of comparable worth (or 
comparable worth-like criteria) do not provide information on the 
maximum potential consequences of completely applying such a stan 
dard. They do, however, indicate the consequences of adopting com 
parable worth subject to constraints imposed by economic and political 
realities. Moreover, the studies in chapters 4-6 explicitly consider 
effects on employment, a subject that was generally ignored in most 
prior work.
The questions to be examined can be stated very simply. Relative to 
what would have prevailed in the absence of comparable worth, is a 
labor market outcome of interest wages, the sex gap in pay, employ 
ment, etc.  either higher or lower as a result of the version of compara 
ble worth actually adopted? If so, by how much?
84 The Economics of Comparable Worth
The empirical analyses of these issues in chapters 4-6 proceed 
sequentially. The first step is to analyze the independent effect of 
adopting comparable worth on wages; the second, to estimate the ceteris 
paribus relation between employment and wages. The final step uses the 
results of the previous two steps to derive an estimate of the independent 
effect of adopting comparable worth on employment. One interesting 
feature of these analyses is that they use time-series data for periods both 
before and after adoption of comparable worth. In contrast, the studies 
of the potential effects of comparable worth described earlier have been 
confined to analysis of single cross-section "snapshots" as of a single 
date.
As noted in section 3.3, the results of analyses of pay may be quite 
sensitive to one©s choice of the unit of analysis: either individuals or jobs. 
In this connection, one important feature of the studies in chapters 4 and 
5 is worth emphasizing at the outset. The basic data available for 
analysis of San Jose©s comparable worth wage adjustments refer to jobs 
rather than individuals: the necessary individual-level data do not exist 
for the relevant period. Here, there is no way to avoid using jobs as the 
unit of analysis. In contrast, the basic data available for analysis of 
Minnesota©s experience with comparable worth refer to individual state 
employees. This makes it possible to perform both conventional eco 
nomic analyses (using the data in their original individual-level form) 
and comparable worth analyses (by aggregating the individual-level 
data up to the level of jobs). Accordingly, I discuss the Minnesota results 
before the San Jose results: the information provided by the Minnesota 
analyses on the consequences of using jobs rather than individuals as the 
unit of analysis turns out to be very useful in assessing the San Jose 
analyses, in which, as just noted, jobs must be used as the unit of 
analysis. (The data available for Australia are conventional macro- 
economic time-series data, so I defer discussion of the framework used 
in evaluating Australia©s experience with comparable worth to 
chapter 6.)
Wage effects
The first step in the analyses in subsequent chapters is to regress a 
measure of the wage of observation / at time t, Wit , on a set of control
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variables pertinent to / at t, Xit , and a "comparable worth" indicator Cit 
denoting the existence at t of a comparable worth policy with the 
potential to affect fs wage:
Wit=bXit +kCit + eit , i=l, 2,..., AT; t=l, 2,...,T. (3.7)
The data are longitudinal, consisting of observations for each of N 
individual units as of each of a total of T dates. Depending on the nature 
of the available data, the unit of analysis, "/," is either an individual 
worker (in some of the analyses for Minnesota) or a job (in other 
analyses for Minnesota, and in all analyses for San Jose). How is the 
comparable worth variable Cit in (3.7) to be defined? As actually 
adopted in the "test sites" considered in this work, comparable worth was 
not applied equally to all jobs or people. Some jobs (and, thus, the 
people in those jobs) were "targeted" for comparable worth wage in 
creases, but others were not. This suggests at least two ways to define 
the comparable worth variable Cit : as an indicator denoting either (1) 
whether the observation i was itself "targeted" and eligible for a com 
parable worth wage increase as of time t; or (2) that the comparable 
worth policy was in force as of time t.
The distinction is not trivial; rather, it can have important econo 
metric implications. Under the first definition, Cit will vary cross- 
sectionally as well as over time, whereas under the second it will vary 
only over time. 26 The major objective here, of course, is to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the "comparable worth effect," k. As the preced 
ing discussion suggests (albeit in rather different contexts), the estimate 
of k will be biased if, at given values of the Xit , the comparable worth 
variable Cit is correlated with the error term eir The interesting point 
here is that since the data used to estimate (3.7) are longitudinal, i.e., a 
cross-section (of individuals or jobs) observed over time, correlation 
between Cit and eit at given Xit can arise either cross-sectionally or over 
time, depending on how Cit is defined.
Under the first definition, Cit equals one for an observation (a job, or 
an individual working in a job) targeted for a comparable worth wage 
increase with the potential to affect wages as of time t. Use of this
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definition raises two kinds of questions: selection bias issues, and 
conceptual issues. 27
The selection bias issue arises if targeting of comparable worth wage 
increases is based in part on the eit of jobs (or of the persons in those 
jobs). For example, if jobs (or jobs with workers) that have consistently 
had low eit over time "chronically underpaid jobs" are "targeted" for 
comparable worth wage increases, then Cit defined in this first sense will 
be negatively correlated with eit (even given Xit) for essentially cross- 
sectional reasons: here the comparable worth wage increases go to jobs 
(or workers) that have consistently had low or negative values of eit at all 
dates t. If so, the estimated effect of comparable worth will understate 
the actual effect due to selection bias. This problem is similar to the one 
that arises in analyses of wage effects of employment training programs 
when program administrators go out of their way to select "disadvan- 
taged" trainees, or persons with below-average earnings (i.e., low or 
negative unobserved components e) even when observed characteristics 
(X) are taken into account. Various techniques to address the selection 
bias problem are available (for a review, see Heckman and Robb 1985), 
but they can be difficult to implement and may require assumptions 
about the precise form of the relation between eit and (the first definition 
of) Cit that are to some extent arbitrary.
Use of the first definition of the comparable worth variable Cit in (3.7) 
also raises a conceptual issue. Even if an unbiased estimate of k can be 
derived, under the first definition of Cit the magnitude of k indicates only 
the amount of additional pay received by (persons in) targeted jobs 
relative to (those in) nontargeted jobs. It will not necessarily indicate the 
amount of additional pay received by either (persons in) targeted jobs or 
(those in) nontargeted jobs relative to what would have been received in 
the absence of adoption of comparable worth. 2*
This conceptual distinction is potentially important. Pay increases for 
individual jobs or workers are not normally made in a vacuum. Com 
parable worth wage increases do not necessarily amount to pure "add 
ons" to the pay of (workers in) targeted jobs, and do not necessarily leave 
pay of (workers in) nontargeted jobs unaffected (Evans and Nelson 
1989, p. 96). Rather, comparable worth wage increases for some jobs
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may be financed, in whole or in part, by wage decreases (or smaller 
wage increases) for others. (Evans and Nelson 1989, pp. 117-121, 
report that in Minnesota, 60 percent of state employees expressed 
concern that that state©s comparable worth wage adjustments might 
mean that some salaries would be "frozen.") Alternatively, comparable 
worth wage increases for (workers in) some jobs may be accompanied 
by, or give rise to, wage increases for others, even if the latter wage 
changes are not labelled "comparable worth increases" as such. 29
Given the potential statistical and (in particular) conceptual problems 
associated with the first definition of Cit , the studies in this work use the 
second definition: Cit is a simple "before or after" indicator variable, 
equal to unity if the observation pertains to a date on or after the date of a 
comparable worth wage increase, and zero otherwise. As such, this 
second version of Cit varies over time but not cross-sectionally: for a 
given job (or individual), it will equal zero for dates prior to the date of a 
comparable worth wage increase and unity thereafter, but it will have the 
same value (either zero or unity) for all observations as of the same date. 
Hence, unlike the first definition, the second has little or no potential for 
selection bias. The second definition also avoids the conceptual problem 
to which the first definition may be subject. For example, when (3.7) is 
estimated for predominantly male jobs using this second definition of 
Cit , the coefficient on k will reflect the extent (if any) to which compara 
ble worth wage adjustments were accompanied by wage changes (in 
creases or decreases) for predominantly male jobs, even if such jobs 
were not explicitly targeted for comparable worth wage increases and 
were not supposed to "pay for" (or "share in") such wage increases.
Of course, a potential for biased estimates of comparable worth wage 
effects arises under this second definition, largely because of time-series 
(as opposed to cross-sectional) reasons. The key problem is to specify 
correctly the appropriate "counterfactual," i.e., to control for changes in 
the outcome of interest that would have happened (even) in the absence 
of comparable worth. For example, suppose that adoption of compara 
ble worth in a given area coincides, purely by chance, with a major 
contraction (or expansion) of the surrounding economy, decreases (or 
increases) in the general wage level, etc. Then unless the Xit appropri-
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ately reflect these changes in the economic environment, Cit , as defined 
in the second sense, will be negatively (or positively) correlated with eit 
and the comparable worth effect, k, will be downward- (or upward-) 
biased. Hence, the empirical hurdles here resemble those confronting 
researchers studying the employment effects of minimum wage in 
creases or the wage effects of affirmative action. For example, since 
employment grows over time along with (and despite?) increases in the 
minimum wage, simple before-and-after comparisons may yield the 
erroneous conclusion that increases in the minimum "caused" increases 
in employment. 30
For this reason, the control variables X used in estimation of (3.7) 
include measures not only of characteristics of the unit of analysis as of 
the relevant date (e.g., years of state government employment, in the 
Minnesota analyses of individual workers) but also of the general 
economic environment prevailing as of that date. Specifically, the "en 
vironmental variables" consist of measures of prices, private-sector 
employment and private-sector average earnings as of the same date31 
and time trend terms, thereby abstracting from fluctuations in general 
economic conditions and secular trends.
A final and more subtle set of issues concerns the technique to be used 
to estimate (3.7). The data are longitudinal, so that each of the N units of 
observation (jobs or individuals) appears in the analysis a total of T 
times. In principle, pooled OLS regression can yield consistent esti 
mates of all of the parameters of the model. To the extent that the error 
term eit tends to be the same for a given individual unit (person or job) 
over time, however, the properties of simple pooled OLS estimators will 
suffer. Rather than rely on pooled OLS, I therefore use fixed-effects 
estimation. This is equivalent to specifying the error term eit as consist 
ing of an individual- (person- or job-) specific time-invariant component 
eL and a purely random component vit that varies both across individuals 
and overtime, i.e.,
**=«I.+v* (3-8)
Fixed-effects regression is equivalent to OLS regression on all NT 
observations using (3.7) with a dummy variable added for each cross-
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section unit i: that is, by (3.7)-(3.8), the e, in (3.8) is equivalent to the 
coefficient at on the dummy variable Df in
Wit=bXit +kCit +fD + vit (3.9)
where D is a vector of dummy variables, with the ith equalling unity if 
the observation refers to the ith job (or individual) and zero otherwise, 
and / is the vector of coefficients on the D. The coefficient f{ on the 
dummy variable D, for observation (person or job) / is that observation©s 
"fixed effect." Since time-invariant factors for a given observation are 
collinear with the dummy variable for that observation (and since their 
combined effect on the dependent variable plus that of any time- 
invariant unobserved variables is captured by / ), all time-invariant 
regressors in X are dropped from the fixed-effects regression itself; only 
time-varying regressors remain.
The problem of bias may be less severe in fixed-effects regression 
than in pooled OLS regression: bias induced by correlation between the 
error term eit and observables Xit that is caused by fixed effects e{ has, of 
course, been removed because the et itself has effectively been removed. 
In particular, some of chapter 5©s analyses of San Jose©s experience with 
comparable worth use data on jobs to estimate (3.7) by fixed effects 
using the first (targeted job) definition of the comparable worth indicator 
Cir To the extent that jobs are targeted for comparable worth wage 
increases because they are "chronically underpaid," it seems reasonable 
to treat the fixed effect et in (3.8) as a determinant of "being targeted." 
Then, although fixed-effects estimation, i.e., estimating (3.9), does not 
avoid the conceptual issues raised by use of the first definition of Cit , it 
may at least avoid the bias that would arise if (3.7) were estimated by 
OLS.
Wages and employment
The second step in the analyses performed here is to estimate the 
relation between wages and employment using a regression model of the 
form
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log Nit=bXit+g log Wit+uit (3. 10)
in which the unit of analysis (/) is the job; Af is employment, Xis a set of 
control variables, W is a measure of the wage rate in the job, and u 
denotes unobservables. As in the wage analyses, the data used here are 
longitudinal, referring to each of J jobs observed at each of T dates.
This is, of course, a rudimentary labor demand function. As an 
example of the kind of underlying process that generates such a func 
tion, consider a two-level CES-style cost function in which sets of 
different jobs make up composites or groups, g:
C = Y'&lLWW™}"* (3.11)
where C=cost, Y= output, W)=wage rate paid for job i, t subscripts 
denote time, and s, v, the r(g) and the ai are parameters. Then, by 
Shephard©s Lemma, a cost-minimizing employer©s employment Nf of 
workers in a job i that belongs to a group j is given by
log Nit=\og Zit+[r(f)-\] log Wit , iej (3.12) 
where Z in (3. 12) is given by
Zit = C, 1 - vy,-*o - v)v[E^JV0©)] (v~^))/r0X-, iej. (3.13)
On the (somewhat heroic) assumption that log Z in (3. 12), as defined in 
(3.13), can be approximated by a smooth function of time and ex 
ogenous variables, (3.10) is equivalent to (3.12).
Several comments about estimation and interpretation of (3.10), 
particularly in light of (3.12), are appropriate at this point. First, since 
the right hand side of (3.10) does not include an explicit measure of 
output or total cost, it might appear that the coefficient on W is an 
ordinary wage-elasticity, incorporating both the substitution and output 
(or "scale") effect of wage changes. As (3. 12)-(3. 13) indicate, however, 
the X vector in (3. 10) may be regarded as a proxy for output Y (and the 
other factors included within Z, e.g. , costs C). Hence the coefficient on 
the wage variable in (3. 10) should be interpreted as an output-constant 
wage elasticity that does not incorporate output (or "scale") effects. 
Second, note that the coefficient on log Wt in (3 . 12), r(/) - 1 , is the same
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for all jobs i belonging to the same group./. In the analyses of chapters 4 
and 5,1 have put jobs into three groups, according to the sex composi 
tion of their employment: predominantly female jobs are in one group, 
predominantly male jobs are in a second group, and all other jobs are in 
the third group. Finally, in keeping with the interpretation of (3.10) as a 
labor demand function, the samples used to estimate (3.10) are limited 
to jobs with positive employment (AO over the entire period of analysis: 
jobs with zero employment at some date are inframarginal (at least at 
that date) and so observations for that date are not on the relevant 
demand function.
There are two obvious potential bias problems connected with estima 
tion of (3.10). The first is that, in a hierarchical organization, high-paid 
jobs (e.g., senior clerk, police chief) usually have relatively few incum 
bents at any given date, whereas low-paid jobs (e.g., file clerk, police 
officer) usually have relatively many. Thus a negative coefficient on Win 
(3.10) may indicate only that employment is indeed hierarchical, rather 
than that wage increases reduce employment in a given job. I address 
this problem by estimating (3.10) using fixed-effects regression; to the 
extent that a job©s position in the employment hierarchy is fixed, this 
provides a means of abstracting from the hierarchy-induced negative 
relation as of any given date between jobs© pay rates and their employ 
ment levels. 32
The second problem is that, as noted above, I exclude jobs with zero 
employment at any point during the period of analysis. It is possible that 
this generates a form of selection bias. To the extent that a job©s having 
zero employment at some point is a consequence of attributes that are 
essentially fixed, however, fixed-effects regression provides a means of 
obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters of (3.10). The alter 
native, including jobs even when they are not on the demand curve, 
seems much less appealing.
Employment effects
The final step in the analysis is to use estimates of the comparable 
worth effect on wages, derived from (3.7), and of the relation between
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wages and employment, derived from (3.10), to work out the effect of 
comparable worth on employment. Since the analyses use log-log 
specifications, the wage effect in (3.7) is expressed as a percentage and 
the effect of wages on employment in (3.10) is expressed as an elasticity. 
Thus, the effect of the comparable worth wage adjustments may be 
derived by multiplying the wage effect times the employment elasticity. 
As indicated in subsequent chapters, these employment effects are 
usually negative. It should therefore be emphasized at the outset that 
these are ceteris paribus effects that abstract from the effects of other 
factors. That is, to say that the employment effect of comparable worth 
was negative is not to say that adoption of comparable worth actually 
reduced employment relative to the level that prevailed prior to adop 
tion. Rather, it means that, in the absence of comparable worth, employ 
ment would have been higher than it actually was or, more or less 
equivalently, that adoption of comparable worth reduced growth in 
employment. Indeed, as documented in the following chapters, adop 
tion of comparable worth in the "test sites" considered here did not cause 
anyone to lose his or her job. 33 Rather, the employment effects were 
more subtle: the wage increases resulting from adoption were large 
enough to reduce employment growth, but were not so large as to cause 
complete stagnation of employment, much less actual declines. Thus, 
the evidence in the following chapters suggests that, in general, the real 
losers from the comparable worth wage adjustments were persons who 
were seeking jobs but were unable to get them (rather than people who 
already had jobs but lost them) because of adoption of comparable 
worth.
Appendix to Chapter 3: 
Selection Bias Induced by Use of Grouped-Data Regression
To see the potential selection bias problem that may be induced by use 
of grouped-data regression methods, consider the following simple 
example of a sex-neutral company employing workers in only two jobs, 
A and B. Pay of individual / depends on his or her observed charac-
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teristics, X, and on unobserved characteristics, e, but does not depend 
on sex, M. Thus, in terms of (3.1), d=Q; equivalently, pay is now given 
by
Y^bXi + e^ (A3.1)
Next, suppose the job actually held by / depends on the index function
I^hXi+Ui (A3.2)
where ut denotes unobserved characteristics of/ that affect whether he or 
she is in job A or B, and where individuals for whom / is positive 
(nonpositive) are selected to hold job A (B). 34 Thus, by (A3.2),
M, > - (hXf) «-» individual i is in job A (A3.3.1) 
M, < - (hXd <-> individual i is in job B (A3.3.2) 
By (A3.1)-(A3.2), the mean of Y given / is
E(Y\f)=E(bX+e\hX+u)=E(w\v) (A3.4)
where w=bX+e and v=hX+u. To simplify, suppose that the X of 
(A3.1)-(A3.2) is a single variable, normally distributed, with mean fj,x 
and variance ax2 , and independent of both e and u; and that e and u are 
jointly normally distributed mean-zero random variables with finite 
variances a 2 and au2 , respectively, and covariance aeu . Then w and v are 
also jointly normally distributed random variables with finite variances 
aw2 and a 2 , respectively, and covariance awv .
Now consider estimating (A3.1) by OLS using data aggregated by 
job, as in comparable worth analyses (instead of data for individual 
workers, as in conventional economic analyses), while following con 
ventional economic methodology in all other respects. (Thus, as in the 
previous two cases, one aspect of comparable worth analyses is consid 
ered in isolation from the others; see note 10 in the text.) Equations 
(A3.1)-(A3.4) and familiar results on selection bias (e.g., Heckman 
1979) yield the following expressions for average pay, skill level, etc., 
within the high-paid job A:
bnx+[aJav}LA (A3.5.1)
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eA =E(e\I>Q) = [aev/av]LA (A3.5.2)
XA=E(X\I>Q)=nx+[°Xv/<rv\LA (A3.5.3)
YA=bXA+eA (A3.5.4)
where LA =f(—h^x/av)/[\—F(—h^x/ffv)], /is the standard normal 
probability density function and F is the standard normal cumulative 
density function. Note that LA is positive- valued and monotonically 
increasing in its argument (Heckman 1979). Similarly, equations (A3. 1) 
-(A3. 4) and conventional selection bias analysis yield the following 
expressions for average pay, skill level, etc., within the low-paid job B:
YB=E(Y\I< 0) =biLX+ [oJov}LB (A3.6. 1)
eB=E(e\I< 0) = [aJav]LB (A3 .6.2)
XB=E(X\I<Q)=fjix+[aXv/av]LB (A3.6.3)
YB=bXB+eB (A3. 6. 4)
where LB=   /(  h^xla^lF(— /i/x^/aj; note that LB is negative- valued 
and decreasing in its argument.
If e and u are uncorrelated, then aev=Q and the error term ej,j=A or 
B, has zero expectation. In this case, regression of Yj on X, where both 
variables are job averages, as in a comparable worth regression, should 
yield (1) an unbiased estimate of b and (2) a zero (in statistical terms) 
coefficient for Mj, the proportion male in job j, unless men are in fact 
paid more than women with the same X. Here, that is, aggregating over jobs does not induce a selection bias in estimates of the male salary 
advantage.
On the other hand, if u and e are positively correlated -if unobserved 
factors (e.g. , "motivation") that enhance one©s chances of getting a high- 
paid job, «, are positively correlated with unobserved factors that raise 
pay, e— then aggregating over jobs induces a selection bias that creates 
the appearance of a male salary advantage even if none exists.
To see this, consider equations (A3.5)-(A3.6). In the "true" salary 
relation, (A3.1), pay Y depends (only) on skill X and unobserved 
characteristics e, where average e is assumed to be zero at all levels of
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skill. In the high-paid job A, the average skill level is XA . However, by 
(A3. 5. 2) and (A3. 5. 4), average pay of persons in A, YA , exceeds the 
average pay of persons with skill level XA by an amount eA =E(e\I>0) 
= [aev/av]LA >0. That is because selection into A depends not only on 
measured skill X but also on unmeasured attributes, u, that are (by 
assumption) positively correlated with unmeasured factors that affect 
pay, e; thus, persons in A enjoy high pay, on average, not only because 
they have high X but also because they have high e. Similarly, in the low- 
paid job B, the average skill level is XB but, by (A3. 6. 2) and (A3. 6. 4), 
average pay of persons in B, YB, is less than the average pay of persons 
with skill level XB by an amount eB=E(e\I< 0) = [aev/av]LB < 0. Selec 
tion into B also depends on both measured skill X and unmeasured 
attributes, u, that are (by assumption) positively correlated with un 
measured factors that affect pay, e\ thus, persons in B receive low pay 
because they not only have low X but also, on average, have low e.
What does this imply about regression using within-job means, as in a 
comparable worth analysis? By (A3. 5. 4) and (A3. 6. 4), the relation 
between pay and skill across jobs is given by
Yj=bXj+ejt j=A,B. (A3. 10
By (A3.5.2)-(A3.5.4) and (A3.6.2)-(A3.6.4), ej is positively corre 
lated with Xji on average, jobs that "score high" (or low) in terms of X 
also do so in terms of e. In effect, (A3.T) suffers from an omitted 
variables problem: the nature of the job selection process induces a 
positive correlation between average within-job measured skill Xj and 
the within-job error term e^. Note also that if, for any reason (e.g., 
supply factors), men have more measured skill X than women, on 
average, then ^ in (A3. 1©) will also be positively correlated with Mjt the 
"maleness" of jobs.
The consequences for comparable worth pay analyses are now appar 
ent. Consider the prototype comparable worth regression equation:
q, j=A, B. (A3.7)
If men have a higher average skill level (/x^) than women, then, for 
entirely nondiscriminatory reasons, (1) men will be overrepresented in
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the high-Xjob and underrepresented in the low-Xjob; (2) the €j of 
(A3.1©) will be positively correlated with the "maleness" of jobs; and (3) 
the expression dMj+qj in (A3.7) is therefore essentially the equivalent 
of the 6j of (A3.1©); and so (4) the estimate of d, the coefficient on Mj in 
(A3.7), will be positive.
NOTES
1 Note that the X may include a vector of ones, i.e., an intercept. Examples of variables 
typically included among the X are total years of work experience, tenure (years of service with 
current employer), age, educational attainment, field of educational attainment, and the like. Both 
proponents and critics of the conventional economic approach sometimes loosely refer to such 
variables as "human capital variables" and/or to equations like (3.1) as a "human capital earnings 
function" (for example, see Smith 1977, pp. 35-40, and Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, pp. 
17-24). Such references to human capital may simply be intended to indicate that expressions like 
(3.1) may have been inspired in part by the seminal work of Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) on 
human capital models of earnings. It should be noted, however, that regardless of their original 
inspiration, (3.1) and similar expressions may well be entirely consistent with other models of 
earnings, even ones whose underlying assumptions differ radically from those of human capital 
models. For example, screening models of earnings (surveyed by Riley 1974) reject the "human 
capital" notion that education affects earnings by affecting productivity; but they nevertheless imply 
that the "human capital variable" of educational attainment will have a significant independent effect 
on earnings, and thus that it belongs in expressions such as (3.1).
2 Following Oaxaca (1973), who first popularized the approach in economics, many investiga 
tors estimate separate equations for men and women rather than a single equation (with sex 
indicator variable M) such as (3.1) for both sexes combined. The single-equation approach 
embodied in (3.1) in effect assumes that the male and female pay structures differ by a constant 
amount regardless of other characteristics (the X), whereas the two-equation approach allows for 
the possibility that the payoffs to individual characteristics (the X) differ by sex; see Cain (1986) for 
further discussion. However, in my own experience, the two approaches have very similar 
quantitative implications regarding the overall average sex difference in pay for persons with the 
same characteristics (which is not surprising, since the single-equation approach provides what 
amounts to a matrix-weighted average of the effects yielded by the two-equation approach). As a 
practical matter, the differences between the single- and two-equation approaches are more in the 
nature of fine tuning rather than important methodological differences with significant implications 
for estimating sex differences in pay.
3 Note that variation in earnings among men and the male/female pay gap are two quite 
different things: the former refers to variation about the mean among men, whereas the latter refers 
to a difference in means between men and women. Comparing the two amounts to comparing apples 
and oranges. It is therefore inappropriate to infer, as Roback apparently does, that because the 
fraction of earnings variation among men that is "unexplained," 60 percent, is larger than the 
fraction of the pay gap between men and women that is "unexplained," 13 to 34 percent (according 
to Roback), inclusion of omitted variables might explain all of the latter. As a simple example, due 
to Fisher (1982), imagine a company in which all employees are identical and at which monthly
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salaries are 10 times the figure derived by spinning a roulette wheel plus either $600 (in the case of 
women) or $1,100 (in the case of men). Among both men and women, much of the variation in 
earnings would be "unexplained" (that is, R2 for an earnings regression would be relatively low), but 
the pay gap of $500 would clearly be discriminatory, and would persist even if a variable measuring 
each employee©s roulette wheel number were added to the analysis, thereby making it possible to 
explain perfectly all of the variation in pay.
4 The last sentence in O©Neill©s discussion, quoted above, suggests that "intangible qualities"  
omitted variables may well be correlated with variables that are typically included in analyses of 
the pay gap (e.g., years of work experience, years out of the workforce, schooling). To the extent 
that this is so, omission of variables denoting the intangible qualities O©Neill mentions will not bias 
the estimated pay gap at all. For further discussion of the omitted variables issue, see Bloom and 
Killingsworth (1982).
5 For example, see Willis and Associates (1980); Young (n.d., esp. Part IV; and 1984); 
Stackhouse (1980); Council on the Economic Status of Women, State of Minnesota (1982); 
Commission on the Status of Women, State of Illinois (1983); and Urban Research Center (1987). 
Several of these studies have not involved the use of formal statistical analysis; for example, Remick 
(1988, p. 226) writes that the original Willis study for Washington State (1974) was based not on 
regression but rather on "eyeballing" the relation between pay and evaluation points.
6 Instead of running a single regression with a sex composition variable, some analysts (e.g., 
Sorensen 1986) fit two regressions, for predominantly female and predominantly male jobs 
considered separately. The pay difference disfavoring the "female" jobs is then calculated as the 
difference between actual mean pay in those jobs and "predicted" pay, calculated using the mean 
level of job evaluation points among the female jobs and the regression coefficients derived for the 
"male" jobs. (The pay difference favoring predominantly male jobs can be derived in a similar 
manner.) This procedure is analogous to the two-equation approach adopted in many conventional 
economic analyses of pay (recall note 2). In general, two-equation comparable worth analyses, like 
their counterparts in conventional economic analyses, yield implications regarding overall sex 
differences in pay that are quantitatively very similar to those yielded by the single-equation 
approach.
7 Since Pierson, Koziara and Johannesson (1984) did not have job evaluation point scores, they 
took this approach in their study of a single private-sector employer. Lacking "formal ratings of job 
worth," Baron and Newman (1989, p. 110-111) analyzed jobs in the California civil service using 
either (1) vectors of dummy variables denoting detailed state civil service job families or (2) 
variables denoting minimum requirements (education, work experience, etc.) established for jobs.
8 For example, see Newman (1976) and Newman and Vonhof (1981). Newman was counsel to 
the plaintiffs in AFSCME v. State of Washington, discussed in chapter 1, and has been a leading 
advocate of the concept of comparable worth. Indeed, Bergmann (1988, p. 186) calls Newman one 
of the originators of comparable worth. Newman and Vonhof (1981, p. 322) contend that "pay 
equity, the so-called ©civil rights issue of the 80©s,© is nothing more than a simple garden variety wage 
rate inequity [sic] which the industrial relations world has historically wrestled with and resolved." 
Newman (1976, p. 265) argues that existing laws are adequate to address this problem, and presents 
data for an industrial plant showing unequal rates of pay for jobs with similar evaluation point 
scores to support his contention that, at the plant in question, women were adversely treated relative 
to men in terms of unequal access to better-paid work as well as unequal pay for identical work.
9 This appears to be the case in all of the comparable worth analyses prepared for adminis 
trative bodies or legal proceedings, e.g., the Willis (1974, 1976) studies. To simplify, the 
discussion here assumes that the absolute magnitude of salary "ranges" (i.e., the dollar difference
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between the maximum and minimum for different job classifications) does not vary systematically 
with salary levels (e.g., the midpoint of the salary range or the average actual salary). The 
argument, however, can readily be adapted to an alternative case in which the proportionate 
magnitude of salary ranges does not vary with salary levels (in which case the absolute magnitude 
of salary ranges will be wider at higher salary levels). The former approach amounts to an 
assumption that the appropriate dependent variable (10 is the dollar amount of salary; the latter, to 
an assumption that the appropriate dependent variable is the logarithm of salary.
10 Thus, consequences of other differences between the conventional economic analysis and 
comparable worth analysis of pay use of job rather than individual characteristics, use of jobs 
rather than individuals as the unit of analysis are temporarily ignored; the discussion here refers 
only to the effect of using an administrative pay construct instead of actual pay.
11 For example, suppose a firm has two jobs, each with minimum salary rates. If men enjoy 
favored treatment in hiring and/or promotion into the better-paid job, then, on average and other 
things (job preferences and qualifications, X) being equal, women will typically be in the lower- 
paid job and will have been there for a long time, whereas men will typically be in the higher-paid 
job and will have been there for less time. Thus, particularly when pay in excess of the minimum for 
one©s job depends on "time in job" (e.g., time in rank or time in grade), the amount of pay received 
in excess of the minimum for one©s job, a, will be greater among women than among men. (Of 
course, this does not mean that the firm favors women: since women are denied equal access to the 
better-paying job, they will be concentrated in the job with the lower minimum salary and will be 
earning a lower "total" salary, Y=A+a, relative to otherwise similar men.)
12 The same arguments apply when A is the salary midpoint for employees©jobs (so that a can be 
either positive, i.e., pay in excess of the midpoint, or negative, i.e., pay below the midpoint). 
Unequal pay for equal work would mean that, at given X, women©s a will tend to be negative and 
men©s a will tend to be positive; thus, at given X, unequal pay for equal work entails a positive 
correlation between Mand a, and a negative correlation between M and both —a and e*, resulting in 
a downward bias in the estimate of d, i.e., to understatement of the male salary advantage and 
female salary disadvantage. On the other hand, to the extent that there is unequal access to better 
work via differential promotion rates, so that women "max out" at lower-paid jobs more often than 
do men with the same X, women©s (men©s) a will tend to be positive (negative). This induces an 
upward bias in the estimate of d.
13 Because the company is assumed to be sex-blind, the same dividing line, XA*, separates 
persons working in jobs A and B regardless of sex. For either sex, average skill within job B (A) is 
simply the mean of the skill distribution to the right (left) of XA*. The mean skill levels within joby 
(=/4orfl)forsex5(=wory), Xjs , are shown in figure 3.1. For each joby, XJm > X^ reflecting the 
assumption that the skill distribution of men has a higher mean than that of women.
14 To distinguish between the two concepts, imagine a company with 1,000 employees divided 
into 100 jobs (with employment in some jobs greater, and in others less, than the overall average of 
10 employees per job). A conventional economic analysis would run a regression for individual 
workers, and would thus have a sample size of 1,000. A grouped-data equivalent would be to 
compute the mean, within each of the 100 jobs, of each of the variables considered in the 
conventional approach and to run a regression using the within-job mean values of all variables. 
This grouped-data regression would have a sample size of 100. The jobs in such a regression can be 
weighted according to employment in each job; this ensures that jobs with many employees receive 
a greater statistical weight in the calculations than do jobs with only a few employees. Most 
comparable worth analyses, however, have used unweighted rather than weighted data.
15 See the appendix to this chapter for a formal demonstration in the context of a simple model of 
a firm with two jobs.
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16 A simple example may be helpful here. Several years ago, as director of the Rutgers graduate 
program in economics, I advocated a sizable raise for the graduate program©s secretary. Rutgers has 
a highly bureaucratized civil service-style job structure, complete with job descriptions, salary 
ranges, etc., so, to support the raise, it was necessary to argue that the secretary©s job should be 
reclassified. It was, and the raise duly took effect. Why did she receive the raise? The institutionalist 
answer might be: because her position in the job structure changed. From a conventional economic 
perspective, however, that does not answer the question, but merely reformulates it: why did her 
position in the job structure change? The conventional economic answer to this fundamental 
question seems natural: because of her productivity, which is a function of both "measured" 
characteristics X (e.g., education, prior service) and "unmeasured" characteristics e (e.g., moti 
vation, intelligence).
17 Presumably, working conditions are essentially the same in all departments, as are responsi 
bility and effort. Depending on what enters into the evaluation, "skill" might vary from one 
department to another, although it would seenr likely that individuals at the same academic rank 
(full professor, associate professor, etc.) would be assessed as having the same "skill" even if they 
are in different departments. Note the similarity between this hypothetical situation and the 
translators example discussed in chapter 2.
18 If "job" were defined as a department-rank combination, it would, however, be necessary to 
include a variable measuring the difference in assessed worth of the different academic ranks. 
Alternatively, one could simply include a set of indicator variables that denoted each job©s academic 
rank. The former approach is the equivalent of a bias-free job evaluation, whereas the latter is 
equivalent to a policy capturing approach to job evaluation (see chapter 2).
19 One can imagine expanding the regression to include measures of the average characteristics 
possessed by the individuals in each job (i.e., each department or each department-rank combina 
tion). For example, if one were defining "jobs" to be department-rank combinations, one might add 
variables measuring the proportion of persons in each job who have a Ph.D., the average years of 
service of persons in each job, etc. Again, however, one would not include an indicator for the field 
of each job (e.g., social work or statistics) because the jobs would already have been determined to 
be comparable.
20 Discrimination by the university against women engineers in hiring would certainly contrib 
ute to a negative relation between "femaleness" of discipline and pay among faculty employed by the 
university; but neither conventional economic nor comparable worth analysis of pay is concerned 
with discrimination in hiring.
21 Note that sex discrimination by educational institutions in providing scholarships and 
research grants, evaluating students, making admissions decisions, etc., may contribute to over- 
representation of women in low paying fields. Thus, the discussion in the text should not be taken to 
mean that "choice" of academic discipline is entirely voluntary, or that discriminatory behavior on 
the part of universities is in no way responsible for underrepresentation of women in high-paying 
fields such as engineering. However, when it comes to employment decisions, even a sex-blind 
university must take the sex composition of individuals qualified for each discipline as a given.
22 The nursing labor market is literally a textbook example of a monopsonized labor market 
(Ehrenberg and Smith 1982, pp. 65-66). Devine (1969, p. 542) and witnesses at congressional 
hearings (U.S. Congress, House 1983, p. 70) have described collusive wage-fixing agreements 
adopted by hospital administrators. Other witnesses have described similar arrangements adopted 
by employers of clerical workers in San Francisco and Boston (U.S. Congress, House 1983, pp. 
88, 96).
23 See Baker and Bresnahan (1985), whose methodology for analyzing whether collusion of
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firms affects product prices is clearly applicable to questions about whether employers© collusion 
affects wage rates. Note that it may be particularly difficult to analyze systematic underpayment of 
predominantly female (relative to predominantly male) jobs based on shortages and surpluses when 
the employer-e.g., a state government pays above-market rates to essentially all jobs, albeit to a 
greater extent for mostly male than mostly female jobs. In that case, there will be excess applicants 
for essentially all jobs, albeit to a greater extent for mostly male than mostly female jobs.
24 For example, see Treiman and Hartmann, eds. (1981, esp. chapter 4) and Sorensen (1986). 
Ehrenberg (1989) provides a comprehensive review of such studies.
25 A job that is PJ percent female is already 1 —pj percent male, so adding pjd to its pay is 
equivalent to making it (for pay purposes, at least!) an all-male job. Although comparable worth 
need not require raising pay of predominantly/ema/e jobs an alternative would be to reduce pay in 
predominantly male jobs all discussions of comparable worth that I have seen call for pay 
increases, not pay decreases (recall the discussion in chapter 2).
26 For example, suppose that job A is targeted for a comparable worth wage increase effective 
January 1, 1986, and that job B is not targeted for any such increase. Under the first definition, C,, 
would equal zero both for job B (or persons in job B) at all dates land for job A (or persons in job A) 
at dates prior to 1986, and would equal unity for job A (or persons in job A) at all dates on or after 
1986. Under the second definition, C,v would equal zero for all observations (all individuals or jobs) 
before 1986, and would equal unity for all observations on or after 1986.
27 Similar remarks apply to a related definition: defining C,, as the amount of the comparable 
worth wage increase accorded (persons in) the job, and set at zero for all (persons in) jobs not 
targeted for such increases.
28 The analogy here is to traditional studies of the union-nonunion pay differential, which 
estimate the pay gap between unionists and nonunionists but do not estimate the gain or loss in pay 
for either group relative to what would have prevailed in the absence of unionism.
29 For example, in Minnesota, most of the state©s comparable worth wage adjustments were 
targeted to jobs held by employees represented by the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Evans and Nelson (1989, pp. 96-102) note that after these 
adjustments, a rival union, the Minnesota Association of Professional Employees (MAPE), fought 
the resulting compression in pay differentials traditionally enjoyed by its members. If successful, 
MAPE©s initiative would effectively have meant comparable worth-induced pay adjustments even 
for some nontargeted jobs. Ironically, in some of their subsequent discussion, Evans and Nelson 
(1989, esp. p. 99) treat the state©s comparable worth pay adjustments as pure add-ons to existing 
salary levels. Likewise, Orazem and Mattila (1989, esp. p. 182) analyze the wage effects of 
proposed comparable worth adjustments in Iowa by simply recomputing each employee©s salary as 
if the adjustments were pure add-ons: salary of any employee in a nontargeted job is kept at the same 
level; salary of any employee in a targeted job is increased by the amount specified by the proposed 
comparable worth adjustments.
30 O©Neill, Brien and Cunningham (1989) analyze the wage effects of Washington State©s 1984 
and 1986 comparable worth wage adjustments using cross-section regressions for state employees© 
pay in 1980, 1983 and 1987. They find that the sex differential in pay narrowed during 1983-87. 
However, they also find that (1) during 1983-87 the sex differential in pay for nonstate workers also 
narrowed, and (2) the differential for state workers narrowed during 1980-83 as well as 1983-87. 
Since they do not explicitly control for environmental variables of the kind discussed in the text 
(indeed, they are precluded from doing so because they have only three years of data), they are 
therefore unable to quantify the wage effects of the comparable worth adjustments per se.
31 For example, in the case of Minnesota, the environmental variables include (in addition to
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current and lagged values of the Consumer Price Index) a set of measures of total employment and 
average monthly earnings in the private sector in both the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan 
Statistical Area and in the state as a whole, derived from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics© 
ES-202 data file. The ES-202 data file is described in further detail in chapter 4.
32 Note that fixed-effects estimation can be thought of as roughly equivalent to first-differencing 
the data, and thus to analyzing whether changes in wages are associated with changes in employ 
ment levels. Although the hierarchical nature of organizations may induce a relation between wage 
changes and employment changes that has nothing to do with factor demands, this seems much less 
plausible than the notion that hierarchy induces a relation between wage levels and employment 
levels.
33 Strictly speaking, comparable worth did not lead to net job losses, i.e., net decreases in 
employment relative to prior levels. It may have led to some gross reductions in employment. 
However, long-run trends, cyclical factors, etc., induced enough new accessions to offset any such 
gross reductions in employment. On balance, employment was higher after adoption of compara 
ble worth than it was before adoption.
34 One could think of / as a "score" whose value is affected by observed characteristics of the 
individual, X (which in general though not in the case considered here might well include sex), 
and by unobserved characteristics, w, such that a sufficiently high score causes the individual to be 
placed in job A. See Bloom and Killingsworth (1982) for further discussion.

Comparable Worth in Minnesota State 
Government Employment
In this chapter, I discuss Minnesota©s experience with comparable 
worth. A series of studies and reports on the status of women state 
government employees ultimately led to a state Pay Equity Act adopted 
in 1982. 1 Since then, state government employees have received three 
sets of comparable worth pay adjustments. Minnesota©s Commission on 
the Economic Status of Women (1985, p. 1) has said that the state is
in the forefront of pay equity efforts in the nation... the first [state] 
to implement pay equity legislation for its employees.... Min 
nesota©s experience shows that pay equity can be implemented 
smoothly and at a reasonable cost.
How has the state©s comparable worth legislation affected the female/ 
male differential in pay, and employment of women and men, in state 
government?
4.1 Background
Minnesota employs over 30,000 workers in about 1800 job categories 
("classes" or "classifications"). About 90 percent are covered by collec 
tive bargaining agreements and are divided into 16 bargaining units, 
more or less according to occupation, represented by 11 unions, the 
most important of which is the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). (The Minnesota State Univer-
I thank Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Cordelia Reimers and participants in seminars at the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, the University of Maryland and Rutgers University for many helpful comments on 
previous versions of this chapter.
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sity System is autonomous in pay and other matters, and is not consid 
ered in this chapter.)
The period before adoption of the 1982 comparable worth statute saw 
considerable discussion of the status of women in state government 
employment. 2 In 1975, AFSCME and the state agreed to study issues 
about pay and promotion discrimination against women, but no funds 
were appropriated for this purpose. In October 1976, the Twin Cities 
branch of the National Organization for Women published a report on 
women©s status in state government employment. That same year, the 
state legislature established a Council (later renamed the Commission) 
on the Economic Status of Women (CESW), consisting of state legisla 
tors and public members. The commission promptly held hearings on 
women in state employment, and, in 1977, published a report on the 
subject. The next year, the state©s Legislative Audit Commission (LAC) 
reported on its year-long study of the state personnel commission, which 
included analyses of the relative status of female and male state employ 
ees. LAC©s report documented sizable sex differences in occupational 
status and earnings in state government employment, as did a May 1979 
report by CESW.
As these studies and discussions took place, the state began a compre 
hensive Public Employment Study (PES). As part of the PES, the state 
retained Hay Associates to conduct an evaluation of 762 job classifica 
tions, based mainly on job descriptions (most of the jobs not evaluated 
were either managerial or else had fewer than 10 incumbents; see CESW 
1982, p. 19). The evaluations were carried out by three separate com 
mittees of state employees, trained by Hay Associates in its factor-point 
job evaluation methodology. 3 Each committee consisted of a Depart 
ment of Personnel Representative and seven state employees from other 
departments. 4 The committees evaluated the state©s jobs using the Hay 
system, which considers "know-how," "problem-solving," "accountabil 
ity" and working conditions (Minnesota Department of Finance 1979a, 
p. 18); "market factors" (e.g., wages paid in the private sector) were not 
considered. 5
According to Hay Associates, the evaluations showed only a "slight 
tendency" for predominantly male occupations to receive higher pay
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than predominantly female occupations (Minnesota Department of Fi 
nance, 1979a, p. 72). Furthermore, the PES said, predominantly 
female office and clerical jobs (in which the great majority of women 
were employed) were typically "paid about the same as are most other 
classes [i.e., jobs] at similar levels of complexity" (Minnesota Depart 
ment of Finance 1979b, p. 1-19).
"Although the contract with Hay Associates was not undertaken for 
the purpose of conducting a comparable worth study, or even as a basis 
for compensation" (Rothchild 1985, p. 107), and although neither Hay 
Associates nor the PES suggested much reason to adjust pay for pre 
dominantly female job classes, in October 1981 the CESW set up a pay 
equity task force to analyze pay differences between male and female 
jobs. Task force members included state legislators, public members, 
union representatives and representatives from the Department of Em 
ployee Relations. The Task Force©s report directly contradicted the 
relatively benign conclusions of Hay Associates (CESW 1982, p. 21; 
emphasis original):
In almost every case, the pay for women©s jobs is lower than the pay 
for comparable male jobs. In most cases the pay for women©s jobs is 
lower than the pay for men©s jobs with fewer [job evaluation] points.
Overall, the Task Force found, the gap in pay between predominantly 
female and predominantly male jobs was about 20 percent. 6 Accord 
ingly, it recommended that "comparable worth, as measured by skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions, shall be the primary 
consideration in establishing salaries for those jobs which are at least 70 
percent female," and that there be a "pay equity set-aside to target job 
classes which are at least 70 percent female to be brought up to salaries 
for other jobs with comparable value" (CESW 1982, p. 25).
The legislature acted quickly in its 1982 session to put the Task Force 
recommendations into law. The policy statement for the legislation 
(Minnesota Statutes, chapter 43A.1, subdivision 3) reads:
It is the policy of this state to attempt to establish equitable compen 
sation relationships between female-dominated, male-dominated,
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and balanced classes of employees in the executive branch. Com 
pensation relationships are equitable within the meaning of this 
subdivision when the primary consideration in negotiating, estab 
lishing, recommending, and approving total compensation is com 
parability of the value of the work in relationship to other positions 
in the executive branch.
The law requires the Commissioner of Employee Relations to list, by 
January 1 of odd numbered years, predominantly female classes that are 
paid less than other classes with the same number of Hay points, and to 
estimate the cost of equalizing pay for classes with the same Hay 
points. 7 The Legislative Commission on Employee Relations must then 
recommend an amount to be appropriated for special pay comparability 
adjustments. Funds for such adjustments, appropriated through the 
usual legislative process, are earmarked for "salary equalization" for the 
job classes on the Commissioner©s list. These funds are allocated to 
different bargaining units according to their share of the total estimated 
cost of pay equalization; actual distribution of salary adjustments is 
determined by collective bargaining (CESW 1985, p. 14).
The first two sets of comparable worth pay adjustments, adopted in 
1983, were implemented in July 1983 and July 1984 at a total cost 
(including fringes and other nonwage items) of $21.7 million. About 
8225 employees in 151 job classes received pay adjustments of about 
$1,600 over the two-year period. A third set of adjustments, costing a 
total of $11.7 million, was adopted by the 1985 legislature and imple 
mented in July 1985. The cost of the three adjustments represented 
about 2.4 percent (1983-4) and 1.3 percent (1985) of the state©s payroll. 
By the end of the adjustments, individual annual "pay equity" salary 
increases averaged about $2,200; all clerical workers and about half of 
the state©s health care workers received some increases; about ten per 
cent of the beneficiaries were men. (See CESW 1985, pp. 14-15; 
Rothchild n.d., p. 4; and Rothchild 1984, pp. 124-125.)
According to CESW (1985, p. 15), the two waves of salary adjust 
ments enacted under the state©s comparable worth law "will allow for full 
implementation of pay equity for Minnesota state employees by... June 
30,1987." Specifically, according to a Commission newsletter (1986, p.
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2), effective June 30, 1987, the average maximum monthly salary for 
female jobs was to be the same as the average maximum monthly salary 
for male jobs with similar Hay job evaluation point values.
Adoption and implementation of the comparable worth pay adjust 
ments for state employees proceeded quite smoothly (although in 1985 
police and firefighter unions in St. Paul broke with other unions and 
opposed that city©s job evaluation, conducted as part of the extension of 
comparable worth to local government). Private-sector employer 
groups were largely quiescent, although some expressed fears which, 
thus far, have not materialized that "the next step is the private sector" 
(Wall Street Journal 1985b).
4.2 Data
The data used in this chapter©s analyses of pay and employment in 
Minnesota state government both before and after the comparable worth 
pay adjustments described above are contained in a set of computerized 
quarterly "slice files." Each of these files has information on each state 
employee present and active during the relevant quarter from October 
1981 to April 1986 inclusive: 8 the employee©s sex, ethnicity, birth date, 
date of entry into state employment, job classification, date of entry into 
current job classification, handicap status, veteran status and other 
characteristics. Since each employee has a unique identifying number, 
the files can be linked over time to form a longitudinal database. 9 A 
companion "class file," providing the title (e.g., "Engineering Aide") 
and Haypoint score (e.g., 178) for job classifications, can be merged 
with the slice files for analyses of relationships among pay, Haypoints 
and other factors for individual state employees. An obvious advantage 
of the slice files (especially once they have been merged with the class 
file) is that they permit analysis at both the level of the job (i.e., class), as 
in comparable worth studies, and at the level of individuals, as in 
conventional economic studies of pay.
Table 4.1 lists the variables used in the first set of analyses, of pay, 
reported below, and also provides descriptive statistics for individual
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employees. This indicates that as of October 1981 the state©s workforce 
was about 44 percent female, was almost entirely white, had an average 
age of about 40 years, and had been in state employment for an average 
of almost nine years. 10 No Haypoint rating (job evaluation score) is 
available for about 15 percent of the individuals; for the most part, rates 
of pay for the jobs these individuals held were well above average. 
Overall (including both Hay-rated and unrated jobs), the average hourly 
rate of pay (as of October 1981) is about $8.23 (or about $17,122 for a 
2,080-hour year), although hourly rates vary from the minimum wage, 
$3.35, to a maximum of over $26. In the following analyses, pay and 
some other variables mentioned later are measured in units of natural 
logarithms (I use "In," the customary abbreviation, to refer to natural 
logarithms), so that coefficients on variables measured this way may be 
interpreted as percentage effects.
As noted in section 3.4, analyses of wage and employment changes 
over time in the presence of comparable worth may depend critically on 
one©s ability to control for the counterfactual, i.e., for changes that 
would have occurred (even) in the absence of comparable worth. In the 
longitudinal analyses discussed in sections 4.4-5 below, I have therefore 
included regressors pertaining to (1) consumer prices and (2) the pri 
vate-sector economy in both the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) and in the state of Minnesota as a whole. The 
basic data for the private-sector economy are contained in the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics© ES-202 data file, which is derived from state 
employment security agency reports on employment and wage pay 
ments of employers covered by state unemployment insurance pro 
grams (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics n.d.). These data provide direct 
measures of total persons employed for each month and total dollar 
earnings per quarter (including payments not subject to unemployment 
insurance tax). Quarterly employment is derived by summing monthly 
employment figures for the relevant quarter. Monthly wage data i.e., 
earnings per employed person per month  are derived by dividing total 
quarterly earnings by quarterly employment.
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Table 4.1 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
for Variables Used in the Pay Analyses
Short 
Name Definition
LOG_HRLY In (hourly wage rate)
Dummies (for sex and ethnicity)
FEMALE _ indicator: sex is female
BLACK __ indicator: race is black
INDIAN _ indicator: race is American Indian
HISPANIC indicator: race is Hispanic
ASIAN __ indicator: race is Asian
Percent (for sex/ethnic makeup of job class)
PCTFEMAL own job class :% female
PCTBLACK own job class :% black
PCTINDIA own job class: % American Indian
PCTHISPA own job class :% Hispanic
PCTASIAN own job class: % Asian
Haypoint Variables
HAY_MISS indicator: Haypoint rating is unknown
HAYPOINT Haypoint rating (0 if unknown)
HAYPOISQ HAYPOINT squared xO.OOl
Standard Regressors
AGE age at end of quarter
AGE SQ AGE squared X 0.001
SVC_FRST service with State from earliest entry date
SVC_F_SQ SVC_FRST squared xO.OOl
SVC_MREC service with State from most recent entry date
SVC_M_SQ SVC_MREC squared xO.OOl
AGESVC F AGE * SVC FRST
AGESVC M AGE * SVC MREC
HANDICAP indicator: handicapped
VET_VIET indicator: Vietnam-era veteran





























* By construction, SVC_MREC=SVC_FRST as of the first date in the panel (October 1981). For 
later dates, these two variables will differ only if an individual both left and then returned to State 
employment during the period covered by the panel (October 1981-April 1986).
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4.3 Cross-Section Analyses: Sex Differentials in Hourly Pay, 
1981 and 1986
I begin by presenting cross-section regression analyses of pay using 
the October 1981 and April 1986 slice files. First, I use individuals as 
the unit of analysis, as in conventional economic studies of pay; then, I 
use classes (jobs), as in comparable worth studies of pay. These cross- 
section analyses provide information on numerous issues discussed in 
chapter 3, including the following: To what extent do methodological 
differences between comparable worth and conventional economic anal 
yses of pay lead to different results regarding the sex differential in pay? 
To what extent did cross-section sex differentials in hourly rates of pay 
change during 1981-86, when the state©s comparable worth pay adjust 
ments were being implemented?
Individual-level results
Table 4.2 summarizes results for conventional ordinary least squares 
(OLS) cross-section regressions in which the unit of analysis is the 
individual employee (the full results appear in appendix tables A4.1, for 
October 1981, and A4.2, for April 1986). There are four specifications: 
"raw differentials," in which the only regressors are variables denoting 
employees© sex and ethnicity; "raw differentials with Haypoints," in 
which the regressors consist of Haypoint variables pertaining to em 
ployees© classes (i.e., jobs) 11 as well as sex and ethnicity variables; 
"standard regressors," in which the regressors are measures of employee 
characteristics like those conventionally used by economists analyzing 
pay differentials e.g., age, years of service and sex/ethnicity; and 
"standard regressors with Haypoints," i.e., the standard regressors with 
Haypoint variables added. Table 4.1 lists all variables by type (e.g., 
Haypoint variables).
For each of these four specifications, I use three different versions of 
the sex and ethnicity variables: indicators ("dummies"); measures of the 
proportion female, black, etc., in employees©job classes ("percent"); 
and both indicators and proportion variables ("dumm & %"). The first
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Table 4.2 Summary of Individual-Level Pay Regressions 
(dep. var.=LOG_HRLY; t in parentheses)
Raw Differentials Raw Diffs. with Hay points 




































































































(dummies) version is the one typically used by economists. The second 
(percent) has been popularized by proponents of comparable worth. 
The third version simply combines the first and second. Although the 
third may at first seem a rather strange hybrid, the percent variables 
used here are analogous to the "percent organized" variables sometimes 
used in studies of union wage effects. In the present setting, coefficients 
on the percent variables derived using the second (percent) approach
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indicate the extent to which pay for individuals in all-female jobs differs 
from that of individuals in all-male jobs, when the other things in the 
analysis (e.g., Hay points, age, etc.) are held constant. 12 Likewise, in 
the third (dumm & %) version, coefficients on the percent variables 
indicate the extent to which, ceteris paribus, pay for individuals of the 
same sex differs depending on whether they are in (virtually) all-male or 
(virtually) all-female jobs; whereas coefficients on the dummy variable 
for sex indicate how much, ceteris paribus, pay for individuals in classes 
with the same sex composition differs depending on whether they are 
male or female. 13 Accordingly, I refer to the coefficient on the "female 
sex" indicator, FEMALE_, as the "sex differential," and to the coeffi 
cient on the "proportion of the class that is female" variable, 
PCTFEMAL, as the "class composition differential."
Several patterns are apparent in table 4.2. First, for any given specifi 
cation (e.g., standard regressors), the sum of the sex and class composi 
tion differentials in the dumm & % version is usually very close to the 
class composition differential in the percent version: the dumm & % 
version (which explicitly takes account of the sex of individual employ 
ees) effectively subdivides the class composition effect of the percent 
version (which ignores individuals© sex) into a class-composition- 
constant sex effect and a sex-constant class-composition effect. More or 
less equivalently, for any given specification, the dumm & % version 
almost exactly partitions the sex differential in the dummies version 
(which ignores class composition) into a sex effect and a class composi 
tion effect (Welch, 1988): interaction between the effects of sex and class 
composition is minimal in these data.
To see this, note that, in the dummies version, a "change in sex" 
amounts to a change in both (a) sex per se and (b) the sex composition of 
one©s job. In the dumm & % version, the overall change in (the In of) pay 
associated with changing sex from male to female is therefore d In Y=bF 
+b%F(%FF—%FM), where bF and b%F are the coefficients on 
FEMALE_ and PCTFEMAL, respectively, obtained in the dumm & 
% version, and %FS is the mean of PCTFEMAL for sex s ( = men or 
women). In October 1981, %FF-%FM equals about 0.7648-0.1816 
=0.5832; in April 1986 it equals about 0.7598-0.2057=0.5531.
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Evaluated at these values for the relevant year, the magnitude of d In Yin 
the dumm & % version is usually very similar to the magnitude of the 
coefficient on FEMALE_ in the corresponding dummies version of the 
same specification (e.g., standard regressors) for the same year. 14
A second feature of the results is that controlling for Haypoints 
reduces both the sex and class composition differentials considerably. 
Controlling for the standard regressors also reduces these differentials, 
but to a lesser extent. 15 To some degree, then, Haypoints do indeed 
serve as an index of employees© jobs (i.e., classes), as suggested in 
section 3.3.
The most noteworthy aspect of these tables, however, is the consider 
able reduction in both the sex differential and, in particular, the class 
composition differential between October 1981 and April 1986, when 
the state©s comparable worth pay adjustments took place. (In the dumm 
& % specification, virtually all of the reduction has been in the class- 
composition differential, i.e., in the coefficient on PCTFEMAL rather 
than in the coefficient on FEMALE_. Since actual implementation of 
comparable worth focuses on class-composition differentials rather than 
on sex differentials per se, the relative magnitude of the changes in these 
two differentials is about what one would expect.) This suggests that 
CESW©s enthusiasm for Minnesota©s comparable worth pay adjustments 
may not be not misplaced.
Class-level results
As noted in chapter 3 (see particularly the discussion of the prototype 
comparable worth equation (3.6)), comparable worth proponents usu 
ally do not undertake individual-level analyses of the kind summarized 
in table 4.2. Rather, comparable worth analyses usually (1) take jobs 
(classes) rather than individual employees as the unit of analysis; (2) use 
an administrative pay construct (the A of chapter 3), usually either the 
maximum or the minimum rate of pay within each job, rather than the 
actual rate of pay as the dependent variable; and (3) use class composi 
tion measures and job evaluation scores (e.g., PCTFEMAL and Hay- 
point variables) rather than individual employee characteristics (e.g.,
114 The Economics of Comparable Worth
age and years of service) as independent variables. Typically, compara 
ble worth analyses are not weighted to reflect the numbers of persons in 
each job (although some jobs are often simply excluded from the 
analyses on the basis of an arbitrary size cutoff, e.g., having fewer than 
10 incumbents). In such analyses, the coefficient on the class composi 
tion variable (e.g., PCTFEMAL) is taken as the sex differential in pay.
Table 4.3 summarizes class-level analyses of the Minnesota data for 
October 1981 and April 1986. For these analyses, the unit of observa 
tion is the class. As the dependent variable, I use, in turn, three different 
versions of the administrative pay construct A of comparable worth 
analyses: the maximum, mean and minimum of the (In of the) hourly 
wage rates within each job class ("max pay," "mean pay" and "min pay," 
respectively). All regressors are within-class means: for example, 
AGE___ now denotes the mean age of persons within each class. 
(Note that the Hay point variables e.g., number of Hay evaluation 
points awarded to a class depend exclusively on the job and are the 
same for all persons in the same class.) Of course, the mean of the 
FEMALE_ dummy variable within each class is simply its class 
composition i.e., the proportion of workers in the class who are 
female (PCTFEMAL) and similarly for the ethnicity dummies, so 
there are no sex or ethnicity dummies as such in these analyses; rather, 
the only sex and race variables in the class-level studies are percent 
variables (e.g., PCTFEMAL, the complement of the M or proportion 
male variable in the prototype comparable worth equation (3.6)). The 
first two rows of table 4.3 summarize unweighted analyses (the full 
results appear in appendix tables A4.3-4); the third and fourth rows of 
table 4.3 summarize analyses in which each class is weighted according 
to the number of persons employed in it (see appendix tables A4.5-6 for 
the full results).
First consider the unweighted results. Here, as in table 4.2, the most 
noteworthy aspect of the results is the substantial change in the class 
composition differential (i.e., the coefficient on PCTFEMAL, the pro 
portion female in the class) between October 1981 and April 1986. For 
the specifications corresponding most closely to the one favored by 
comparable worth proponents raw differentials with Haypoints, with
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Table 4.3 Summary of Class-Level Pay Regressions 
(dep. var.=log of class max./mean/min. pay; t in parentheses)
Raw Differentials Raw Diffs. With Haypoints 
Variable Max. Pay Mean Pay Min. Pay Max. Pay Mean Pay Min. Pay
October 1981 (unweighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.3381 -0.3718 -0.4002 -0.1765 -0.2028 -0.2218 
(16.133) (17.223) (17.299) (10.890) (12.464) (12.754)
April 1986 (unweighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.2328 -0.2618 -0.2918 -0.0589 -0.0780 -0.0955 
(12.258) (13.270) (13.696) (4.332) (5.662) (6.397)
October 1981 (weighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.3732 -0.4822 -0.4951 -0.1618 -0.2718 -0.3135 
(94.546) (137.555) (149.957) (47.058) (95.666) (111.507)
April 1986 (weighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.2803 -0.3827 -0.4317 -0.0193 -0.1273 -0.2115 
(66.054) (98.245) (108.053) (6.563) (48.895) (65.181)
Variable
Standard Regressors
Max. Pay Mean Pay Min. Pay
Stand. Regs, with Haypoints
Max. Pay Mean Pay Min. Pay
October 1981 (unweighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.2673 -0.2850 -0.3062 -0.1648 -0.1788 -0.1926 
(12.500) (13.215) (13.144) (9.654) (10.675) (10.690)
April 1986 (unweighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.1558 -0.1704 -0.1941 -0.0407 -0.0509 -0.0664 
(8.139) (8.792) (9.234) (2.820) (3.585) (4.301)
October 1981 (weighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.3003 -0.3646 -0.3734 -0.1562 -0.2349 -0.2674 
(59.865) (91.359) (93.994) (36.437) (76.060) (80.129)
April 1986 (weighted):
PCTFEMAL -0.2979 -0.3263 -0.3829 -0.0382 -0.1114 -0.2112 
(51.323) (69.483) (74.966) (9.115) (35.487) (48.950)
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either maximum or minimum (In of) pay as the dependent variable the 
PCTFEMAL coefficient falls in absolute value during this period by 
over 10 percentage points in all cases.
Other aspects of the unweighted results in table 4.3 are also of 
interest. First, choice of dependent variable can have a considerable 
effect on the results. In absolute value, the smallest class composition 
differential (PCTFEMAL coefficient) is derived when the dependent 
variable is the maximum (In of the) wage rate; using the minimum (In) 
wage rate produces a differential that is larger sometimes much 
larger in absolute value; using the mean (In) wage produces intermedi 
ate results: The variance of maximum (In) wage rates is smaller than the 
variance of mean or minimum (In) wage rates, so sex and class composi 
tion differentials with respect to the former are smaller than they are with 
either of the latter two measures of pay (note also that values of/?2 in the 
regressions for maximum (In) wage rates are larger than they are in the 
regressions for the other two measures of pay). As in the individual-level 
analyses shown in table 4.2, controlling for Haypoints in these class- 
level analyses reduces the absolute magnitude of the class composition 
(PCTFEMAL) coefficient considerably, whereas controlling for the 
standard regressors (age, years of service, etc.) does so to a lesser 
extent.
As noted in section 3.3, class-level analyses may be viewed as 
grouped-data studies of the underlying microdata on individual employ 
ees, in which case in the absence of the microdata themselves it 
would seem natural to use econometric techniques derived for grouped 
data. Accordingly, the third and fourth rows of table 4.3 summarize 
analyses that are identical to those in the first two rows except in one 
respect: unlike those analyses, the ones summarized in the last two rows 
are based on regressions in which each class is weighted according to the 
number of persons employed in it. The main difference between the first 
(unweighted) and second (weighted) sets of results in table 4.3 is that the 
class composition (PCTFEMAL) differentials in the latter are generally 
higher than those in the former, except when Haypoint variables are 
included as regressors and the dependent variable is the maximum (In) 
pay rate. (This exception may be related to the fact, noted earlier, that
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the variance of the maximum (In) pay rate is smaller than the variance of 
either the mean or the minimum (In) pay rate.) However, both sets of 
results imply a considerable reduction in the differential over time.
Individual-level vs. class-level analyses
In view of the discussion in section 3.3, differences between the class- 
and individual-level analyses are of particular interest. Comparison of 
tables 4.2 and 4.3 highlights some of the main differences; I focus on 
class-level analyses in which the dependent variable is the mean of the 
(In of the) actual pay rates of persons in each job, since these may be 
regarded as grouped-data equivalents of the corresponding individual 
level analyses.
When the dependent variable is the mean (In of) actual pay, the 
coefficients on the class composition variable, PCTFEMAL, in the 
weighted class-level analyses (last two rows, table 4.3) are all reasona 
bly close to those obtained for PCTFEMAL in the percent version of the 
same specification in the individual-level analyses (table 4.2). For 
example, in the standard regressors specification, the coefficient for 
PCTFEMAL for 1981 (1986) in the percent individual-level results is 
-0.3932 (-0.2974), vs. -0.3646 (-0.3263) for the weighted results. 
Second, the PCTFEMAL coefficients in the class-level analyses are 
always higher in absolute value sometimes substantially so, particu 
larly in the weighted results than the coefficients on FEMALE_ 
obtained in individual-level analyses using the dummies version of the 
same specification. For example, for the standard regressors specifica 
tion, the individual-level dummies version yields a FEMALE_ 
coefficient for 1981 (1986) of -0.2255 (-0.1636), vs. a PCTFEMAL 
coefficient in the corresponding weighted class-level analysis (with 
mean In of pay as the dependent variable) of -0.3646 (-0.3263).
The second of these two stylized facts is particularly noteworthy. 
Class-level analyses (especially weighted ones) like those in table 4.3 
are grouped-data equivalents of the dummies version of individual-level 
analyses like those in table 4.2. Thus, particularly when classes are 
weighted according to the number of employees in them, coefficients on
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the class composition variable PCTFEMAL in class-level analyses 
should be interpreted in the same way as are coefficients on the sex 
indicator variable FEMALE_ in conventional individual-level analy 
ses that otherwise use the same specification: as measures of the sex 
differential in pay. However, as noted in section 3.3, a key assumption 
implicit in conventional grouped-data estimation (that the variable de 
termining the grouping is independent of the individual-level error term 
for pay) may not hold when individuals are grouped by class (i.e., job). 
Indeed, tables 4.2-3 indicate that, other things being equal, the 
grouped-data regression approach implicit in comparable worth analy 
ses overstates the absolute magnitude of sex differences in pay relative to 
what is obtained in a micro-level dummies version of the same specifica 
tion (e.g., standard regressors), even if weighting is not used.
These comparisons highlight the effect of aggregating by class in 
stead of using individuals as the unit of analysis, while keeping the 
specification (dependent and independent variables) the same. Although 
this is one major difference between comparable worth and conventional 
economic analyses of pay, there are two others: comparable worth 
analyses also use an administrative pay construct instead of actual salary 
as the dependent variable, and use Haypoints or other measures of job 
characteristics instead of measures of employee characteristics as inde 
pendent variables. As noted in section 3.3, the net effect of all three 
differences in methodology on estimated pay differentials is difficult to 
determine a priori. Here, too, the results in tables 4.2-3 are of interest. 
They indicate that using all three main components of the comparable 
worth approach (raw differentials with Haypoints, applied to class-level 
data) yields pay gap estimates that are lower, in absolute value, than 
those derived using the kind of conventional economic analysis (stan 
dard regressors with dummies, applied to individual-level data) that can 
be performed with the relatively limited set of variables (e.g., age and 
years of service) available in these data. For example, for 1981, the 
conventional estimate is -0.2255 (standard regressors with dummies, 
table 4.2), vs. comparable worth estimates (raw differentials with Hay- 
points using max pay, table 4.3) of  0.1765 (unweighted) and  0.1618 
(weighted). For 1986, the estimates are -0.1636 (table 4.2) vs.
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-0.0589 (table 4.3, unweighted) and -0.0193 (table 4.3, weighted), 
respectively.
These patterns are even clearer when one compares individual-level 
conventional economic analyses with class-level analyses that mimic 
almost exactly the procedures used by comparable worth proponents, 
including Minnesota©s CESW. Analyses of this kind are summarized in 
table 4.4. The conventional economic analyses are reproduced from 
table 4.2; these use data on individual employees, actual (In of) pay as 
the dependent variable and the standard regressors (including dummies, 
i.e., sex and race indicators) as independent variables. In contrast, the 
comparable worth analyses summarized in table 4.4 adopt the CESW©s 
conventions (see, e.g., CESW 1982, p. 28; 1985, pp. 1,15; 1986, p. 2): 
they use class-level data without weighting according to class size (i.e., 
number of employees in each class); the dependent variable is the 
maximum (In of) pay within each class; and there are only two indepen 
dent variables: HAYPOINT and PCTFEMAL. (See appendix table 
A4.7 for the full results.) In all cases, the class-level analyses exclude 
"unrated classes" (i.e., jobs with no Haypoint job evaluation score); as 
noted in table 4.4, some of the class-level analyses consider all classes 
with Haypoint scores, whereas others consider only classes that not only 
have Haypoint scores but also have at least ten incumbents.
The results summarized in table 4.4 are striking. Both for October 
1981 and April 1986, the comparable worth analyses imply sex differen 
tials (coefficients on PCTFEMAL) that are clearly lower in absolute 
value than the differentials (coefficients on FEMALE_) obtained in 
conventional economic analyses. Indeed, when classes with less than 
ten incumbents are excluded from the comparable worth analyses, the 
implied sex differential for April 1986 is both small, about -2.8 
percent, and not statistically significant at the conventional 5 percent 
level (its r-statistic is only 1.61). In this somewhat limited sense, 16 the 
evidence supports CESW©s claims (1985, pp. 1, 15; 1986, p. 2), quoted 
earlier, that Minnesota has achieved "pay equity" in state government 
employment.
In view of these results, it is tempting to conclude that the meth 
odological differences between conventional economic and comparable
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Table 4.4 Sex Differentials in Pay Implied by Conventional Economic 
and Comparable Worth Pay Regressions, October 1981 and April 1986
(t in parentheses)
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Model in conventional economic analyses: Y=a+Fd+Xb + e, where y=LOG_HRLY, 
F= indicator for "sex is female," X= "standard regressors," and e is an error term. Unit of analysis 
is the individual employee. Entries in table refer to estimates of d for the indicated date.
Model in comparable worth analyses: A=k+Pp+Hh+u, where A = maximum (In of) pay rate 
in class, /^proportion of employment in class that is female, //=Haypoints for class, and u is an 
error term. Unit of analysis is the class (job). Entries in table refer to estimates ofp for the indicated 
date.
worth analyses mean that, on balance, comparable worth analyses will 
yield estimates of the sex differential in pay that are smaller in absolute 
value i.e., more conservative than those derived using the conven 
tional economic approach. However, it should be noted that the conven 
tional economic analyses summarized here control for only a limited set 
of employee characteristics (e.g., age and years of service in state 
government) and, because of missing data, do not control for many 
other characteristics (e.g., education and total years of prior work 
experience). Thus, it is not possible to say whether sex differentials in 
pay derived from a more fully specified conventional analysis would be 
higher or lower than those derived from comparable worth analyses.
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4.4 Longitudinal Analyses: Changes in the Sex Differential in Pay, 
1981-86
Although the different estimators used yield rather different results, 
the estimates summarized in tables 4.2-4 suggest that the sex differen 
tial in pay narrowed during 1981-1986. How did this happen, and to 
what extent are the state©s comparable worth wage adjustments 
responsible?
To highlight some of the issues involved, it is useful to start with a 
seeming paradox. On the one hand, as just noted, the comparable worth 
analyses in tables 4.3-4 yield estimates of the absolute magnitude of the 
sex differential in pay that are smaller than those obtained in the 
conventional economic analyses in table 4.2. On the other hand, the 
change over time in that differential is larger in the comparable worth 
analyses than it is in the conventional economic analyses. For example, 
the change in the FEMALE_ coefficient between October 1981 and 
April 1986 in the conventional economic results (standard regressors 
with dummies, table 4.2) is (-0.1636)-(-0.2255)=0.0619. In con 
trast, the change in the PCTFEMAL coefficient during the same period 
in the class-level results using the comparable worth approach (raw 
differentials with Hay points with max pay, table 4.3) is between 
(-0.0589)-(-0.1765)=0.1176 (unweighted) and (-0.0193)- 
(-0.1618) = 0.1425 (weighted). Similar patterns are evident in 
table 4.4.
This apparent paradox  smaller absolute magnitudes of, but larger 
absolute changes in, the sex differential in comparable worth analyses 
relative to conventional economic analyses can readily be explained, 
however, and the explanation highlights an important point. Conven 
tional economic analyses of cross-section pay differences by sex at 
different dates may be sensitive to differences in employee charac 
teristics (particularly, ones not included in the analyses) at those differ 
ent dates. Since the characteristics of state employees change over time, 
estimated pay differences by sex obtained in conventional economic 
analyses may change over time purely as a result of changes in the
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characteristics of state employees rather than (or in addition to) changes 
in the state©s pay practices.
For example, sex differences in pay generally rise with age: young 
persons of either sex usually have relatively little prior work experience, 
whereas older men usually have more prior experience than do older 
women. Thus, even if the state©s pay practices do not change at all, an 
influx into state employment of young women with little prior work 
experience could produce the appearance of a reduction in the absolute 
magnitude in the sex differential in pay in conventional economic 
analyses of successive cross-sections like the ones in this chapter that do 
not include an explicit measure of prior work experience because of lack 
of data. Likewise, suppose that sex differentials in pay widen with years 
of service in state employment (due, e.g., to differential rates of promo 
tion) and that the state reduces its hiring of new employees (who, by 
definition, have zero years of state service and whose pay rates, by 
assumption, would therefore differ less by sex than would pay rates of 
employees with many years of service). In conventional economic 
analyses of successive cross-sections, this could produce the ap 
pearance of an increase in the absolute magnitude of the sex differential 
in pay even if the state simultaneously began to reduce the pay differen 
tial between men and women with many years of state service.
In sum, the pay differential in conventional economic analyses at a 
given date may be an unbiased estimate of the overall average difference 
in pay between men and women with given characteristics as of that 
date. It may not be the same, however, as the overall average pay 
difference between men and women with different given characteristics 
as of a different date, even in the absence of changes in pay practices of 
the employer. More generally, when the composition of state employ 
ment is changing, changes in the sex differential in pay obtained in 
conventional economic studies of successive cross-sections do not nec 
essarily indicate how the sex difference in pay for a given set of 
employees a "fixed basket of goods," so to speak has changed.
In contrast, comparable worth analyses are concerned with classes 
(jobs) rather than with individual employees. As noted in chapter 3, 
they may fail to yield an unbiased estimate of the overall average
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difference in pay between men and women with given characteristics as 
of any given date. If the class (i.e., job) composition of state employ 
ment remains essentially the same over time, however, successive com 
parable worth analyses of pay may amount to analyses of the same 
"basket of goods," and so may yield an unbiased estimate of how the sex 
difference in pay for a given set of employees has changed over time.
To address this question in greater detail, I selected random samples 
of 1,000 white men and 1,000 white women who were present and active 
in state employment during the entire period (October 1981-April 
1986) covered by the data. The nature of these data permits one to 
abstract from changes in characteristics of the state©s work force over 
time that are an inherent feature of analyses of successive cross- 
sections. I then analyzed whether, holding constant (changes in) per 
sonal characteristics and other (e.g., environmental) influences, pay 
rose by more or less for women than for men after the state©s comparable 
worth wage adjustments.
In these analyses, the state©s comparable worth wage adjustments of 
July 1983, July 1984 and July 1985 are denoted by three indicator 
variables, AFTER783, AFTER?84 and AFTER785, respectively. 
These variables identify observations falling after each of these dates, 17 
and operationalize the notion of the "comparable worth" variable Cit of 
equation (3.7). Also, since the data refer to different dates, I attempt to 
abstract from cyclical and secular effects by including (in addition to 
variables pertaining to consumer prices) time trend terms and/or mea 
sures of private-sector wages in both Minnesota as a whole and in the 
Minneapolis-St.Paul MSA during the relevant quarter; these embody 
the environmental variables discussed in connection with equation 
(3.7). The time trend terms are TIMETRND and TIMETRSQ. TIME 
TRND is defined as the number of years (and fractions of years) elapsed 
as of the current date since January 1, 1960, and thus increases by one 
unit per year; TIMETRSQ is the square of TIMETRND (divided by 
100, to facilitate formatting of the tables). 18 The private sector wage 
variables, LNWGMINP and LNWGMSAP, are the (In of) private- 
sector monthly wage rates in the state of Minnesota and in the Min- 
neapolis-St. Paul MSA, respectively, as of the relevant quarter. (For
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discussion of the basic data underlying these variables, see section 4.2.) 
The price variables, CPINDEX1-CPINDEX4, give the value of the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers ("CPI-U") in the 
month immediately preceding the month referenced by the data 
(CPINDEX1) or three, six or nine months prior to that. (For example, 
for observations pertaining to October, CPINDEX1 is the September 
CPI-U value, and CPINDEX2-CPINDEX4 are the CPI-U values for 
June, March and the previous December, respectively.)
Pooled OLS estimates
The first set of analyses of this question uses pooled OLS: I simply 
pool observations in the random sample for each sex for all 19 quarters 
(making 19,000 total observations for each sex) and estimate the models 
described earlier (with or without percent variables, Hay point variables 
and standard regressors). Since these analyses are concerned with 
samples of whites and are restricted to women (or men), they do not 
include any race or sex indicator variables.
The results are summarized in table 4.5, for women, and table 4.6, 
for men (the full results appear in appendix tables A4.8 and A4.9, 
respectively). In all three models (with time trend terms only; with 
private-sector wage variables only; or with both time trend and wage 
variables), estimated comparable worth effects as measured by the sum 
of the coefficients on the AFTER78/, «© = 3, 4 or 5 are about the same: 
roughly 9 to 12 percent for women, about   1.0 to 2.0 percent for men. 
The AFTER? 8/ coefficients are significant at conventional test levels for 
women, but not for men. In models with both time trend and wage 
variables, (1) the wage variables usually are not themselves significant 
at reasonable levels; and (2) the estimated comparable worth effects are 
similar to those obtained in analogous models with time trend variables 
only. 19 In view of this, I focus on the "time trend" results (i.e., those in 
which the time trend but not the private-sector wage variables are used).
The time trend results for women in table 4.5 are essentially the same 
regardless of which regressors are used: relative to what would have 
been predicted on the basis of time trends and (changes in) their own
Table 4.5 Summary of Pooled OLS Wage Regressions for Women 
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characteristics, women©s pay rose by roughly 3 percentage points after 
July 1983 (the date of the first set of comparable worth wage adjust 
ments), by roughly 4.7 more percentage points after July 1984 (the date 
of the second set), and by about 3.7 additional percentage points after 
July 1985 (when the third set occurred). Thus, the pooled OLS estimates 
in table 4.5 imply that the cumulative effect of the adjustments on pay for 
women was an increase of roughly 11.4 percentage points relative to 
what would have been expected on the basis of trends and (changes in) 
characteristics  such as accumulated seniority  of the women them 
selves. These AFTER78i effects are significant at conventional test 
levels.
The pooled OLS time trend estimates for men in table 4.6 are also 
very similar regardless of which sets of regressors are used, but are very 
different from those derived for women. The estimates suggest that, 
among men, pay (1) was essentially unchanged after the first set of 
adjustments, (2) rose by no more than roughly 0.5 of a percentage point 
after the second set and (3) rose by roughly 1.0 further percentage 
points after the third set, for a cumulative increase of no more than about 
1.5 percentage points relative to what would have been expected on the 
basis of past trends and (changes in) individual characteristics. More 
over, none of the AFTER78i coefficients for men is significant at 
conventional test levels; in the statistical sense, the pay adjustments© 
effect on pay of men was negligible.
Fixed-effects estimates
Persons who were present during the entire period covered by the data 
may not be typical of all state employees, so inferences based on simple 
pooled OLS analyses of such persons may not readily generalize to the 
state©s total employee population. To address this potential problem, I re- 
estimated the OLS analyses allowing for person-specific fixed effects; 
note that all regressors that either are time-invariant or increase one-for- 
one with time (e.g., years since first entry date) now drop out of the 
analyses.
Table 4.7 summarizes these fixed-effects analyses (the full results
Table 4.6 Summary of Pooled OLS Wage Regressions for Men 



































































































































































































Table 4.7 Summary of Fixed-Effects Wage Regressions
for Random Samples of Whites 




























































appear in appendix table A4.10). The estimates here are very similar to 
the pooled OLS estimates, 20 implying (for time trend models) 
cumulative increases up to April 1986 of slightly more than 11.7 
percentage points in women©s wages and of about 1.8 percentage points 
in men©s wages. (Again, the effects for women are significant at conven 
tional test levels, whereas the ones for men are not.) The net gain for 
women was thus about 9.9 percentage points. It is interesting to note that 
this is larger than the size of the reduction (roughly 6.2 percentage 
points) in the FEMALE_ coefficient in individual-level analyses with 
standard regressors (table 4.2), but smaller than the reductions (about 
11.8 percentage points unweighted, 14.3 percentage points weighted) in 
the PCTFEMAL coefficient for class-level analyses using the raw 
differentials with Haypoints specification with max pay (table 4.3). 
Thus, at least as regards wage effects of comparable worth, the cross- 
section conventional economic and comparable worth results bracket 
the fixed-effects results; and the results implied by the unweighted 
comparable worth analyses are quite close to the fixed effects results. 
In sum, the bottom-line numbers for women and men are cumulative
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wage gains of about 11.7 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, after 
the comparable worth wage adjustments; the former effects are statis 
tically significant, whereas the latter are not.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that both the state adminis 
tration and the union representing most of the potential beneficiaries of 
the adjustments wanted to make "comparable worth raises... an addi 
tion to rather than a competitor with general salary increases, [with] no 
job classification [having] its salary lowered" (Evans and Nelson 1989, 
p. 94). Formulation and implementation of the adjustments were struc 
tured in a way that enhanced their add-on character. For example, both 
collective bargaining over and appropriations for the adjustments 
treated them as a special item, distinct from other pay changes (Evans 
and Nelson 1989, pp. 92-103). The evidence from the analyses of this 
chapter suggests that the objective of add-on adjustments was largely 
fulfilled: oversimplifying only slightly, one can say that the actual effect 
of the comparable worth wage increases was a net addition to women©s 
pay and no change in men©s pay, relative to the levels that would 
otherwise have prevailed.
As implied in section 3.4, however, this need not have been the case, 
despite the intentions of the major participants. The state ultimately 
determines what all jobs (and workers) will be paid, and the notion that it 
determines what one job (or worker) will be paid in isolation from other 
jobs (or workers) is implausible. Whatever it may say explicitly, the 
state might implicitly have chosen to finance larger wage increases for 
some jobs (or workers) by making smaller increases for others, by 
scaling down the size of cost-of-living increases, etc. Also, at least in 
principle, men as well as women might benefit. On the one hand, the so- 
called female-dominated jobs that were targeted for comparable worth 
wage adjustments were not all 100 percent female; rather, men as well as 
women were working in these jobs. 21 On the other hand, unions repre 
senting workers in predominantly male jobs might resist the narrowing 
of traditional pay differentials implicit in comparable worth (and, in 
Minnesota, actually attempted to do so: recall note 29, chapter 3). Pay 
increases for predominantly female jobs need not preclude pay in-
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creases for male workers, even though that was essentially the end result 
of the adjustments that were actually adopted.
4.5 Longitudinal Analyses of Changes in Employment, 1981-86
Was employment aifected by the state©s comparable worth wage 
adjustments? As noted in section 3.4, I address this question in two 
stages. First, I estimate the employment demand function (3.10) to 
obtain measures of the effect of wages on employment, other things 
(e.g., prices, time trend terms and variables denoting the state of the 
private-sector labor market) being equal. Then, I use the estimated wage 
elasticity of employment and estimates of the wage increase attributable 
to comparable worth (as derived in section 4.4) to measure the actual 
effect on employment.
Employment demand function estimates
The dependent variable in the employment demand analyses is al 
ways the natural logarithm of class employment. As the wage variable 
(the Wit of (3.10)), I use, in turn, either the maximum, the mean or the 
minimum (In of the) within-class hourly wage rate. The sample used in 
estimation consists of all classes with positive employment over the 
entire period covered by the data. 22 Estimates are presented separately 
for "mixed" and predominantly female and male classes, where pre 
dominance refers to the proportion female in a class as of October 1981: 
classes in which under 30 percent (at least 70 percent) of the incumbents 
as of that date were female are called predominantly (fe)male, whereas 
the rest are called "mixed." The analyses control for prices, time trend 
terms and/or private-sector patterns, where the latter are measured by 
the (In of) private-sector employment in Minnesota and the Minneapolis 
-St. Paul MSA (LNEMMINP and LNEMMSAP, respectively) as of the 
relevant quarter. 23
The results derived using either pooled OLS or fixed effects are 
summarized in table 4.8 (see appendix table A4.ll for the complete
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Table 4.8 Summary of Regressions for Class Employment Levels
by Type of Class
(dep. van=In of class employment; indep var. = maximum/ 
mean/minimum In of wage rate within class; t in parentheses)
Pooled OLS Estimates Fixed-Effects Estimates 
Model, Class Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum
Time Trend Variables Only:




































































































































































results). Both in the pooled OLS and fixed-effects results, the wage 
elasticity for a given group is essentially the same regardless of which 
set of regressors is used (time trend terms only; private-sector employ 
ment variables only; or both time trend and private-sector employment 
variables). 24 In the interest of brevity, the following discussion focuses 
on the time trend results (i.e., those with time trend but not private- 
sector employment variables).
The first half of table 4.8 presents class employment function esti-
132 The Economics of Comparable Worth
mates obtained using pooled OLS. The coefficient on the wage variable 
is always significantly negative and almost always greater (often, sub 
stantially so) than unity in absolute value. These are hard to accept as 
estimates of demand elasticities: as noted in section 3.4, negative wage 
coefficients obtained using pooled OLS may reflect only the hierarchical 
nature of Minnesota state employment, rather than a negative effect of 
wage increases on employment in a given class.
To address this problem, I also estimated employment functions using 
fixed effects; these results are summarized in the second half of table 
4.8. As one would expect, the wage coefficients here are lower in 
absolute value than those obtained using pooled OLS. Indeed, when the 
maximum (log-) wage rate is used as the measure of the cost of labor, the 
coefficient is always positive. On a priori grounds, the maximum 
(log-) wage is a less appealing measure of the cost of labor than either the 
mean or minimum. 25 The positive relation between the maximum 
(log-)wage and employment warrants further study, however.
This result apart, the fixed-effects results for equation (3.10), like the 
pooled OLS results, generally imply a significantly negative relation 
between pay and the level of employment within job classes. The time 
trend fixed-effects estimates (with the Wit of (3.10) defined as the mean 
In of pay) imply elasticities of employment with respect to wages of 
about  0.40,  1.30 and  0.65 for predominantly female, mixed and 
predominantly male classes, respectively. Recall that, as noted in sec 
tion 3.4, these are best regarded as output- (or budget-) constant em 
ployment elasticities, exclusive of any employment reductions attributa 
ble to the decline in the purchasing power of the state©s personnel budget 
due to the comparable worth wage increases.
These estimates (particularly for mixed classes) are larger in absolute 
value than those derived in previous work on state and local government 
employment (see, e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith 1987a; and Ashenfelter 
1977). The present research differs from prior studies in at least two 
potentially important respects, however. First, most prior work used 
either aggregate time-series data (e.g., Ashenfelter 1977) or aggregate 
cross-section data (e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith 1987a), whereas this 
research of course refers to a single governmental unit. Second, unlike
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the earlier analyses, this research is concerned with a setting in which 
there was substantial and (if the participants are to be believed) genu 
inely exogenous variation in wages, variation that was not dictated by 
market forces. This does not necessarily mean that the Minnesota 
experience is the equivalent of a controlled experiment, but it may mean 
that problems of aggregation, imprecision and simultaneity affect the 
present study to a lesser extent than was the case in prior work.
Estimated employment effects
Given the cumulative effects of comparable worth on wages, dis 
cussed previously, the employment elasticities just discussed imply that 
the cumulative effects of comparable worth on employment were about 
-0.40 x 11.7= -4.7 percent and -0.65 x 1.8= -1.2 percent for pre 
dominantly male and predominantly female jobs, respectively.
Thus, these estimates imply that the cumulative three-year effect of 
comparable worth on both women©s and men©s employment between July 
1983 (the date of the first comparable worth pay adjustments) and April 
1986 (the end of the period covered by the data) was not much different 
from (loss of), at most, several years of employment growth. "Ex 
ogenous" employment growth associated with trends (TIMETRND, 
TIMETRSQ) and price changes (CPINDEX1-4) between July 1983- 
April 1986 was about 8.0 percent for predominantly female jobs, 19.0 
percent for mixed jobs and 10.1 percent for predominantly male jobs. 26 
For each type of job, this exogenous employment growth is more than 
sufficient to offset the effects of the wage increases that actually occurred 
over the same period. For example, between July 1983-April 1986, the 
actual mean In wage increased by about 0.178, 0.135 and 0.135 for 
predominantly female, mixed and predominantly male job classes, 
respectively. Evaluated at the appropriate wage elasticity of employment 
( 0.40,  1.30 and  0.65, respectively), these changes in (mean In) 
wages imply ceteris paribus wage-induced employment reductions of 
about 7.1 percent, 17.6 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively less than 
the employment increases implied by exogenous factors during the 
same period. Note that the actual changes in (mean In) wages include the
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effects of the comparable worth wage adjustments; in the absence of the 
adjustments, then, wage changes would have been smaller and the net 
growth in employment would have been larger.
In sum, the wage adjustments not only did not reduce the level of 
anyone©s pay; they also did not actually cause anyone to lose his or her 
job. Rather, they meant only that subsequent employment growth was 
smaller than would otherwise have been the case. The real losers from 
the wage adjustments, if any, were taxpayers and individuals particu 
larly women in the private sector (or outside the workforce) seeking a 
state job.
4.6 Summary and Conclusions
The results of this chapter may now be summarized briefly. On the 
methodological plane, there is little to support the use of class (job) level 
regressions, with or without Haypoints and whether weighted or un 
weighted, to analyze sex differences in pay levels. On the one hand, the 
aggregation of individuals into jobs that is inherent in comparable worth 
analyses consistently yields estimated sex differentials in pay that are 
noticeably larger, in absolute value, than those obtained in otherwise- 
identical specifications using individual-level data. On the other hand, 
adopting all three main elements of comparable worth analyses simul 
taneously using jobs rather than individuals as the unit of analysis, an 
administrative pay construct rather than actual wages as the dependent 
variable, and job evaluation scores instead of employee characteristics 
as independent variables yields estimated sex differentials in pay that 
are smaller, in absolute value, than the ones obtained in conventional 
economic analyses of individual-level data that use the limited set of 
employee characteristics variables available in these data.
In contrast, comparable worth cross-section analyses particularly 
unweighted ones of pay at different dates yield estimates of the change 
in the sex differential in pay that are reasonably close to those obtained in 
fixed-effects analyses of individual level data.
On the substantive question of the effects of Minnesota©s comparable
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worth wage adjustments, the evidence suggests that although the adjust 
ments certainly did not eradicate the female/male pay gap in Minnesota 
state employment, 27 they did reduce it. Women clearly received wage 
gains, relative to what their pay would otherwise have been; although 
the estimates also imply that men enjoyed some wage gains as well, 
these are very small and statistically insignificant. Relative to what 
would have been observed in the absence of the wage adjustments, 
employment in female jobs fell. However, relative to prior years, em 
ployment in female jobs rose: that is, wage increases (and induced gross 
reductions in employment) for female jobs were offset by other forces, 
leaving a net increase in employment, on balance, relative to prior 
years. The effects on pay were of fairly moderate size; not surprisingly, 
so were the resulting effects on employment.
NOTES
1 In 1984, the legislature required local governments to make payment on the basis of 
"comparable work value" a "primary consideration" in municipal employee compensation deci 
sions. See Local Government Pay Equity Act (Minnesota Statutes, chapter 471.991, subdivision 
5).
2 Most of the following discussion is based on Council on the Economic Status of Women 
(1982), Evans and Nelson (1986, 1989) and Rothchild (1984a, 1984b, 1985).
3 Hay Associates led the committees in their evaluation of the first 250 jobs; the Department of 
Personnel representatives then led the committees in evaluating the next 200 jobs; the remaining 
jobs were evaluated by the Department of Personnel representatives with input from the other 
committee members as needed; Hay Associates evaluated "key managerial, personnel, and particu 
larly sensitive classes" (Minnesota Department of Finance 1979a, p. 18).
4 For example, Committee "C" included a human resources specialist, a senior clerk-ste 
nographer, an agricultural field inspector, a principal highway technician, the personnel director in 
the Department of Administration, a natural resources technician, an executive in the Department 
of Public Safety, and a Department of Personnel representative. See Minnesota Department of 
Finance (1979a, p. 17).
5 Even before the state©s comparable worth pay adjustments, pay for relatively low-level 
occupations in Minnesota state government exceeded that in the private sector (Minnesota Depart 
ment of Finance, 1979, esp. pp 1-43 -1-44). For example,"... even before we started our pay equity 
program, our office and clerical workers were paid 15 percent above the prevailing wages" 
(Rothchild 1984b, p. 78).
6 The task force©s study was limited to state jobs that (1) had been assigned Hay point scores, (2) 
had at least 10 incumbents and (3) were predominantly male (i.e., jobs in which at least 70 percent 
of the incumbents were male) or predominantly female (i.e., at least 80 percent of the incumbents
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were female). About 88 percent of nonacademic state employment was in job classifications 
meeting these criteria. (See Rothchild 1985, p. 108.)
7 In Minnesota state employment, jobs are usually referred to as "classes" or "classifications."
8 The available slice files cover October 1981, January and April 1986, and the months of 
January, April, July and October for each of the years 1982-1985 inclusive, making a total of 19 
quarters. Each slice file contains data on about 30,000 employees; in total, the 19 slice files contain 
over 580,000 records.
9 The unique identifier is the employee©s scrambled Social Security number. I thank James Lee 
and the late Paul Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Employee Relations for preparing the 
slice files, and Jan Anderson, Florence Buggert and James Lee for answering queries about their 
contents.
10 About 7 percent of the individuals in the slice files have state employment entry dates that 
change over time (usually because they leave and then re-enter state employment). I extracted both 
the earliest and "most recent" (as of the end of the relevant quarter) entry date for each person. Also, 
for some individuals, certain information (concerning, for example, birth date or sex) is missing in 
the initial record but is available in later records. I extracted such information and appended it to all 
records for each such person.
1 © As shown in table 4.1,1 use a quadratic form for jobs© Haypoint scores, i.e., include both the 
actual Haypoint score (HAYPOINT) and its square (HAYPOISQ). This allows for the possibility 
that pay rises with Hay points at a decreasing rate. In the jargon of job evaluation practitioners, this 
quadratic relation between pay and evaluation points - rising, but flattening out at higher evaluation 
point values  is a "dogleg" pattern (see, e.g., Farnquistetal. 1983, p. 362). This quadratic relation 
is in fact observed in Minnesota (see, e.g., appendix tables A4.1-6), in San Jose (see chapter 5 and 
Stackhouse 1980) and elsewhere (see, e.g., Willis and associates 1974, 1976).
12 That is, the "percent female" variable varies between zero (for all-male jobs) and unity (for 
all-female jobs), so that the coefficient on this variable indicates the change in pay when "percent 
female" changes from zero to unity, other things being equal. (Similarly, the coefficient can be 
multiplied by 0.5 to yield the effect of changing from an all-male job to one that is 50 percent 
female.) Note that, in the second (percent) version, neither sex nor ethnicity is among the "other 
things" being held constant.
13 Analogously, studies of union wage effects might ask (a) how pay for workers differs 
depending on whether they are in 100 percent or 0 percent organized firms, (b-1) how pay for 
workers of given union status differs depending on whether they are in 100 percent or 0 percent 
organized firms, and/or (b-2) how pay for workers in firms that are organized to the same degree 
differs depending on their union status. Addressing question (a) would entail a specification 
analogous to the percent version used here; addressing questions (b) would entail a specification 
analogous to the dumm & % version used here, with answers to (b-1) derived from the coefficient 
on a "percent organized" variable and answers to (b-2) derived from the coefficient on an "is a union 
member" dummy variable.
14 For example, for the standard regressors specification for October 1981 (see table 4.2), d In Y 
for the dumm & % version is -0.0208 + (-0.3740x0.5832)= -0.2389, vs. a coefficient in the 
dummies version of -0.2255.
15 Controlling for Haypoints or the standard regressors reduces the class composition effect 
(i.e., the PCTFEMAL coefficient) substantially, but reduces the sex effect per se (i.e., the 
FEMALE_ coefficient) by only a small amount, in the dumm & % version relative to the percent 
version.
16 Note that the analysis underlying the -2.8 percent differential excludes classes that either (1)
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are unrated (do not have Haypoint values) or (2) have less than 10 incumbents. Both kinds of classes 
are predominantly male and generally entail rates of pay that are well above average; their exclusion 
clearly reduces the differential relative to what would be obtained were they not excluded.
17 Thus, these indicators are cumulative: for example, an observation dated September 1983 
will have AFTER783 = 1 and AFTER784=AFTER785=0, but one for September 1984 will have 
AFTER783=AFTER784 = 1 and AFTER785=0.
18 Unemployment rates for both men and women in Minnesota and the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
MSA rose early in the 1980s with the onset of the 1980-81 recession but fell during the mid-1980s, 
so a quadratic in time seems much more appropriate than a simple linear time trend. (TIMETRSQ 
is generally significant at conventional test levels in both the pooled OLS analyses of tables 4.5-6 
and the fixed-effects analyses of table 4.7, discussed presently.)
19 Also, the results are not sensitive to inclusion of higher-order terms in private-sector wages 
(e.g., the square of LNWGMSAP) and/or terms in private-sector employment levels.
20 In contrast with the pooled OLS results, in the fixed-effects results the private-sector wage 
variables are often statistically significant at conventional test levels. The fixed-effects estimates of 
comparable worth effects (the AFTER78i coefficients) are very similar regardless of which sets of 
regressors are used, however. Thus, in the interest of brevity, the discussion of fixed-effects results 
in the text focuses on the time trend models.
21 As noted earlier, the state estimated that about 10 percent of the beneficiaries of the 
adjustments were men (see, e.g., Rothchild n.d., p. 4).
22 Jobs with zero employment at some point are, at least at that point, inframarginal and so are 
not on the relevant demand function (recall section 3.4). Jobs with positive employment throughout 
the period of analysis may be atypical, but later on I address this potential problem using fixed 
effects.
23 Like the private-sector wage variables, these private-sector employment variables are de 
rived from the ES-202 file, discussed in section 4.2.
24 Also, the results are not sensitive to inclusion of higher-order terms in private-sector 
employment (e.g., the square of LNENMSAP) and/or terms in private-sector wages.
25 The maximum does not appear to be a very meaningful measure of the cost of labor: the 
proportion of employees actually paid the maximum wage rate for their class is never more than 31 
percent in any quarter covered by the data (in most quarters, the proportion is between 22 and 29 
percent). The proportion of persons actually receiving the maximum changes in a cyclical fashion 
because of the manner in which pay changes are implemented: between July of any given year 
(when new pay rates usually take effect) and the following April, the proportion receiving the 
maximum increases steadily, and then falls in the following July as new pay rates take effect. Also, 
recall from section 4.3©s discussion of the class-level results for pay that the variance of maximum 
(In) wage rates is smaller than the variance of mean or minimum (In) wage rates: using maxima 
instead of means or minima in effect tends to overstate the similarity of jobs© pay rates.
26 These figures are derived by multiplying the fixed-effects time trend coefficient estimates 
shown in the "mean" column of appendix table A4.ll for TIMETRND, TIMETRSQ and 
CPINDEX1-4 for each type of job by the changes in these variables between July 1983-April 
1986.
27 Contrary to the rather self-congratulatory comments of CESW (1985, pp. 1, 15; 1986, p. 2) 
quoted earlier in this chapter. As shown in table 4.4, even the approach that is apparently preferred 
by comparable worth proponents yields a sex differential in pay that is not statistically significant at 
the conventional 5 percent level only if one excludes all jobs that either do not have a Haypoint 
rating or else have fewer than ten incumbents.
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Appendix Table A4.1(l) Individual Pay Regressions, October 1981 
























































































































































Appendix Table A4.1(2) Individual Pay Regressions, October 1981 

























































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.2(l) Individual Pay Regressions, April 1986 
























































































































































Appendix Table A4.2(2) Individual Pay Regressions, April 1986 





























































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.3(l) Class-Level Pay Regressions, October 1981
































































































































Appendix Table A4.3(2) Class-Level Pay Regressions, October 1981

































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.4(l) Class-Level Pay Regressions, April 1986
































































































































Appendix Table A4.4(2) Class-Level Pay Regressions, April 1986





































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.5(l) Class-Level Pay Regressions, October 1981
































































































































Appendix Table A4.5(2) Class-Level Pay Regressions, October 1981

































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.6(l) Class-Level Pay Regressions, April 1986
































































































































Appendix Table A4.6(2) Class-Level Pay Regressions, April 1986





































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.7 "Comparable Worth" Pay Regressions,
October 1981 and April 1986 











































"Sample A" consists of all classes with a Hay evaluation point score.
"Sample B" consists of all classes with a Hay evaluation point score that also have at least ten 
incumbents.
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Appendix Table A4.8(l) "Time Trend" Pooled OLS Wage Regressions 
for Random Sample of 1,000 White Women Present Continuously
During October 1981-April 1986 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.8(2) "Private-Sector Wages" Pooled OLS Wage
Regressions for Random Sample of 1,000 White Women Present
Continuously During October 1981-April 1986













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.8(3) "Time Trend and Private-Sector Wages"
Pooled OLS Wage Regressions for Random Sample of 1,000
White Women Present Continuously During October 1981-April 1986















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.9(l) "Time Trend" Pooled OLS Wage Regressions 
for Random Sample of 1,000 White Men Present Continuously
During October 1981-April 1986 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.9(2) "Private-Sector Wages" Pooled OLS Wage
Regressions for Random Sample of 1,000 White Men Present
Continuously During October 1981-April 1986











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.9(3) "Time Trend and Private-Sector Wages"
Pooled OLS Wage Regressions for Random Sample of 1,000 White Men
Present Continuously During October 1981-April 1986















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.10 Fixed-Effects Wage Regressions 
for Random Samples of Whites Continuously Present
During October 1981-April 1986 
















































































































































































Appendix Table A4.11(l) Regressions for Employment Levels
in Predominantly (>70%) Female Classes
(dep. van=In of class employment; indep. var.=maximum/mean/































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.11(2) Regressions for Employment Levels
in Mixed (70% > % Female > 30%) Classes
(dep. van=In of class employment; indep. var.=maximum/mean/
































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A4.11(3) Regressions for Employment Levels
in Predominantly Male (< 30% Female) Classes
(dep. van=In of class employment; indep. var.=maximum/mean/
































































































































































































































































































































































Comparable Worth in San Jose 
Municipal Government Employment
In this chapter, I discuss the experience of San Jose, California, with 
comparable worth. As part of the two-year contract that settled a July 
1981 municipal employees© strike, the city agreed to adjust pay for 
certain predominantly female city jobs along the lines suggested by a 
Hay Associates job evaluation. Subsequent contracts included addi 
tional adjustments. The workers© union, Local 101 of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 
maintained that the 1981-83 contract did not provide equal pay for jobs 
of comparable worth in all respects (Bureau of National Affairs 1981, 
esp. p. 35). There do appear to have been significant changes in pay 
along comparable worth lines, however.
5.1 Background
San Jose, the seat of Santa Clara County, is located to the south of San 
Francisco. With a population of over 650,000, it is the fourth largest city 
in California and the fourteenth largest in the United States. San Jose is 
the unofficial capital of the "Silicon Valley," the heartland of the com 
puter industry (San Jose Chamber of Commerce 1983).
San Jose©s municipal employment runs the gamut of occupational
I am very grateful to Russell P. Strausbaugh of the San Jose" Personnel Department for supplying me 
with numerous documents pertaining to San Jose©s experience with comparable worth (including, in 
particular, the class listings that form the basis for the empirical studies described here); and to 
Shulamit Kahn for supplying additional documents and for helpful discussions. I thank Paul 
Decker, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, M. Anne Hill, Cordelia Reimers and participants in seminars at 
Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University and Princeton University for many helpful comments 
on previous versions of this chapter.
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categories: from painter and police officer to aircraft refueler and 
architect; from secretary and stock clerk to senior plant mechanic and 
senior planner. Roughly 1500 city workers are uniformed firefighters or 
police; 500 are blue-collar workers represented by various craft unions 
and the Operating Engineers; approximately 2800 are represented by 
AFSCME Local 101; there are about 400 nonunion managerial 
employees.
Various factors led up to the 1981 strike and subsequent comparable 
worth pay adjustments to the city©s compensation structure. l At the time 
of the strike, seven of the eleven City Council members were women, 
including the mayor, Janet Gray Hayes, who described San Jose as the 
"feminist capital of the world." Local 101 drew many of its leaders from 
workers in predominantly female jobs (e.g., the city©s librarians, cler 
ical workers and recreation specialists), who had long been concerned 
with women©s issues, including comparable worth. In 1977, a group of 
female city employees, City Women for Advancement, presented a 
report to the City Council that advocated (among other things) paying 
women©s jobs on the basis of an "equity standard" rather than their 
"normal value in the market place" (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 359). The 
following year, Local 101©s contract proposal included a request for a 
study of sex differences in pay in the city©s workforce.
As collective bargaining began in 1978, however, the city government 
"had no desire to explore the... comparable worth concept" (Farnquist 
et al. 1983, p. 359); and in June 1978 California voters approved 
Proposition 13. Proposition 13, and "bail-out" legislation passed to 
implement it, set stringent limits on spending by California munici 
palities. Bargaining in San Jose ground to a halt. In April 1979, however, 
the California State Supreme Court struck down some of the key parts of 
the bail-out legislation. Bargaining in San Jose resumed, but not to the 
satisfaction of comparable worth proponents. Local 101 pointed out that 
the new city manager, James Alloway, had commissioned Hay Associ 
ates to conduct a study of management positions in order to establish an 
equitable management compensation system. Local 101 insisted on a 
similar study of nonmanagement positions. Alloway resisted, telling the 
City Council that "it was his professional opinion that the Hay system of
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job evaluation was not appropriate for setting salaries for [nonmanage- 
ment] employees, and that salaries for [such] employees should be set 
through the traditional collective bargaining process" (Farnquist et al. 
1983, p. 360).
Local 101 was not slow to respond. In the words of Maxine Jenkins, 
the union©s business agent at the time, in April 1979
... we pulled a wildcat sickout of the women in City Hall. And I 
refused to sign a contract until we got the city manager to agree in 
writing that he would conduct an outside scientific study [of non- 
management employees] in which we would have the right to par 
ticipate. And he agreed to that, in writing. (Hutner 1986, p. 72.)
Eventually, the parties agreed that Hay Associates would be retained to 
perform such a study.
Agreement on how the study would be conducted was at least as 
important as agreement on whether it would be conducted; and here, 
too, the union ultimately prevailed on two crucial points. First, the 
union insisted on having a strong voice on the committee charged with 
actually assigning points to the jobs being evaluated. In the words of 
Local 101 president Mike Ferrero:
Personnel and management resisted that with everything they had. 
But we fought it on a political level and the council eventually said, 
"If we©re going to do this, this has got to be fair." And so an 
evaluation committee was put together with one person from per 
sonnel, who would have a vote, and the rest of the voting members 
were employees who were chosen jointly by management and the 
unions involved there were a number of other unions, but 
AFSCME was much the largest. So we had a lot of input on that 
evaluation committee. (Hutner 1983, p. 84.)
The resulting evaluation committee consisted of one management em 
ployee and nine nonmanagement employees "chosen in a manner to 
maximize their representativeness across departments and employee 
groups" (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 361).
Second, the union also insisted that the study be concerned only with 
internal pay equity, with no dollar valuation of Hay points for jobs by
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relating them to the external market, and no written recommendations 
from the consultants (Hutner 1983, p. 84). Again, the union prevailed; 
each job was evaluated according to four "evaluation factors" know- 
how, problem solving, accountability and working conditions  with 
points assigned to each. These point scores were then summed to arrive 
at a total "Haypoint" score, representing an "overall measure of the job©s 
value to the organization and to allow for direct comparisons of different 
jobs© relative organizational worth" (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 361); pay 
rates prevailing in other jurisdictions were not considered in the evalua 
tion. In the words of the Hay Associates "Client Briefing" (Hay Associ 
ates 1981, p. 2) on the study:
The City of San Jose as an employer, and the AFSCME local 
representing employees, each agreed to establish a "leading edge" 
posture on the issue of comparable worth.... The Hay Guide 
Chart-Profile Method of job measurement. .. [is] the appropriate 
methodology to rank jobs within the city organization without 
reference to the particular incumbents, external markets or how the 
results might be interpreted.
As soon as it was released in December 1980, the study set off a furor. 
According to Prudence Slaathaug, a business agent for Local 101 at the 
time:
.. .it was, in fact, absolute dynamite. People had it Xeroxed and 
routed through the city in about five minutes.... It was the topic of 
conversation. And, of course, they found the incredible inequities 
that had been reported all over the country. (Hutner 1983, p. 83.)
In the words of three San Jose personnel officials:
Individual comparisons between specific male and female- 
dominated [job] classes, particularly in the media, became a popu 
lar and often emotional pastime. Should, for instance, a female 
dominated class like Senior Librarian.. . [with] 493 points and $900 
[biweekly salary]... be paid the same as a mixed class like Senior 
Chemist (493 [points] and $1100 [biweekly salary]) with the same 
rating value? Or should a female-dominated Typist Clerk II (140
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points, $550 [biweekly salary]) class be paid the same as the equally 
valued but male-dominated Aircraft Refueler (140 points, $729 
[biweekly salary]) or Automotive Equipment Inspector (140 points, 
$827 [biweekly salary])? (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 363.)
Nor were these merely isolated examples. As discussed below, the 
study documented a pervasive pattern of "underpayment" of predomi 
nantly female jobs relative to predominantly male jobs with similar 
Hay point scores. Union officials argued that this pointed to the presence 
of "discrimination, pure and simple," in the city©s pay structure; city 
administrators argued that "the study did not take into account other 
productivity-related sex differences and sex-linked personal tastes for 
certain kinds of jobs" (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 363). After several 
months of debate along these lines, the city administration and Local 
101 began formal negotations on the study in May 1981.
In principle, the parties could have agreed to assign pay to each job 
exclusively on the basis of its Haypoint score. That, however, would 
have entailed substantial cuts in pay for some jobs, most of them 
predominantly male jobs with pay rates in excess of the figure implied 
by the overall "trend line" linking pay and Haypoints; and neither side 
"considered for a minute the notion of cutting anyone©s pay, since by 
doing so the city would have placed itself in a noncompetitive position" 
(Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 364). The union instead argued for raising the 
pay of all jobs below the trend line and preserving the pay of jobs at or 
above the trend line; whereas the city offered special "salary equity 
adjustments" for predominantly-female jobs that would have narrowed 
the disparities identified by the Hay study.
On June 12, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in 
County of Washington, Oregon, et al. v. Gunther et al. (452 U.S. 967 
(1981)). Although the Court stressed that it was not judging the merits of 
comparable worth, its decision appeared to open the door to comparable 
worth lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Frustrated by 
what it considered to be lack of progress in their negotiations with the 
city, on June 18 AFSCME filed a complaint against the city with the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging 
that although both the city and the union accepted the results of the Hay
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study, the city continued to pay "discriminatory" salaries. The city 
administration accused the union of bargaining in bad faith; negotiations 
bogged down. Finally, on July 5, the union went out on strike.
It was hardly a conventional strike. In the words of the business agent 
for Local 101 at the time, Bill Callahan, it was "the first strike on the 
issue of sex-based wage discrimination," which made it a "media event," 
attracting reporters from as far away as Canada and England (Hutner 
1983, p. 91). Sally Reed, deputy city manager during the strike, noted 
that officials at the California and local chambers of commerce, business 
groups, and other municipalities were putting "a lot of pressure" on the 
city administration to resist the union (Hutner 1983, p. 90).
The major obstacle to an agreement was apparently the question of 
how to pay for the comparable worth pay adjustments sought by the 
union. According to Local 101 president Ferrero (quoted in Hutner 
1986, p. 92), the city attempted to play the union©s male and female 
members off against each other:
They would give us comparable worth but they were going to make 
us pay for it out of the general salary increases of all the other 
members in our units. And they couldn©t understand why we didn©t 
think that was fair. You don©t give pay equity on one hand and then 
take it away on the other, in a general wage increase.
Eventually, in time-honored fashion, the parties struck a compro 
mise, one "that had little to do with an objective, systematic job evalua 
tion system" (Farnquist et al. 1983, p. 365). The 1981-83 contract 
agreed to on July 14, 1981 provided for general salary increases of 7.5 
percent during the first year of the contract and 8.0 percent during the 
second; and for two sets of "special equity adjustments," effective July 
1981 and August 1982, for female-dominated jobs farthest below the 
salary-Hay point trend line.
As part of the 1981 settlement, the city agreed to bargain over further 
comparable worth pay adjustments in subsequent contracts. The 
1983-84 contract provided for two further adjustments, in July 1983 
and January 1984; the 1984-86 contract included one additional adjust 
ment, in July 1984. 2 Finally, the 1986-89 contract provided for two 
more small adjustments, effective June 1986 and June 1987.
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In what follows, I consider the effects of these changes in the city©s pay 
structure. Did they alter the relation between pay and Hay points? Did 
they erase, or at least reduce, the sex differential in pay between female 
and male jobs with similar Haypoint values? Did they affect male and 
female jobs© pay differently? Did they affect employment in female or 
male jobs?
5.2 Data
This chapter©s analyses of wage and employment effects of San Jose©s 
experience with comparable worth are based on two kinds of data. 
Unfortunately, each provides only limited information and covers only a 
limited time period. First, the Hay study of nonmanagement jobs 
(Stackhouse 1980) provides data on Haypoints ("job grade points"), the 
maximum biweekly salary rate, working conditions ratings and sex 
composition of 229 full-time job classifications as of November 14, 
1980. Nine "class listings" computer printouts, prepared for internal 
administrative purposes, showing the maximum biweekly salary rate of 
each job classification for distinct dates during 1980-88 are a second 
source of information. Eight of these class listings also indicate, for 
each job classification, the number of positions authorized and filled as 
of the relevant date. 3 Since all data refer to jobs ("classifications"), the 
analyses of this chapter are similar to the class-level analyses presented 
in chapter 4.
Many of the 229 jobs evaluated in the 1980 Hay study were not filled 
at any point during the period 1981-88. The studies in this chapter are 
concerned only with the 160 jobs that not only (1) were evaluated in the 
1980 Hay study but also (2) had at least one incumbent throughout 
1981-88. 4 One other aspect of the data on jobs worth noting at the outset 
is that in some cases the same job appears in the class listings in several 
different places; in these cases, I have combined all incumbents into one 
job. 5
Tables 5.1-2 give definitions and summary statistics, respectively, for 
the variables derived from these sources used in the analyses of this
190 The Economics of Comparable Worth
chapter. The data do not indicate the actual proportion of employees in 
each classification (job) who were of either sex. Instead, each classifica 
tion is categorized as either "predominantly female," "predominantly 
male" or "heterosexual" (i.e., neither predominantly female nor pre 
dominantly male); I refer to these as "female," "male" or "mixed." Of the 
160 classifications considered in the analyses, 101 (about 63 percent) 
were male and 41 (about 26 percent) were female. About 39 percent of 
the male jobs are assessed as having relatively adverse working condi 
tions (i.e., had WRKCON3 or WRKCON4 equal to unity), whereas 
none of the female jobs are. Also, the average Haypoint rating is 
somewhat higher for the male jobs (about 218 Haypoints) than for the 
female jobs (about 202 Haypoints).
The last part of table 5.2 also summarizes the seven comparable 
worth wage adjustments, as given in the collective bargaining agree 
ments between the city and Local 101. The contracts express the pay 
adjustments made for the different jobs in terms of "salary range move 
ments," where one salary range movement is equivalent to a pay in 
crease of about 0.5 percent. 6 A small number of predominantly male 
jobs received increases in the sixth and seventh set of adjustments (none 
received increases in any of the first five adjustments), but, not surpris 
ingly, most of the adjustments were made to predominantly female jobs. 
The first and second adjustments made relatively large changes on a 
relatively large scale. For example, the first set of adjustments made 
changes to the pay of over three-fourths of the female jobs; those 
receiving an adjustment were moved an average of about 9.6 salary 
ranges (so that, overall including jobs that received no adjustment  
pay of female jobs changed by about 7.24 salary ranges, on average). 
The remaining adjustments were smaller in magnitude and less wide 
spread. For example, the final set of adjustments changed pay of about 
56 percent of the female jobs by an average of about 2.8 salary ranges 
(entailing an overall average change, among all female jobs, of about 
1.6 salary ranges).
Finally, in the longitudinal analyses discussed in sections 5.4-5 
below, I have used variables pertaining to the state of the private-sector 
economy in the San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). These
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Table 5.1 Definition of Variables Used in the Analyses 
Variable Definition
MAX_SAL maximum biweekly salary rate of job
LMAXSAL natural logarithm of MAX_SAL
NUMFILL number of incumbents in job
LNUMFIL natural logarithm of LNUMFILL
Sex Composition Dummies
JOBMALE indicator: job is predominantly male
JOB_FEM indicator: job is predominantly female
JOB_MIX indicator: job is "mixed"
JOB_UNK indicator: sex composition of incumbents in job is unknown
Working Conditions Dummies
WRKCONO indicator: job©s working conditions least unpleasant 
WRKCON1 indicator: job©s working conditions second-least unpleasant 
WRKCON2 indicator: job©s working conditions third-least unpleasant 
WRKCON3 indicator: job©s working conditions fourth-least unpleasant 
WRKCON4 indicator: job©s working conditions most unpleasant
Haypoint Variables
HAY_PTS Haypoint rating (evaluation points) of jobxO.Ol
HAYPTSQ square of HAYJPTS (Haypoint rating, squared, times 0.0001)
Environmental Variables
TIMEVAR time trend term (increases by one unit per year; =0 as of 1/1/60)
TIMEVSQ square of TIMEVAR
LNAVWGP In of private-sector wages, San Jose MSA
LNWGPSQ square of LNAVWGP
LN_EMPP In of private-sector employment, San Jose MSA
LNEMPSQ square of LN_EMPP
Comparable Worth Variables
AFTRCW1 indicator: date is on or after 7/19/81 (first comparable worth pay
adjustments) 
FTIMEAF =0 if before 7/19/81; = 1 if after 6/28/87 (last comparable worth pay
adjustments); otherwise, = fraction of time between first and last
comparable worth pay adjustments elapsed between 7/19/81 and
current date
FTIMESQ square of FTIMEAF 
ADJCHGa number of salary range movements given to job pursuant to ath
comparable worth wage adjustments, a = 1  7, through current date
(dates of comparable worth wage adjustments: 7/19/81; 8/15/82;
7/3/83; 1/1/84; 7/1/84; 6/29/86; 6/28/87) 
ADJ_CUM cumulative number of salary range movements given to job through
current date (sum of ADJCHG1-ADJCHG7 as of current date)
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Table 5.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
Used in the Analyses
All Jobs (n = 160)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Female Jobs (w=41)
Mean Std. Dev.









































































































































































































































































Alljobs(/i = 160) Female Jobs (n=41) Male Jobs (« = 101)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Comparable Worth Pay Adjustments:
ADJCHG1 2.0375 4.3767 


































































































































NOTE: Means for ADJCHGa, a = 1-7, give the mean number of salary range increments awarded 
to jobs (including jobs that received no increment) under the ath comparable worth pay adjustment. 
Means for ADJGGTa, a=\-l, give the proportion of jobs receiving a salary range increment 
under the ath adjustment. Means for ADJAMTa, a = 1-7, give the mean number of salary range 
increments awarded to jobs that received an increment (excluding jobs that received no increment) 
under the ath adjustment.
were derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ES-202 data file in the 
same way as were the analogous variables for private-sector wages and 
employment used in the analyses of chapter 4 (see section 4.2 and 
section 3.4 for further discussion).
Since this chapter is concerned with comparable worth-induced 
changes in wages and employment, it is useful to begin by noting what 
the simple descriptive statistics in table 5.2 imply about trends in these 
variables for male and female jobs. In October 1981 (the first date for
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which employment data are available), the mean maximum biweekly 
salary rates in the 101 male and 41 female jobs were about $977 and 
$771, respectively, whereas mean employment levels per job were about 
11.7 and 16.9, respectively. In contrast, as of October 1988, mean 
salaries were about $1388 and $1161 and mean employment levels were 
about 12.8 and 21.5 in the 101 male and 41 female jobs, respectively. 
Thus, between October 1981 and October 1988, mean pay grew by 
about 42.1 percent and 50.6 percent whereas employment grew by 
about 8.9 percent and 27.5 percent, respectively, for male and female 
jobs; even though women©s jobs enjoyed faster wage growth, they also 
enjoyed faster employment growth.
5.3 Cross-Section Analyses: Sex Differentials in Hourly Pay, 
1981 and 1988
I begin with cross-section analyses of pay using the data for July 25, 
1980, and October 22, 1988. These two dates are respectively the first 
and last dates for which wage data are available: the first precedes the 
first of the strike-induced comparable worth pay adjustments, whereas 
the last comes after the final comparable worth adjustments, made in the 
1986-89 contract. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of a 
job©s maximum biweekly salary rate, LMAXSAL; the independent 
variables refer to the sex composition of the incumbents in the job (JOB_ 
FEM, JOB_MIX, JOB_UNK), working conditions on the job 
(WRKCON1-WRKCON4), and Haypoint variables for the job (see 
table 5.1 for further details).
The sex composition variables implicitly take male jobs as a refer 
ence; the working conditions variables implicitly use jobs with the most 
pleasant (least unpleasant) working conditions -those with WRKCONO 
= 1 as a reference. (In both cases, choice of the reference category is 
arbitrary and will not affect the results.) Finally, the analyses enter each 
job©s Haypoints in quadratic form to allow for the possibility that pay 
rises with Haypoints at a decreasing rate (see note 11 in chapter 4).
The results of these analyses appear in table 5.3. The first pair of
Comparable Worth in San Jose" Municipal Government Employment 195
columns refers to all 160 jobs; the second, to the 101 male jobs; the 
third, to the 41 female jobs. The first column in each pair gives results 
for July 1980; the second, for October 1988. The regressions alternately 
exclude and then include the Haypoint variables (HAY_PTS and HAY- 
PTSQ); I focus on the results obtained when these variables are in 
cluded.
Estimates for all jobs
First, consider the results for all jobs as of July 1980. These indicate 
that, in general, less pleasant working conditions (as measured by the 
Hay study) are associated with higher pay, although the relation is weak: 
only the coefficient on WRKCON3 approaches significance at conven 
tional levels. There is a very strong relation between pay and Haypoints: 
other things being equal, the higher a job©s Haypoint rating, the higher 
its pay. 7
Also, and of particular interest here, the results indicate that as of July 
1980, before San Jose©s comparable worth pay adjustments, predomi 
nantly female jobs were paid appreciably (about 20.2 percent) and 
statistically significantly (r=6.65) less than predominantly male jobs 
with the same working conditions and Haypoint score. For "mixed" 
jobs, the figure is smaller but still sizeable in absolute terms (implying 
about 7.4 percent lower pay for such jobs, on average, relative to 
predominantly male jobs with the same working conditions and Hay- 
points) and close to significance at conventional levels (£=1.78). As 
noted above, the city and the Local 101 debated about whether these 
differences are attributable to "discrimination, pure and simple"; but 
there is clearly no room for argument over whether they are substantial.
The second column in table 5.3 repeats the analysis for all 160 jobs 
for October 22, 1988, after all of the comparable worth adjustments had 
taken effect. The differential between "mixed" and predominantly male 
jobs as of October 1988 was about  6.3 percent (£=1.71), a relatively 
small decline from the 1980 figure. On the other hand, by 1988, the 
differential between predominantly female and predominantly male jobs 
was only about -10.2 percent (most of the reduction had occurred by
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Table 5.3 Cross-Section Wage Regressions, 1980 and 1988 
(dep. var.=LMAXSAL; ^-statistics in parentheses)
All Jobs (n = 160)
Variable 07/25/80 10/22/88
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1983). Although this is sizable and statistically significant (r=3.76), it 
is only about half of the 1980 figure. Interestingly, the relation between 
Haypoint score and pay in these results for 1988 is about the same as it is 
in the 1980 results. 8
Estimates for male and female jobs
The second and third pairs of columns in table 5.3 present analogous 
results for male and female jobs, respectively. Here the most noteworthy 
differences between 1980 and 1988 have to do with the regression 
intercepts and implied effects of (greater) Haypoints. Both intercepts 
rose, but the difference in intercepts changed very little: the male 
intercept rose by 0.48 (from about 5.80 to about 6.28), whereas the 
female intercept rose by 0.46 (from about 5.86 to about 6.32). In 
contrast, whereas for male jobs the pay gain associated with 10 extra 
Haypoints changed only slightly-from about 2.52 percent in 1980 to 
about 2.71 percent in 1988 the gain for female jobs rose from about 
1.94 percent to about 2.42 percent between 1980 and 1988. 9 Thus, 
although San Jose©s pay adjustments did not result in exactly equal pay 
for jobs of "comparable worth," these cross-section analyses do raise the 
question of whether the adjustments did at least reduce substantially the 
sex differentials in pay among jobs with similar Haypoint values e.g., 
by raising the pay gain associated with Haypoints among female jobs to 
move it closer to the gain prevailing among male jobs.
Although these analyses refer to a "fixed market basket" (i.e., the 
same set of jobs) over time, however, simply taking the difference 
between the sex differentials in pay at successive dates does not neces 
sarily disentangle comparable worth effects from other changes that 
went on during the same period. For example, the change in the JOB_ 
FEM coefficient between 1980 and 1988 in table 5.3©s results for all jobs 
is not necessarily due exclusively to San Jose©s comparable worth pay 
adjustments: some of the change may have been the result of local labor 
market conditions, e.g., growing demand (and hence higher wages) for 
predominantly female jobs such as clerical positions.
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5.4 Longitudinal Analyses: Changes in the Sex Differential in Pay, 
1980-88
To analyze how pay rates changed as a result of the comparable worth 
pay adjustments, I now use estimates that exploit the longitudinal nature 
of the data. Data with information on wages are available for 10 dates 
(from July 14, 1980, to October 22, 1988: see section 5.2); thus the 
fixed effects analyses of wages have 101x10=1010 observations and 41 
x 10=410 observations for the 101 male and 41 female jobs, respec 
tively. Unlike the cross-section analyses of the previous section, the 
longitudinal analyses of wages include three other kinds of variables.
First, to embody the environmental variables discussed in connection 
with equation (3.7), I use price variables (CPINDX1-4), time trend 
terms (TIMEVAR and its square, TIMEVSQ) and/or measures of 
private-sector wages in the San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) as of the relevant date (LNAVWGP and its square, LNWGPSQ). 
As in chapter 4, the price variables give the value of the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers ("CPI-U") in the month immediately 
preceding the month referenced by the data (CPINDX1) or three, six or 
nine months prior to that. Like the TIMETRND variable of chapter 4, 
TIMEVAR measures the number of years elapsed since January 1, 
1960, and increases by one unit per year. LNAVWGP is analogous to the 
private-sector wage variables LNWGMSAP and LNWGMINP of chap 
ter 4, and is derived in the same way from the ES-202 data. Second, as 
noted below, I include alternative specifications of the comparable worth 
variable Cit of equation (3.7).
Comparable worth variables
A review of section 5.2 indicates some of the difficulties inherent in 
disentangling changes in pay induced by comparable worth from 
changes in pay that would have occurred even in the absence of the 
comparable worth wage adjustments. The first problem is that, as a 
source of before-and-after comparisons, the data are quite limited: data 
are available for only ten dates during 1980-88; only two of these ten
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dates come before the city©s first comparable worth adjustment of July 
19,1981; and only two more fall after June 28,1987 (when the last such 
adjustment occurred). The second problem is that the variables in the 
data do not vary both cross-sectionally and over time (except those, 
discussed below, referring to the comparable worth pay adjustments 
themselves). On the one hand, as noted in table 5.2, the available 
information on jobs© working conditions, Haypoint ratings and (initial) 
sex composition is time-invariant; thus these variables drop out of a 
fixed-effects analysis, and in any case can shed no light on changes over 
time. On the other hand, the environmental variables (the time trend and 
private-sector wage and employment variables) vary over time but not 
cross-sectionally. In a setting of this kind, identifying two separate 
phenomena occurring over time  comparable worth effects and other 
effects using data for a small number of dates will inevitably prove 
difficult.
These limitations dictate very simple specifications of the comparable 
worth variable Cir As noted in chapter 3, the specifications are of two 
kinds: in the first, Cit is a function of time alone, and simply indicates 
whether comparable worth was "in force" as of time t and thus able to 
affect pay of any job /; in the second, Cit varies cross-sectionally as well 
as over time, and indicates whether (and to what extent) each job / was 
targeted for a comparable worth pay adjustment as of time t. 10
Cit as a function of time alone. The first version of Cit treats the 
comparable worth effect on wages as a function of time alone, as 
embodied by two different specifications. In the first or "dummy" speci 
fication, Cit is a simple indicator variable AFTRCW1, equal to unity for 
all dates after the first set of comparable worth wage adjustments (July 
19, 1981) and zero otherwise. This treats the comparable worth adjust 
ments as equivalent to a once-and-for-all change in the level of wages.
A second or "quadratic" specification uses not only AFTRCW1 but 
also two continuous variables, FTIMEAF and FTIMESQ. As shown in 
figure 5.1 (which, for purposes of illustration, abstracts from all other 
factors that might affect wages, e.g., secular and cyclical effects), this 
provides a quadratic approximation to the pattern of comparable worth
200 The Economics of Comparable Worth
pay adjustments that occurred during July 19, 1981-June 28, 1987. 
Specifically, FTIMEAF is equal to zero for the two dates (July 25,1980, 
and November 14, 1980) prior to the first set of wage adjustments (July 
19, 1981); is equal to unity for the two dates (August 1, 1987, and 
October 22, 1988) after the last set of adjustments (which occurred on 
June 28,1987); and, for the remaining six intermediate dates, is equal to 
the time elapsed between the current date and the first set of adjustments 
(July 19,1981) as a fraction of the entire period of adjustments (July 19, 
1981-June 28, 1987). FTIMESQ is simply the square of FTIMEAF 11 
Thus, in this quadratic specification, the coefficient on AFTRCW1 (the 
b0 of figure 5.1) reflects the initial shift in pay rates that occurred with 
the first set of wage adjustments; whereas the coefficients on FTIMEAF 
and FTIMESQ (the b l and b2 of figure 5.1, respectively) represent the 
effects of subsequent adjustments through the end of the period consid 
ered. Since both FTIMEAF and FTIMESQ equal unity as of the end of 
the period of pay adjustments, the final or cumulative effect of the 
adjustments is given by the sum of the coefficients on AFTRCW1, 
FTIMEAF and FTIMESQ.
Cit as a function of targeting. The second version of the comparable 
worth variable indicates the extent to which each job was targeted for a 
comparable worth wage increase as of time t, based on the number of 
salary range movements provided for each job under the comparable 
worth wage adjustments. Thus, this second version of the comparable 
worth variable varies not only over time but also cross-sectionally.
In the wage analyses described below, I use two specifications of this 
version of Cit . In the first, Cit for each job as of a given date is 
represented by seven variables, ADJCHG1-ADJCHG7, where 
ADJCHGa, a = 1-7, is the number of salary range movements given to 
that job pursuant to the ath comparable worth wage adjustment as of the 
relevant date. 12 The second specification of this version of Cit , ADJ_ 
CUM, denotes the cumulative number of salary range movements given 
to each job as of the relevant date; i.e., the sum of the ADJCHGa, 
a= 1-7, as of the same date. 13
There are obvious limitations to each of these specifications. As noted
Comparable Worth in San Jose Municipal Government Employment 201 




t*<t l : W* = Wl ; AFTRCW1=0, FTIMEAF = 0, FTIMESQ = 0 
< t* < t7 : W* = H/j = bgAFTRCWl + fejFTIMEAF + ^FTIMESQ;
AFTRCW1= 1, FTlMEAF = (t*-t l )/(t7-t l ), FTIMESQ =FTIMEAF
/7 : W* = W 1 =ft0 + fe 1 +fe2; AFTRCW1 = 1, FTIMEAF= 1, FTIMESQ = 1 
/. = beginning of comparable worth pay adjustments
= end of comparable worth pay adjustments
in chapter 3, specifying Cit as a function of targeting may entail prob 
lems of endogeneity (for example, Cit defined in this way may not be 
independent of the regression error term). Fixed-effects estimation may 
avoid this problem to the extent that jobs are targeted for comparable 
worth wage increases because they are "chronically underpaid," pro 
vided being "chronically underpaid" can reasonably be regarded as a 
fixed effect. However, specifying Cit as a function of targeting also raises 
a conceptual issue: even in the absence of the endogeneity problem,
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adopting this specification of Cit means that one can estimate only the 
effect of comparable worth on targeted jobs relative to nontargetedjobs. 
In contrast, as noted in chapter 3, specifying Cit as a function of time 
alone permits one at least in principle to estimate the average effect 
of comparable worth on pay relative to what pay would have been in the 
absence of comparable worth. It will soon become clear, however, that, 
given the limited number of dates for which data are available, dis 
tinguishing comparable worth effects per se from other influences on 
wages using a "time alone" version of Cit is not feasible here.
Fixed-effects estimates
With this as background, I now discuss fixed-effects wage regressions 
for female and male jobs as set out in table 5.4. 14 For each type of job, 
the results appear in groups. Columns (l)-(3) use the first or "dummy" 
specification of the "time alone" version of Cit ; columns (4)-(5) use the 
second or "quadratic" specification. Columns (6)-(8) use the seven- 
variable (ADJCHG1-ADJCHG7) specification of the targeting version 
of Cit \ columns (9)-(l 1) use the cumulative (ADJ_CUM) specification.
Cit as a Junction of time alone. The most striking feature of the results 
for both female and male jobs when Cit is specified as a function of time 
alone is their extreme variation. For example, for female jobs, the 
dummy specification with time-trend variables (column (1)) yields an 
implied comparable worth wage effect of 0.0505, whereas the quadratic 
specification with the same time-trend variables (column (4)) yields an 
effect of  1.4882! Similarly, the quadratic specification with private- 
sector wage variables (column (5)) implies a cumulative comparable 
worth wage gain of about 7.64 percent for men and a comparable worth 
wage loss of about 8.13 percent for womenl Note also (recall note 14) 
that, since the available data refer to only ten dates, it is not feasible to 
include more than nine time-varying (but cross-sectionally invariant) 
regressors. This means, for example, that it is not possible to include 
both time trend and private-sector wage variables in the quadratic
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Table 5.4 Fixed-Effects Wage Regressions, 1980-88 










































































































































































































Implied effect of comparable 
worth on wages: 0.0262 0.0333 -0.7599 -0.3856 0.0764
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Table 5.4 (continued)















































































































































































































Variable (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LNWGPSQ 0.0631 -5.1351
(0.744) (6.198) 
Implied effect of comparable 
worth on wages: 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Implied effect of comparable worth on wages:
Regressions (l)-(3): coefficient on AFTRCW1.
Regressions (4)-(5): sum of coefficients on AFTRCW1, FTIMEAF and FTIMESQ.
Regressions (6)-(8): sum of products of coefficients on ADJCHGa and means of ADCHGa 
(a = l-7) (ADJCHGa=range increase received in ath comparable worth 
pay adjustment, including jobs receiving no increase).
Regressions (9)-(ll): product of coefficient on ADJ_CUM and mean of ADJ_CUM (=sum of 
means of ADJCHGa (a = 1-7)).
specification (AFTRCW1, FTIMEAF, FTIMESQ) of comparable 
worth wage effects.
It seems clear, then, that the small number of data points and the 
absence of variables that vary cross-sectionally as well as over time 
make it very difficult to distinguish, in a reliable way, between wage 
increases attributable to comparable worth and wage increases attributa 
ble to other (e.g., cyclical or secular) factors.
Cit as a Junction of targeting. With this in mind, consider estimates 
derived using the targeting version of Cit , shown in columns (6)-(l 1) of 
table 5.4. Rather than ask about the difference between pay in the 
presence of comparable worth relative to what pay would have been in 
the absence of comparable worth, these are concerned with a potentially 
more modest question: the effect of comparable worth on pay of targeted 
relative to other jobs. (The answers to these two questions will be the 
same only if comparable worth had no effects, even indirect ones, on 
pay of non-targeted e.g., predominantly male jobs.) As noted above, 
to the extent that jobs were targeted for comparable worth wage adjust 
ments because they were "chronically underpaid," and to the extent that 
being "chronically underpaid" may be treated as a fixed effect, fixed- 
effects estimation avoids the endogeneity bias (due to a correlation 
between the regression error term eit and the targeting version of the
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comparable worth variable Cit) that may arise if OLS is used. Moreover, 
since the targeting version of Cit varies cross-sectionally as well as over 
time, it turns out that questions about the effect of comparable worth on 
pay of targeted relative to other jobs can be answered rather precisely.
Columns (6)-(8) of table 5.4 present estimates for female jobs using 
the seven-variable specification of the targeting version of Cit . (Only a 
few male jobs were targeted for comparable worth wage changes, and 
then only in the last two sets of adjustments, so no results for this 
specification are shown for male jobs.) Regardless of which set of 
"environmental variables" is used, the implied effect of the comparable 
worth wage adjustments on female jobs is rather stable, ranging be 
tween about 5.6 and 5.9 percent.
Columns (9)-(l 1) present results obtained for both female and male 
jobs when one collapses the seven ADJCHGa variables into a single 
cumulative variable, ADJ_CUM. Again, the implied effect of compara 
ble worth on wages in female jobs is highly statistically significant and 
essentially the same (between about 5.7 and 5.8 percent) regardless of 
which set of environmental variables is used. In contrast, the implied 
effect on male jobs© wages is negligible in terms of both magnitude and 
statistical significance.
In sum, the city©s comparable worth wage adjustments do appear to 
have led to genuine changes in pay for predominantly female jobs: even 
after one takes into account environmental forces (as measured by 
prices, time trend and/or private-sector wage variables) that may have 
affected wages over the same period, the comparable worth wage 
adjustments appear to have raised pay in targeted, predominantly 
female jobs relative to other jobs. To the extent that it is legitimate to 
assume that the comparable worth wage adjustments did not affect (even 
indirectly) pay in nontargeted jobs, the comparable worth wage effects 
shown for regressions (6)-(l 1) are also estimates of the effect of com 
parable worth on the cost of female jobs relative to the cost that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the adjustments.
Of course, in a naive view, it is not necessary to use a statistical 
analysis to distinguish between wage changes attributable to compara 
ble worth and wage changes that would have occurred even in the
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absence of comparable worth: could it not be argued that the city©s 
contracts with Local 101 and reports by city personnel officials docu 
ment all of the pay increases awarded to jobs targeted for the special 
"pay equity" adjustments? The difficulty with this view is that some or 
even all of these pay changes might have occurred in any case (due, e.g., 
to changes in the cost of living or local labor market conditions): there is 
potentially an important difference between (1) pay changes identified 
by city or union officials as a consequence of comparable worth and (2) 
pay changes that would not have taken place, other things being equal, in 
the absence of comparable worth. Furthermore, neither the city nor the 
union has attempted to specify what, if anything, comparable worth did 
to pay for jobs other than those targeted for comparable worth pay 
adjustments. For example, the city may in effect have tried to finance 
some of the comparable worth adjustments by keeping a lid on pay for 
other jobs. (Indeed, as noted earlier, at one point during the 1981 strike 
the city threatened to do precisely this.) Alternatively, the union may 
have tried to increase support for the comparable worth adjustments by 
having male jobs (and thus, presumably, male workers) share in the 
gains. In either case, then, it is desirable to attempt to separate observed 
wage gains into components attributable to comparable worth and to 
other factors. Indeed, ignoring the underlying environment (as proxied 
by price, time trend and/or private sector wage variables) overstates the 
wage changes attributable to comparable worth as such: simple fixed- 
effects regression of LMAXSAL on ADJ_CUM without any environ 
mental variables yields coefficients of 0.0164 (r=32.533) and 0.0539 
(t=4.513) for female and male jobs, respectively; these are much larger 
than any of the coefficients on ADJ_CUM shown in columns (9)-(l 1) of 
table 5.4.
5.5 Longitudinal Analyses: Changes in Employment, 1981-88
I now consider the extent to which the comparable worth wage 
increases affected employment. As in chapter 4, the basic approach 
consists of two stages. First, I estimate the employment demand func-
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tion (3.10) to obtain measures of the effect of wages on employment, 
ceterisparibus. Then, I use these wage elasticities and the estimates (or 
guesstimates?) of the wage changes attributable to comparable worth 
noted in section 5.4 to estimate the actual effect on employment of the 
"pay equity" adjustments.
Employment demand function estimates
As in chapter 4, the unit of observation in the employment demand 
analyses is a job (classification), and the dependent variable is always 
the natural logarithm of employment in the job. The wage variable (the 
Wit of (3.10)) is the (In of the) maximum of the range of pay rates for 
each job (LMAXSAL). 15 Estimates are presented separately for female 
and male classifications. As in chapter 4,1 present estimates controlling 
for prices, time trend terms and/or private-sector patterns, where the 
latter are now measured by the (In of) private-sector employment in the 
San Jose MSA as of the relevant quarter, LN_EMPP.
As noted in sections 3.4 and 4.5, pooled OLS estimates of employ 
ment demand functions, e.g., (3.10), are implausible on a priori 
grounds: they may merely reflect the hierarchical nature of employ 
ment. 16 Accordingly, I turn directly to fixed-effects estimates for San 
Jose, which appear in tables 5.5 and 5.6 for female and male jobs, 
respectively. Data with information on employment are available for 
eight dates (from October 17, 1981, to October 22, 1988: see section 
5.2); thus the fixed-effects analyses have 101 x 8 = 808 observations and 
41x8 = 328 observations for the 101 male and 41 female jobs, 
respectively.
The implied wage elasticity is always at least about 0.77 (in absolute 
value) for female jobs; it is smaller in absolute value (at least about 0.34) 
for male jobs. The male wage-elasticity of employment is usually 
significant at reasonable levels; the female elasticity is much less pre 
cisely estimated, possibly because of the relatively low sample size for 
the female jobs (since fixed-effects estimation requires one degree of 
freedom for each cross-section unit, the effective sample sizes in the 
analyses for male and female jobs are 808  101=707 and 328 41
209
Table 5.5 Fixed-Effects Employment Regressions,
Female Jobs, 1981-88 











































































NOTE: DUMMY82-DUMMY88 are indicators denoting whether an observation pertains to a 
given date (1/22/83; 8/25/83; 3/17/84; 4/27/85; 7/7/86; 8/1/87; or 10/22/88, respectively) after 
the first date covered by the data (10/17/81).
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Table 5.6 Fixed-Effects Employment Regressions,
Male Jobs, 1981-88 











































































NOTE: DUMMY82-DUMMY88 are indicators denoting whether an observation pertains to a 
given date (1/22/83; 8/25/83; 3/17/84; 4/27/85; 7/7/86; 8/1/87; or 10/22/88, respectively) after 
the first date covered by the data (10/17/81).
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=287, respectively). In absolute value, the lowest elasticity estimate for 
both male and female jobs occurs when LN_EMPP but not time trend 
terms is used (column (3), tables 5.5-6); however, LNJEMPP is not 
itself significant at reasonable test levels in either regression. Of the four 
estimates in these tables, the ones in column (4) are the most plausible. 17 
These imply wage elasticities of employment for female and male jobs 
of about  1.15 and  0.52, respectively. Recall that, as noted in section 
3.4, the elasticity estimates in tables 5.5-6 are most reasonably inter 
preted as output- (or budget-) constant employment elasticities, ex 
clusive of any employment reductions attributable to the decline in the 
purchasing power of San Jose©s personnel budget due to the comparable 
worth wage increases.
Thus, these estimates, like those obtained in chapter 4, are generally 
larger in absolute value than those obtained in previous work on state 
and local government employment. Again, the special nature of the 
situation considered here-analysis of a single employer that adopted 
what seem to be genuinely exogenous changes in its wage rates  may 
help explain why the results here differ from those in previous work.
Estimated employment effects
Given the fixed-effects wage elasticities just noted, calculation of the 
effect of San Jose©s comparable worth pay adjustments on municipal 
employment is straightforward provided suitable estimates of the wage 
effects of the adjustments are available. As noted previously, the esti 
mated wage effects indicate the impact of comparable worth on targeted 
relative to nontargeted jobs. If they also indicate the effect on pay 
relative to the levels that would have prevailed in the absence of com 
parable worth  which is possible, but by no means certain then the 
longitudinal wage analyses of section 5.4 suggest that comparable worth 
may have changed wages by between about 5.7 percent and 5.8 percent 
for female jobs and had essentially no effect on pay for male jobs. Since 
the wage elasticity of employment is about   1.15 for female jobs, the 
wage effect for female jobs translates into a ceteris paribus employment 
effect that is between about  6.55 percent and  6.67 percent. In
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contrast, since the wage analyses imply that comparable worth had 
negligible effects on pay in male jobs, the employment effect on these 
jobs was likewise negligible.
Of course, actual employment in female jobs rose between October 
1981 and October 1988, because other forces in addition to comparable 
worth wage increases were at work. In particular, the fixed-effects 
analyses in tables 5.5-6 imply exogenous employment growth of over 
10 percent per year for women©s jobs. 18 Thus, to say that the employ 
ment effects of comparable worth were (no more than) about  6.67 
percent for female jobs is not to say that, due to comparable worth, 
employment in 1988 was lower by these amounts for these jobs than was 
the case in 1981. Rather, it means that, in the absence of comparable 
worth, employment in 1988 would have been about 6.67 percent higher 
than it actually was. In other words, implementation of six years of 
comparable worth wage adjustments in San Jose was roughly the equiv 
alent of somewhat less than a year of lost growth for female jobs.
5.6 Summary and Conclusions
Because of the limitations inherent in the available data, conclusions 
about the effects on wages of San Jose©s comparable worth wage adjust 
ments are problematic. If they can properly be regarded as measures of 
the effect on wages relative to levels that would otherwise have pre 
vailed, then the estimates indicate that San Jose©s comparable worth pay 
adjustments may have raised wages by between 5.7 percent and 5.8 
percent in female jobs, and had negligible effects on pay in male jobs. 
As a result, the six years of comparable worth wage adjustments in San 
Jose had a negligible effect on employment in male jobs, and may have 
reduced employment in female jobs by between 6.55 percent to 6.67 
percent roughly the equivalent of somewhat less than a year of lost 
employment growth. 19 In terms of employment, then, the real losers 
from the comparable worth pay adjustments in San Jose as in Min 
nesota are likely to have been persons (particularly women) in the
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private sector or not in the labor force who were seeking public-sector 
jobs.
NOTES
1 Much of the discussion in this section is based on Flammang (1986), Hutner (1986) and 
Farnquistetal. (1983).
2 According to a Personnel Department memorandum (Farnquist, 1984), the total cost of the 
five adjustments made during 1981-84 was approximately $6.8 million (which may be compared 
with a total pay and benefit cost, in 1981, of approximately $10 million). During the first two years, 
the special adjustments averaged about $800-$900 per employee, or about 4.5-5 percent of annual 
pay; subsequent adjustments were somewhat smaller.
3 The class listings I have used are dated July 25, 1980; October 17, 1981; January 22, 1983; 
August 25, 1983; March 17, 1984; April 27, 1985; July 7, 1986; August 1, 1987; and October 22, 
1988. The listings for October 17, 1981, and later dates include data on positions filled as of the 
relevant date, whereas the ones prior to October 17, 1981, do not. Other listings are available (e.g., 
for July 1, 1980), but the salary figures in them are the same as the ones in those just listed (e.g., for 
July 25, 1980). San Jose also maintains computerized files on the personnel histories and charac 
teristics of individual employees. Such data, however, are not available for years prior to 1982 
(recall that the first set of comparable worth pay adjustments took effect in July 1981).
4 The results are not sensitive to this exclusion; essentially the same estimates are obtained 
when all 229 jobs are analyzed. (In addition, results obtained for jobs with positive numbers of 
incumbents when observations on a job are weighted by the number of incumbents in that job are 
essentially the same as when unweighted observations are used, so only the unweighted results are 
presented here.)
5 For example, some incumbents in a job are designated "confidential" when they work with 
senior managers; and bilingual incumbents in a job sometimes have the designation "specialist" 
appended to their job title. In determining the total number of incumbents in such jobs, I have 
included persons with "confidential" or "specialist" titles.
6 For example, Exhibit II ("Pay Equity Adjustments") of the 1981-83 contract between the city 
and Local 101 specifies, among other things, that job class no. 1116 (Principal Clerk) will move 13 
salary ranges effective July 19, 1981, and will move a further 12 ranges effective August 15, 1982.
7 The salary-Haypoint relation flattens out (or "doglegs") at higher Haypoint values: pay 
increases with Haypoints, but at a decreasing rate. Evaluated at the approximate overall average 
Haypoint value (219 points), an additional 10 Haypoints are associated, on average and other things 
being equal, with roughly 2.39 percent higher salary.
8 Evaluated at the approximate mean value (for all jobs taken together) of 219 Haypoints, the 
1988 results imply that an increase of 10 Haypoints is associated, on average and other things being 
equal, with an increase in pay of about 2.66 percent (vs. about 2.39 percent in the results for July 
1980).
9 In each case, these percentage figures represent the change in the natural logarithm of salary 
associated with an increase in Haypoints from 219 (the overall mean Haypoint value) to 229 implied 
by the regression coefficients for the relevant year (either 1980 or 1988).
10 See note 26 of chapter 3 for further discussion of this distinction.
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1 © For example, the value of FTIMEAF for data as of March 17, 1984, is about 0.448 (so that 
FTIMESQ is slightly over 0.20). To see this, note that the period of wage adjustments (1981-87) 
covered by the data is approximately six years long and that as of March 17, 1984, about two years 
and eight months had elapsed since the first adjustments of July 19, 1981.
12 For example, a job that received a pay adjustment of five salary ranges effective as of the last 
of the comparable worth changes (June 28, 1987) would have ADJCHG1-ADJCHG6 equal to zero 
for all dates; would have ADJCHG7 equal to zero for all dates prior to June 28, 1987; and would 
have ADJCHG7 equal to five for all dates after June 27, 1987. Similarly, a job that never received a 
pay equity adjustment would have zero values for each of the ADJCHGa variables as of all dates. 
(Values shown in table 5.2 for the ADJCHGa are the "final" values, i.e., relevant to dates after June 
27, 1987.)
13 For example, consider a job that received an increase of five salary ranges as part of the first 
adjustments (July 19, 1981), a further increase of four ranges under the second adjustments 
(August 15,1982), and none in any of the subsequent adjustments. Then, for this job, CUMCHCW 
equals zero prior to July 19, 1981; equals five for dates between July 19, 1981 and August 14,1982; 
and equals nine for dates on or after August 15, 1982. The entries for ADJ_CUM in table 5.2 are 
the "final" values, i.e., those relevant to dates after June 27, 1987.
14 Recall that this chapter©s wage analyses refer exclusively to jobs. All of the variables the 
comparable worth and environmental (i.e., time-trend and private wage) variables included in the 
fixed-effects regressions of table 5.4 exhibit only time-series variation: none of them varies cross- 
sectionally as well as over time. (In contrast, chapter 4©s analyses of wages in Minnesota were based 
on data for individual employees rather than jobs, and thus included variables that vary cross- 
sectionally as well as over time.) This has several implications for the wage analyses of this chapter. 
First, since the data cover only ten dates, it is feasible to include no more than nine time-varying 
(but cross-sectionally invariant) regressors in the fixed-effects regressions. Second, in the absence 
of variables that vary cross-sectionally, pooled OLS regressions with the same variables used in the 
fixed-effects regressions of table 5.4 yield coefficient estimates that are identical to the fixed-effects 
estimates; so I do not present or discuss pooled OLS results corresponding to the fixed-effects 
results in table 5.4.
15 The class listings for October 1981 and later dates i.e., for the dates considered in these 
analyses of employment show the minimum as well as the maximum of the salary range for each 
classification; hence, to measure the cost of workers in each classification for these analyses, one 
can use the (In of) minimum or maximum salary, or the (In of the) midpoint between the maximum 
and the minimum. The results, however, are virtually identical regardless of which of these three 
wage variables is used.
16 In a nutshell, the difference between fixed-effects and pooled OLS estimates of employment 
functions for San Jose is essentially the same as the difference for Minnesota (see particularly table 
4.8): in San Jose as in Minnesota, pooled OLS estimates of wage elasticities of employment are 
considerably higher in absolute value than fixed-effects estimates derived using the same set of 
(time-varying) variables.
17 The fourth column of tables 5.5-6 uses the most general possible specification of environ 
mental variables: a set of dummies, one for each period represented in the data beyond the first, 
which is thus implicitly the reference category. (Note that differences between coefficients on the 
successive dummy variables in this fourth column measure exogenous employment growth from 
one date to the next.) In absolute value, the wage elasticities yielded by this specification are either 
about the same as or larger than those derived using any of the other variants. The general dummy 
variable specification is feasible in the employment analyses because the "wage" variable in these
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analyses varies cross-sectionally as well as over time. In contrast, in most of the analyses of wages 
reported in table 5.4, there are no variables that vary cross-sectionally, and so in those analyses a 
fully general dummy variable specification of the kind used in tables 5.5-6 is not possible.
18 In particular, note the results in column (4) of each table and recall the discussion in note 17, 
above.
19 Note, however, that these employment effects are based on output- (budget-) constant 
elasticities, and so may have been magnified at least to some extent by (e.g.) expenditure cuts 
undertaken to help pay for the wage increases.

Comparable Worth in Australia
This chapter is concerned with Australia©s version of comparable worth: 
a policy, first adopted in 1972, of "equal pay for work of equal value." 
Several countries have adopted pay policies that contain at least some 
elements of the comparable worth principle (Bellace 1980), and a 
number of observers have argued that Australia©s implementation of 
"equal pay for work of equal value" has fallen far short of perfection. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Australia, to a greater extent than most if 
not all other countries, has adopted and even implemented pay-setting 
practices that can reasonably be characterized as akin to comparable 
worth. How have these policies affected wages and employment of 
women and men?
6.1 Background
To the U.S. observer, the idea that comparable worth of any kind 
would find a home in Australia might at first seem puzzling. Compara 
ble worth in Australia, the land of Crocodile Dundee, Ned Kelly, the 
Outback, and Rupert Murdoch?
Perhaps the most important factor contributing to comparable worth 
in Australia is that "[g]overnment intervention in the labour market in 
Australia is almost as old as white settlement" (Deery and Plowman
I thank Jenny Acton, Patricia Apps, Sheila M. Bonnell, Clare Burton, David Card, Bruce 
Chapman, R. C. Duncan, Bob Gregory, Paul Miller, Martin Parkinson, Christopher Pissarides, 
Margaret Power, Sue Richardson, James Robinson, Stephanie Sheean, Christine Short, Margaret 
Thornton, Paul Volker, and participants in seminars at the Australian National University, Prince- 
ton University, the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales, and the University 
of Western Australia for many helpful discussions, letters, and comments on previous versions of 
this chapter.
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1985, p. 107). A major result of such intervention is that wage determin 
ation is probably more centralized in Australia than in any other country 
in the developed capitalist world. For much of Australia©s history, state 
intervention was consciously used to keep women out of "male jobs." 
Under the right circumstances, however, intervention could be used for 
quite different objectives. By the 1960s, an elaborate institutional struc 
ture based on state intervention in wage-setting was firmly in place. It 
was only a matter of time before someone would see its potential for 
altering sex differences in wages along lines suggested by comparable 
worth principles.
Government regulation of labor markets began in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, when much of the workforce consisted 
of convicts resettled from England. Australia©s colonial governors felt it 
necessary to take at least some steps to regulate the terms and conditions 
of convict employment. The scarcity of labor led to a system of pay 
ment, even for some convict workers, and thus to additional regulations.
Between the gold rushes of the 1850s and the 1890s, government 
continued to intervene in labor relations, setting a "pattern of part 
nership between government and private institutions" (Butlin 1959, p. 
38). Government itself was a major employer, concerned with building 
infrastructure for the young colony. In the 1890s, Australia went through 
a series of strikes and lockouts "of a scale and bitterness which threat 
ened the whole fabric of the state" (Deery and Plowman 1985, p. 125), 
and was sharply divided on the question of tariff protection. Eventually, 
there developed a kind of social contract, based on tariffs and wage 
regulation: avoid industrial conflict by relying on government tribunals 
to conciliate and arbitrate disputes over wages, working conditions and 
the like; grant employers tariff protection against imports, but make 
sure they paid fair wages to their workers once they had such protection.
Accordingly, Australia began to move towards a system of concilia 
tion and arbitration of industrial disputes. 1 In 1894, South Australia 
became the first state to adopt a compulsory arbitration law. The 1900 
federal constitution authorized the national parliament to pass laws for 
"conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of indus 
trial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state,"2 which led to
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passage of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904). 
This established a Federal Court of Conciliation and Arbitration for 
settlement of industrial disputes. At first, the Court attracted relatively 
little attention, but in 1906 the Excise Tariff Act sealed the second half of 
Australia©s budding social bargain: employers could apply for certifi 
cates of exemption that would grant them tariff protection, but granting 
of such certificates depended on their paying their employees a fair and 
reasonable wage.
Since the Harvester case of 1907, the Court has been a powerful force 
in national wage determination, and an ever-increasing fraction of the 
workforce has been brought into the conciliation and arbitration system. 
At present, almost 90 percent of employees are covered by tribunal 
awards of some kind. Almost 40 percent are covered by awards issued 
by federal as opposed to state or other awards. (This understates the true 
influence of federal awards, however, since state and other tribunals 
often follow the federal lead.)
In recent years, the Court called the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission during 1956-893  has consisted of "presidential mem 
bers" (a president and 13 deputy presidents) and 28 commissioners. The 
president must be a lawyer; most of the deputy presidents are lawyers 
(although there is no requirement that they be lawyers). Of the commis 
sioners appointed between 1956 and 1980, 43 percent were previously 
unionists, 33 percent came from managerial backgrounds and 20 per 
cent were formerly in government (Dabscheck and Niland 1981, p. 
243). All members are appointed by the government of the day and may 
serve until the age of 65.
The Commission©s primary responsibility is to resolve industrial 
disputes by conciliation or if attempts at conciliation fail by binding 
arbitration of the claims of the parties. 4 All that is necessary for a 
"dispute" to exist is "that one party, usually the employer, reject some 
demand made by another party, usually a union" (Deery and Plowman 
1985, pp. 134-5). Although other parties ("intervenors," e.g., the 
federal and state governments and other parties, such as advocacy 
groups) may participate in Commission hearings on a dispute, in gen 
eral the parties consist of one or more unions, on one hand, and one or
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more employers, on the other. 5 Particular disputes are referred to 
individual commissioners; disputes regarding industries are heard by 
individual deputy presidents or, more usually, panels consisting of two to 
four members of the Commission. Disputes of national economic im 
portance on the standard workweek, the minimum wage, etc. are 
decided by a "Full Bench" consisting of at least three members, two of 
whom must be presidential members.
Commission decisions, called awards, have the full force of law. Such 
awards cover specified employers and unions (a given award usually 
covers several employers or even an entire industry rather than just one 
firm); they tend to follow occupational (and to a lesser extent industrial) 
boundaries. "Roping-in" awards apply previous awards to employers 
newly discovered to be operating in the relevant industry.
Although the federal Commission is by far the most important tri 
bunal with the power to affect wages and other terms of employment, 
individual state tribunals also issue decisions on such issues. The Com 
mission is ultimately responsible for determining whether it or a state 
tribunal has jurisdiction in a given case. Federal government employees 
are automatically subject to federal jurisdiction, as are workers in 
industries that involve employers operating in more than one state; 
interstate unionism typically leads to federal jurisdiction. In some 
areas  notably, state public services (including teaching, nursing and 
social welfare) workers are represented by unions within individual 
states; here, state tribunals typically have jurisdiction.
For present purposes, one of the most important aspects of the 
Commission and the state tribunals is that their pay awards determine 
minimum, rather than maximum, wage rates. Labor and management 
are therefore free to negotiate rates (called overaward payments) in 
excess of these minima. (Although rare until the late 1960s, overaward 
payments have become important since that time.) In determining pay 
awards, the Commission (or a state tribunal) is able to exercise consider 
able discretion. Section 40(c) of the law establishing the arbitration 
system specifies that the Commission is to "act according to equity, good 
conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to 
technicalities and legal form." The Commission may receive formal
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statements and documents from the contending parties, may hear sworn 
testimony from witnesses offered by the parties, and may conduct on- 
site interviews and job inspections. Use of legal counsel is not required, 6 
and neither is legal formalism although some parties, notably union 
ists, have complained about excessive legalism in the Commission©s 
manner of operation.
Not surprisingly, questions about pay rates have historically been 
among the most contentious issues considered by the Commission (and 
its predecessor, the Court). Whatever may be the degree of legalism in 
other aspects of its operations, the Commission©s wage awards do 
resemble court decisions in two important respects. First, if only to 
avoid inconsistency and charges of unfair treatment, essentially the 
same principles tend to be applied to claims involving different indus 
tries, in much the same way as a court would apply a given statute to 
different cases. Second, principles adopted in previous decisions tend to 
be applied to subsequent cases, in much the same way as courts follow 
the principle of stare decisis (reliance on past precedent).
The principles adopted in wage decisions have shifted over time but, 
in one form or another, most of them can be viewed as attempts to base 
wages on supply-side and/or demand-side considerations: workers© 
needs, employers© ability to pay, changes in the cost of living, and 
government policy at the micro (efficiency, equity) and macro (stabiliza 
tion) levels have all played some role in the wage-setting process. The 
issues addressed in wage-fixing may conveniently be divided into two 
parts: questions about the aggregate level of wages, addressed in so- 
called national wage cases; and questions about wage differentials, 
addressed in so-called industry cases.
The aggregate level of wages
In one of the earliest cases, the 1907 Harvester Judgment (2 Common 
wealth Arbitration Reports (hereafter, CAR), p. 1), Henry Bournes 
Higgins, president of the Court, adopted seven shillings per day (for a 
six-day workweek) as a fair and reasonable minimum wage for unskilled 
labor. Relying in part on testimony offered by a butcher, a landlord©s
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agent and nine laborer©s wives, Higgins held that this sum was in line 
with the budget of the average male laborer with a wife and three 
children, and was necessary to satisfy the "normal needs of the average 
employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community."7 
The sum determined on the basis of this "needs" standard became known 
as the "basic wage," the wage payable for essentially unskilled labor. 
Higgins later introduced the concept of adjustments in the basic wage 
for changes in the cost of living.
The Harvester decision also recognized the need to add margins to the 
basic wage to allow for differentials in skill, effort, responsibility and 
working conditions, thereby yielding the "secondary wage." As Higgins 
later explained (1922, pp. 6-7, footnotes omitted):
The secondary wage is remuneration for any exceptional gifts or 
qualifications, not of the individual employee, but gifts or qualifica 
tions necessary for the performance of the function, e.g., skill as a 
tradesman, exceptional heart and physique, as in the case of a 
shearer, exceptional responsibility, e.g., for human life, as in the 
case of winding or locomotive engine-drivers.
The job of fitter in the Metal Trades was the first classification for which 
a secondary wage was determined; soon, fitters and Metal Trades 
awards generally  became an important benchmark for other 
decisions,
... because fitters were employed in a wide range of industries, and 
because it could be extended to other classifications which required 
the same degree of skill and training: millers, borers, slotters, gear 
cutters, cutting bar drillers, lappers, precision grinders, brass 
finishers, turners, boiler-makers and metal moulders. In other in 
dustries the fitter©s rate was applied to tradesmen such as carpenters, 
coopers, tailors, printing compositors, butchers, and so on. Mem 
bers of the Court argued that those trades required periods of 
apprenticeship and training and a degree of manual skill similar to 
that of the fitter. The establishment of a tradesman©s rate in any award 
in turn provided a benchmark by which the marginal relativities 
[i.e., differentials in "secondary wage rates"] of other classifications
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within that award could be fixed. (Deery and Plowman 1985, p. 
336.)
In time, wage cases for the Metal Trades became national test cases, 
important both for adjustment of the basic wage and via operation of 
the principle of "comparative wage justice" for fixing the general level 
of the margin, i.e., the secondary wage, for the economy as a whole., 
"Comparative wage justice (in simple terms) requires the continuance of 
pre-existing relativities [i.e., wage differentials]," so as to ensure that 
one group does not fall behind another (Hancock 1984, p. 190). Al 
though relative award rates can and do change, comparative wage 
justice tends to preserve them:
Under the operation of the principle of comparative wage justice, 
the interlocking relationship between award classifications made the 
wage structure rigid.... [W]hen the Metal Trades Award varied, 
pressures mounted for variations to both dependent and related 
awards. If one award varied, related classifications in other awards 
would also seek a variation, on the grounds of comparative wage 
justice with the award already varied. Classifications within awards 
had then to be varied by the same proportions. Thus comparative 
wage justice became an important way of transmitting wage gains 
from one award to another. (Deery and Plowman 1985, pp. 336-7.)
In the 1930s, the Great Depression led the arbitration court to con 
sider the demand side of the market, cutting nominal wage awards 
(relative to earlier levels) on the grounds that the capacity of the econ 
omy to pay high wages was severely undermined. A "workers© needs" 
standard gave way to an "employers© ability to pay" standard. Subse 
quent decisions reaffirmed the primacy of this "ability to pay" criterion 
and allowed, e.g., for a "prosperity loading" during periods when 
economic conditions were favorable. The "needs" standard was never 
completely abandoned, but it was certainly deemphasized. For exam 
ple, although changes in the price level were still considered, they were 
deemed relevant not so much as indicators of changing worker "needs" 
but rather as a reflection of changes in employers© "ability to pay." In 
1953, the court announced that it would rely on a set of macroeconomic
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indicators investment, production and productivity, overseas trade and 
the overseas balance, retail trade indicators, etc.-in determining the 
national "ability to pay." There followed a number of changes and 
amendments to wage-setting policy that gave priority to macroeconomic 
concerns.
In 1967, the Court©s successor, the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission, decided that it would focus on the "total wage," i.e., the 
sum of the basic wage and the secondary wage (Employers© Total Wage 
Case, 110 CAR, p. 196). This reflected increasing preoccupation with 
macroeconomic stabilization. During the 1970s and 1980s, wage deci 
sions came to be viewed as an important tool of incomes policy, and the 
Commission devoted much time and attention to questions about the 
macroeconomic consequences of its decisions and the degree to which 
wage awards would be linked to inflation and productivity (Braun 1974; 
Deery and Plowman 1985). There was growing concern about reducing 
or preventing "flow-on" the potential for awards in one industry to lead 
to demands, and thus wage increases, in many other industries. In 1983, 
the Commission decided that increases in pay rates outside the "national 
wage adjustment" framework (i.e., for reasons other than productivity 
growth or inflation adjustment) were to be strictly limited. Changes in a 
job©s skill, effort, responsibility or working conditions could prompt 
wage adjustments, but only if such "work value" changes were "such a 
significant net addition to work requirements as to warrant the creation 
of a new classification." Anomalies and inequities8 were to be brought 
before an Anomalies Conference, which could adjust award rates in 
response to inequities only if the change (1) was justified on the merits, 
(2) had "no likelihood of flow-on," (3) would entail "negligible" eco 
nomic cost and (4) would be a "once-only matter" (National Wage Case 
1983, MD Print F2900, pp. 51-2).
Wage differentials
To sum up (at the risk of further oversimplifying) the discussion thus 
far, Commission decisions on the total wage (or, earlier, on the basic 
wage and margins, i.e., the secondary wage) set the general level of
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wages; and comparative wage justice then passes these basic decisions 
through the structure of the economy, essentially preserving existing 
wage differentials ("relativities"). But how are wage differentials deter 
mined in the first instance?
The main concept underlying the initial determination of differentials 
is called "work value." Determination of work value involves "the 
detailed identification of job characteristics and the attachment of 
money values to the total package" (Hancock 1984, p. 190). One 
authoritative survey of awards has identified no less than 55 factors that 
have figured in work value assessments (Hutson 1971, pp. 163-4). For 
the most part, these factors may be grouped under four main headings 
that sound (and are) very much like those advocated by U. S. proponents 
of comparable worth: skill, effort, responsibility and working condi 
tions. 9 As noted earlier, changes in these four factors are now the only 
circumstances that can lead to a change in work value (National Wage 
Case 1983, MD Print F2900, p. 50).
As Hancock (1984, p. 190) has put it, "The processes of cerebration 
which converted years of training or on-the-job responsibility into 
money have never been described." Work value determination has often 
been somewhat rough-and-ready. In the Marine Cooks© Case of 1906 (2 
CAR, p. 55 ff.), Mr. Justice Higgins compared the work of marine cooks 
and butchers with that of butchers© assistants, whose wages had been 
determined by the Victoria wages board; similarly, in the Boot Trades 
Case of 1909 he awarded footwear industry operatives the same rate as 
that given to metal machinists on the grounds that "there is much general 
resemblance between the character of the work of such machinists and 
the work of factory bootmakers" (4 CaR, p. 1). As noted earlier, in time 
the Metal Trades awards were used to determine pay rates in a variety of 
industries; thus, for example, tin solderers in the Food Preservation 
industry were compared with canister makers in the Metal Trades (Food 
Preservers© Case, 45 CAR, p. 343). In general, there has been little or no 
use of formal job evaluations of the kind described in chapter 1; rather, 
work value determination in Australia has usually been relatively infor 
mal, and certainly much less systematic than (e.g.) the Hay point-factor 
method. 10
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Once an occupation©s work value has been determined, it is reassessed 
from first principles only rarely, and the relativity or wage differential 
between a given job and others tends to be preserved via the principle of 
comparative wage justice: at present, changes in wage differentials are 
allowed only if there is a demonstration that there have been important 
changes in work value. The burden of proof that work value has 
changed, which lies squarely on the unions making the claim, can be 
onerous. For example, in the 1961 Professional Engineers© case (97 
CAR, p. 233), professional engineers in the Federal Public Service 
argued against the historic practice of assessing their work and pay in 
relation to that of members of the administrative and clerical divisions of 
the service. Instead, they argued, their work should be compared with 
that of professionals in the higher reaches of the professional officer 
salary scale (e.g., lawyers, architects, dentists and doctors). After 180 
days of proceedings spread over three and one-half years involving 26 
lawyers (including 8 Queen©s Counsels and the Commonwealth Crown 
Solicitor), during which the Commission heard about 180 witnesses, 
received over 600 exhibits (including several motion pictures) and 
conducted several on-site inspections, the Commission eventually 
agreed with many of the engineers© claims. Ironically, the wages of 
clerical and administrative officers were eventually restored to their 
previous relationship with those of the professional engineers (Mol- 
huysen 1962; Deery and Plowman 1985, pp. 342-4).
Female/male differentials
Unlike other wage differentials, the arbitration system paid relatively 
little attention to the sex differential in pay until the 1970s. Moreover, 
until the 1970s, the arbitration system had effectively institutionalized a 
sizable differential in awards between men and women.
The Rural Workers© Case of 1912 (6 CAR, p. 61) was the first case to 
consider questions of sex differences in wages. Although the agri 
cultural workers© unions were asking for "equal pay for equal work," Mr. 
Justice Higgins noted that this request was ambiguous, and that what the 
unions were seeking might better be described as equal pay for "work of
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the same character," with fruit picking, fruit pitting and fruit packing all 
to be treated as comparable. This Higgins was not willing to agree to. 
All the work was unskilled, and so it might be argued that it should all be 
paid at the same minimum (basic) wage. Higgins pointed out, however, 
that the minimum wage established in the Harvester case was the sum 
necessary to
meet the normal needs of an average employee, one of his normal 
needs being the need for domestic life. If he has a wife and children, 
he is under an obligation even a legal obligation to maintain 
them. How is such a minimum applicable to the case of a woman 
picker? She is not, unless perhaps in very exceptional circum 
stances, under any such obligation. The minimum canot be based on 
exceptional cases. (6 CAR, p. 71.)
This distinction quickly hardened into precedent. In the Theatrical Case 
(11 CAR, p. 133) five years later, Mr. Justice Powers, Deputy President 
of the Court, established the basic terms of 50 years of subsequent 
decisions as follows (11 CAR, p. 146):
This Court allows to men a living wage based on the assumption 
that the average man has to keep a wife and family of three children 
whatever the value of the work he does may be.
The Court allows a living wage to a woman as a single woman.
The single man often gets more than his work,is worth, but if 
single men are paid less than married men the cheaper labour would 
be employed and they could not make the necessary provision for 
marriage.
There remained the question of differences in pay for occupations 
whose sex composition was different. In his Rural Workers decision, 
Higgins applied the "needs" criterion to this issue with an interesting 
twist. Pay for predominantly male jobs such as blacksmiths "must be 
such as recognises that blacksmiths are usually men" (6 CAR, p. 72), 
i.e., should be sufficient to support a family; for predominantly female 
jobs such as fruit packing and pitting, the wage "should be that suitable 
for a single woman supporting herself only" (13 CAR, p. 692, Clothing 
Trades Case 1919, summarizing Rural Workers© Case 1912). Fruit
228 The Economics of Comparable Worth
picking was a different story, for it was done by substantial numbers of 
both men and women (albeit with men in the majority).
There has been observed for a long time a tendency to substitute 
women for men in industries, even in occupations which are more 
suited for men; and in such occupations it is often the result of 
women being paid lower wages than men. Fortunately for society, 
however, the greater number of bread winners still are men.... Asa 
result, I come to the conclusion that in the case of the pickers, men 
and women, being on a substantial level, should be paid on the same 
level of wages; and the employer will then be at liberty freely to 
select whichever sex and whichever person he prefers for the work. 
(6 CAR, p. 72.)
This would have several desirable consequences, Higgins suggested. 
First, setting the same wage for male and female pickers would lead to 
"true and healthy competition not competition as in a Dutch auction by 
taking lower remuneration, but competition by making oneself more 
useful to the employer" (6 CAR, p. 72.) The other benefit, implied rather 
than stated, was that setting the same wage regardless of sex would tend 
to keep women out of picking work. Accordingly, Higgins awarded 
adult pitters (most of whom were female) and adult female packers a 
wage of nine pence per hour, and awarded adult male packers and all 
adult pickers (men or women) a wage of twelve pence per hour (6 CAR, 
pp. 80-1).
In the Clothing Trades Case 1919 (13 CAR, p. 647), Higgins adopted 
the same approach but was still more explicit:
In the case of tailoring, there is no doubt that men and women are in 
competition; but that the competition is weighted in favour of the 
women by the practice of paying women lower rates. Mr. Scovell, 
who appears for many employers before me, and who conducts a 
workshop himself, said very frankly that if he had to choose between 
men and women as employees in all the operations of the industry, at 
equal rates, other things being equal, he would always choose men. 
I find the lower rates habitual for women are the cause of the gradual 
disappearance of men from the industry in all but the most skilled
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operations, or the operations (such as pressing off) which require 
strength. "Women are equal to men in brains, unequal in muscle," as 
one employer graciously admits: I find that the lower rates for 
women have driven the men from the making of trousers and vests 
and from the making of most of the sac coats. The men are, in effect, 
making a last stand at body and dress coats, cutting, trimming, 
fitting, pressing. Is it right that this Court should aid the gentle 
invaders?
... It is urged here for the employers that I should not now, by 
prescribing equal wages, drive the women out of employment; but it 
is equally serious to drive men out of employment by prescribing 
unequal wages.... [As] even the [employers] admitf,]... [i]f there 
are 1,000 jobs vacant, and 1,000 men and 1,000 women want the 
jobs, it is better for society if the candidates are equally qualified  
that most of the jobs should go to the men. (13 CAR, pp. 701-2.)
The net result was that women would be paid lower wages than men 
except in occupations in which women might displace men  in which 
case wages were to be equal for both women and men.
The reaction of female workers to this version of equal pay was 
mixed. One female tailor testified in the Clothing Trades case, "If girls 
got the same wages, the girls would be employed if they can do as well as 
the average man.... The girls want the same rate even at the risk of 
losing employment" (13 CAR, p. 704). Other women in similar circum 
stances were less sanguine:
In Victoria, the commercial Clerks© Board on which women were 
not represented, deliberately fixed equal pay for women working as 
clerks in order to improve the chances of men clerks, and an appeal 
was brought by women clerks to the Industrial Appeals Court on the 
ground that the Determination of the Board would oust them from 
employment. They, therefore, asked for a lower wage to be fixed for 
women clerks, and the Court upheld the appeal and granted their 
request. (Royal Commission into Industrial Arbitration in New 
South Wales, 1914, quoted in Scherer 1984, p. 132.)
Such objections notwithstanding, subsequent Court decisions 
adopted Higgins© framework, setting a lower female wage for most
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occupations (except those in which women competed with men). The 
Clothing Trades Case had fixed the female basic wage at 35 shillings per 
week, 54 percent of the male basic weekly wage of 65 shillings; and it 
remained at roughly that ratio in subsequent cases "notwithstanding the 
shift from the needs to the capacity to pay approach in fixing the male 
basic wage" (Deery and Plowman 1985, p. 309).
During World War II, female wage rate fixing was the job of the 
Women©s Employment Board, which made awards of between 60 and 
100 percent of the relevant male rate (the largest group received 90 
percent). In 1944, the Court reassumed jurisdiction over female wages. 
In its Basic Wage Inquiry 1949-50 (68 CAR, p. 698), the Court ex 
plicitly rejected union demands for equal rates for males and females as 
both undesirable and unsustainable, instead setting the female basic 
wage at 75 percent of the male figure (68 CAR, pp. 815-9).
The following year, the International Labour Organization adopted its 
Convention No. 100, calling for "equal pay for work of equal value," 
and Australian unionists, rebuffed by the federal Court, began pressing 
for equal pay either for work of equal value, or, as a second-best, for 
equal work at the state level. In 1958, the most populous and most 
progressive state, New South Wales, adopted relatively narrow legisla 
tion requiring equal pay for equal work; Queensland (1964), Tasmania 
(1966, though only for government employment), South Australia 
(1967) and Western Australia (1968) followed. All state governments 
began to implement equal pay within the state public services (although 
in Victoria, equal pay was confined to teachers).
Prospects for equal pay seemed to be improving. As noted earlier, in 
1967 the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (successor to the 
Court) had shifted from the concept of a basic wage and a secondary 
wage (i.e., a skill margin) to the concept of a total wage. The Commis 
sion observed that this meant that, for the time being, there would be two 
total wages, one for men and one for women, creating apparent 
anomalies. 11
The Commission then appeared to open the door to equal pay  an 
equal total wage for equal work: it awarded the same increase in wages 
to adult males and females, and noted that earlier decisions had affirmed
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the concept of equal margins for men and women doing equal work. 
"The extension of that concept to the total wage would involve economic 
and industrial sequels and calls for thorough investigation and debate in 
which a policy of gradual implementation could be considered," the 
Commission©s decision said. "We invite the unions, the employers and 
the Commonwealth to give careful study to these questions with the 
knowledge that the Commission is available to assist by conciliation or 
arbitration in the resolution of the problems." 12
Hie Equal Pay decisions. In 1968, as demonstrators marched outside, 
the unions, joined by women©s groups, went back into the Commission 
to ask for equal pay for equal work. The Commission©s decision (Equal 
Pay Cases 1969, 127 CAR, p. 1142) agreed that the concept of the 
"family wage" used to justify the historic male/female difference in 
awards "no longer has the significance, conceptual or economic, which 
it once had and is no real bar to a consideration of equal pay for equal 
work" (127 CAR, p. 1153). It dismissed employer predictions of eco 
nomic dislocation by specifying that implementation of equal pay for 
equal work would be phased in over the period 1969-1972.
The Commission, however, limited the scope of equal pay in several 
important respects (127 CAR, pp. 1158-9). 13 Equal pay was to cover 
only jobs performed by both men and women that were "of the same or a 
like nature"; work "essentially or usually performed by females  in 
which about 80 percent of the female workforce was engaged  was 
specifically exempted from the decision; the Commission restricted 
equal pay "to work performed under the determination or award con 
cerned," thereby prohibiting comparisons between awards, i.e., ones 
that would cross industry and occupational boundaries.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the unions and women©s groups found this 
less than completely satisfactory. In 1972, they returned to the Commis 
sion seeking equal pay for work of equal value. The Commission©s 
decision (National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 147 CAR, p. 172) 
opined that "broad changes of significance have occurred since 1969"  
including further legislative developments within Australia, in Britain 
and New Zealand, and endorsement at Commission hearings of equal
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pay for work of equal value by the Commonwealth Government that 
exemplified "a world wide trend towards equal pay for females." 14 The 
Commission declared (147 CAR, p. 177):
In our view the concept of "equal pay for equal work" is too narrow 
in today©s world and we think the time has come to enlarge the 
concept to "equal pay for work of equal value." This means that 
award rates for all work should be considered without regard to the 
sex of the employee.
In the past, work value determination had disadvantaged women:
Differentiations between male rates in awards of the Commission 
have traditionally been founded on work value investigations of 
various occupational groups or classifications. The gap between the 
level of male and female rates in awards generally is greater than the 
gap, if any, in the comparative value of work performed by the two 
sexes because rates for female classifications in the same award have 
generally been fixed without a comparative evaluation of the work 
performed by males and females. (147 CAR, p. 179.)
The Commission now ruled, however, that henceforth "female rates 
[shall] be determined by work value comparisons without regard to the 
sex of the employees concerned." 15
Rather than revise all work valuations and pay rates, the Commission 
contented itself with simply stating the new principle and leaving it up to 
individual commissioners to implement it through work value reviews 
(i.e., reevaluation of women©s jobs) in individual industry cases. The 
Commission emphasized that work value meant value in terms of skill, 
effort, responsibility and working conditions i.e., the factors tradi 
tionally used in work value reviews rather than value to the employer 
(e.g., marginal productivity). "The value of the work refers to worth in 
terms of award wage or salary fixation, not worth to the employer." 16 As 
in its 1969 Equal Pay decision, the Commission©s new decision provided 
for gradual implementation of the equal pay for work of equal value 
principle, with full compliance to be achieved over two and one-half 
years, on June 30, 1975.
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In principle, then, the 1972 "equal pay for work of equal value" 
("EPEV") decision had far-reaching implications; but what would it 
mean in practice?
Several writers have argued that the full possibilities of the decision 
have not been realized (Burton et al. 1987; Power et al. 1985; Short 
1986; Thornton 1981). Short (1986) found only 53 Commission awards 
in cases brought since 1972 under the equal pay rubric a surprisingly 
small number, given the potential ramifications of the 1972 decision. 17 
Moreover, only one of these cases involved reassessments of work value 
for different job classifications.
That equal pay cases seem to represent a trickle rather than a flood 
may in part be due to the fact that the 1972 decision included several 
important caveats and qualifications (147 CAR, pp. 179-80). The Com 
mission exempted existing geographic differentials from the equal value 
rule, and said that "pre-existing award relativities may be a relevant 
factor in appropriate cases." Although it cautioned that "unfamiliar 
issues" were likely to arise in valuing work irrespective of sex, the 
Commission was vague about how equal value should be determined; it 
suggested that "different criteria will continue to apply from case to case 
and may vary from one class of work to another" and that implementa 
tion of the equal value principle would require "the exercise of the broad 
judgment which has characterised work value inquiries." Thus, rather 
than adopt a set of explicit rules on work value determination that would 
have facilitated implementation of EPEV, the Commission retained the 
fuzzy and manipulable ad hoc approach to work value that had been 
used in the past.
The Commission also discouraged work value comparisons across 
award boundaries, thereby inhibiting consideration of whether dis 
similar but arguably comparable jobs were in fact of equal value. As a 
rule, the Commission said, work value comparisons (and thus relative 
pay rates) were to be performed "where possible" by comparing "female 
and male classifications within the award under consideration." "Where 
such comparisons are unavailable or inconclusive, as may be the case 
where the work is performed exclusively by females," the Commission 
conceded that it might be necessary to compare a female job and either
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(1) another female job within the same award, or (2) female jobs in other 
awards, or (3) male jobs in other awards; but its tone suggested that such 
comparisons were to be made as a last resort.
A final impediment to full implementation of EPEV derives from the 
centralized nature of the arbitration system. Cases are argued by em 
ployers (or groups of employers) and unions (or groups of unions). 
Individual workers or worker groups (e.g., a women©s caucus) or 
dinarily are not able to put their viewpoints directly to the Commission. 
Interested outside parties, e.g., women©s advocacy groups, may appear 
as intervenors, but they will inevitably have less credibility than the 
unions directly involved. Thus, the support of individual unions and 
union organizations such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) is important, if not essential, to implementation of EPEV.
Such support has not always been forthcoming. According to Power 
et al. (1985, p. 59), some unions "even went on strike to prevent equal 
award wages being introduced in their industry or occupation." Even if 
the relevant union or group of unions is not overtly hostile to EPEV, it 
may be unwilling to support EPEV aggressively, especially if that would 
entail sacrificing other objectives. Although the ACTU has long sup 
ported EPEV (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1985), some ob 
servers have suggested that in practice it has been decidedly un- 
enthusiastic about implementing the policy. 18
More generally, critics of Australia©s system of arbitration have often 
alleged that it has been dominated by a "free-wheeling free masonry of 
fixits called the Industrial Relations Club" union and management 
officials, civil servants, lawyers and academics who have over the years 
acquired formidable expertise in manipulating the system, have a vested 
interest in continuing it in its present form, and have over the years 
established "a self-perpetuating, closed society making deals in its own 
interest, deals which, more often than not, run contrary to the national 
interest" (Bowers 1985). 19 In its most extreme form, this view of the 
Industrial Relations Club verges on a conspiracy theory. In milder 
versions, it resembles the well-known proposition that regulatory bodies 
end up being dominated by those whom they are supposed to regulate 
(see Stigler 1971, for a classic statement of this view). In either case,
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however, it suggests that, even if they are not consciously excluded by 
the "Ins," the "Outs" may find it hard to get the established players in the 
regulatory game to consider a new set of demands. In this connection, it 
is interesting to note that as of March 1989, only four of the Commis 
sion©s 46 members were women (Thornton 1989, p. 36).
Several of the obstacles to implementation of EPEV are illustrated by 
Thornton©s interesting case study (1981, pp. 473-7) of a failed attempt 
to make relatively modest comparable worth pay adjustments to the 
wages of typists and stenographers at the University of New South 
Wales. The Public Service Association (PSA), representing the workers 
before the Industrial Commission of New South Wales, 20 noted that the 
pay scales of the typist and stenographer jobs (both of which were 
overwhelmingly female) started lower and rose to much lower maxima 
than did the scale for general clerical officer (clerks) jobs, which were 
predominantly male. After the Commission©s 1972 EPEV decision, the 
University adjusted the pay scales of the stenographers and typists, but 
the scales remained below the clerical scale. The PSA charged that this 
only partially implemented EPEV, and asked that the three groups© pay 
scales be completely integrated.
An individual commissioner rejected the PSA©s case, and so did a 
three-judge appellate panel. Two elements of the appeal judgment21 are 
of particular interest in the present context. First, the appellate panel 
was clearly unimpressed by the PSA©s reference to other awards in which 
stenographer and typist scales were integrated with those of clerks ("the 
persuasive influence of those cases has not been sufficient for us to come 
to the conclusion that a complete salaries integration in regard to 
relevant employees at the university is justified"). The judges gave 
greater weight to the university©s own practices prior to the 1972 EPEV 
decision in particular, the fact that the university maintained separate 
salary schedules for (1) the typists, (2) the stenographers, and (3) two 
distinct groups of predominantly male clerical jobs  as indicating that 
there were genuine differences in work value among the different job 
categories.
In principle, this might have been countered by a comprehensive 
assessment of the work value of the three groups (typists, stenographers
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and clerks); but the PSA did not produce one. Rather, as Thornton notes 
(1981, p. 475), the PSA©s evidence was mostly "individualistic and 
unsystematic," based on testimony from individual stenographers and 
typists. Indeed, the PSA devoted much of its effort to showing that some 
of the work performed by the stenographers and typists was identical to 
some of the work performed by the clerks; this was irrelevant to the issue 
of equal value, and given the heterogeneity of the jobs in question  
could hardly have supported a conclusion of equal work. Although the 
appeals judges suggested that "these kinds of situations might properly 
engage the attention of the classifications committee which exists at the 
university," and asked the PSA and the university to consider whether at 
least some pay increase for the stenographers and typists might be 
appropriate, they added that "we were not satisfied overall that the work 
value of the three groups was so similar that an integration of rates 
should in justice take place."
Dissatisfaction with such work value issues reached the national level 
in 1983, when, in the National Wage Case, several women©s groups 
contended that implementation of the 1969 and 1972 equal pay decisions
'4
had been frustrated by the lack of "proper work value exercises" for 
predominantly female jobs (a failure to reassess the work value of such 
jobs). These groups asked the Commission to provide for such revalua 
tions, but the Commission rejected their request. According to the 
Commission, "such large scale work value inquiries would clearly 
provide an opportunity for the development of additional tiers of wage 
increases, which would be inconsistent with the centralized system 
which we propose for the next two years and would also be inappropriate 
in the current state of unemployment especially among women" (Na 
tional Wage Case 1983, MD Print F2900, p. 29). What the Commission 
seemed to have given in 1972 it seemed to have taken away eleven years 
later.
The 1986 Nurses Case. With dissatisfaction about implementation of 
EPEV growing, various unionists and women©s groups eventually per 
suaded the ACTU to bring a comparable worth "test case," involving 
nurses, before the Commission. The objective was to realize (or, per-
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haps more accurately, expand) the full potential of the 1972 Equal Pay 
decision by getting the Commission squarely on record in favor of 
comparable worth. The Commission©s decision, however, neatly side 
stepped the particular issue raised by the case-comparable worth 
adjustments for nurses and was unequivocally negative on the general 
principle of comparable worth. 22
The Commission invoked the National Wage Case 1983, which, as 
noted earlier, had rejected demands from women©s groups for revalua 
tion of women©s jobs. As in 1983, the Commission said it was unwilling 
to change wages for women©s jobs if that was going to conflict with its 
policy of wage restraint. In language reminiscent of that used by U.S. 
District Judge Fred Winner in rejecting comparable worth claims of 
nurses in Denver, 23 the Commission declared (MD Print G2250, p. 11):
There are... serious implications for flow on of any increases which 
might be granted as a result of these applications. Indeed the 
applicants and interveners supporting them made it plain that they 
see these proceedings as part of a wider movement to increase 
salaries for nurses throughout the country. The applications there 
fore carry great potential for undermining the current centralised 
wage fixing system.
Rather than accept "claims for the application of the 1972 Principle in 
awards in which it has not been applied," the Commission said, it would 
refer them to the Anomalies Conference established in the 1983 Na 
tional Wage Case, where they would be evaluated subject to the strict 
guidelines established for wage changes (which included, inter alia, a 
requirement that there be no likelihood of flow-on). 24 This appeared to 
preclude large-scale reassessments of the work value of women©s jobs, 
and to rule out any appreciable improvement in the female-male differ 
ential in award rates of pay.
Not only did the Commission materially reduce the practical potential 
of comparable worth to revalue women©s work and raise women©s wages; 
it also took on the general principle of comparable worth. Rather 
disingenuously, it asserted (MD Print G2250, p. 10) that ".. .in the 
United States at least, the doctrine of comparable worth refers to the
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value of the work in terms of its worth to the employer," and noted that 
this conflicted with the 1972 Equal Pay Case (which had said that equal 
value meant "equal in work value," not "of equal value to the em 
ployer"). 25 In addition, the Commission asserted, valuing substantially 
dissimilar jobs on a common basis  as in comparable worth  would 
carry the doctrine of work value beyond the boundaries that were 
customary and appropriate for Australia (MD Print G2250, p. 9):
At its widest, comparable worth is capable of being applied to any 
classification regarded as having been improperly valued, without 
limitation on the kind of classification to which it is applied, with no 
requirement that the work performed is related or similar. It is 
capable of being applied to work which is essentially or usually 
performed by males as well as to work which is essentially or 
usually performed by females. Such an approach would strike at the 
heart of long accepted methods of wage fixation in this country and 
would be particularly destructive of the present Wage Fixing 
Principles.
Further eiforts by comparable worth proponents are in progress. In 
1986, nurses in Victoria and South Australia sought and ultimately won 
wage increases in state tribunals on the grounds that the 1972 decision 
had not previously been applied to them. Anomalies conferences con 
vened in response to the 1986 Nurses Case ultimately led to a 1987 "Full 
Bench" decision of the Commission which granted a pay increase for 
nurses without, however, specifying which components of the increase 
were for equal pay "anomaly claims," changes in work value or other 
factors (Thornton 1989; Women©s Bureau 1987, esp. pp. 50-51). It is 
also possible that litigation under the Sex Discrimination Act may 
eventually yield results more favorable to comparable worth than the 
Commission©s 1986 decision (Innes 1986). 26 For the moment, however, 
substantial extension of the boundaries of the 1972 EPEV decision  
e.g., large-scale revaluation of women©s jobs, or adoption of an explicit 
comparable worth standard  seems unlikely.
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6.2 Effects of Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: 
Previous Research
Although Australian proponents of comparable worth feel  not with 
out reason, as the preceding discussion indicates that Australia©s ver 
sion of comparable worth has fallen well short of its potential, it should 
be noted that even the relatively mild "equal pay for work of equal value" 
(EPEV) policy may have had important effects on both wages and 
employment. This section is concerned with previous research on the 
effects of EPEV; the next section presents new results on those effects.
Comparable worth and "equal pay for work of equal value"
In view of the comments in the Commission©s 1986 Nurses decision, 
the first order of business in analyzing the effects of EPEV is to note 
that, the Commission©s assertions notwithstanding, EPEV, and more 
generally the Australian system of work valuation, is indeed a form of 
comparable worth. To be sure, work value determinations are generally 
conducted within the occupational and industrial boundaries set by 
awards; this diverges from the ideal of comparable worth proponents, 
but leaves the central principles of comparable worth essentially in 
tact. 27 Moreover, comparisons across occupational and industrial 
boundaries in Australia, although not the norm, are not unheard of; for 
example, journalists and professional engineers have compared their 
work to that of professionals covered by other awards. Finally, and 
perhaps most important, Australian work value determinations gener 
ally include the same factors typically considered in most comparable 
worth job evaluations in the U.S. (skill, effort, responsibility and work 
ing conditions) and generally exclude the same factors that are usually 
excluded from consideration in comparable worth job evaluations in the 
U.S. (i.e., market considerations such as the profitability of individual 
employers).
Hence, as many observers have noted, the Australian system of work 
valuation-especially after the 1972 EPEV decision-may properly be
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considered a form of comparable worth. In the U.S., both proponents 
and opponents have regarded the Australian experience as indicative of 
the likely effects of introducing comparable worth in the U.S. 28 As one 
U.S. scholar has put it (Mitchell 1984, p. 133), the 1972 EPEV decision 
was indeed "roughly equivalent to the ©comparable worth© notion cur 
rently under debate in the United States" (see Aaron and Lougy 1986, 
pp. 40-1, for similar remarks).
Australian observers generally share this view of the similarity of 
EPEV and comparable worth. In the words of the ACTU (1985, pp. 30, 
32), "the essential features of comparable worth or pay equity are 
relevant to Australia and can be applied here," for "the 1972 Equal Pay 
Decision embraces the concept of comparable worth or pay equity." 
Academic observers have generally drawn the same conclusion. For 
example, Thornton (1981), who argues that implementation of EPEV 
has been unduly restricted, notes that at least in principle it is quite 
similar to comparable worth as advocated in the U.S.; likewise, Gre 
gory and Ho (1985), although disagreeing with Thornton as to the 
magnitude of the effects of EPEV, treat it as a form of comparable worth 
and argue that Australia©s experience is indicative of what would happen 
if comparable worth were introduced in the U.S. on a large scale.
In sum, there seems to be general agreement in both countries  
despite assertions to the contrary in the Commission©s 1986 Nurses 
decision on the similarity of EPEV and comparable worth. There is 
much less agreement, however, on the effect of EPEV in Australia and 
on what it implies about the likely consequences of widespread adoption 
of comparable worth in the U.S.
Effects on wages
Although EPEV has not fulfilled the expectations of its proponents, 
did it nevertheless have an effect on the structure of pay?
Although the female/male differential in award rates changed little 
during the 1960s, it fell appreciably after 1969, and especially after 
1972. In 1966, female weighted average minimum (award) rates per 
week were 71.4 percent of the male figure, and hourly rates were 71.8
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percent of the male figure; in 1969, the ratios were 72.1 and 72.7; in
1972. 77.4 and 78.2; in 1975, 91.0 and 91.9; in 1978, 93.1 and 93.9. 
Nor does this increase in female relative award rates seem to have been 
offset by a decrease in female relative overaward rates. For example, in
1973. female average hourly earnings were 76.5 percent of the male 
figure, growing to 82.3 percent by 1975 and 84.0 percent by 1978. 29 
Thus, although neither average female award rates nor average female 
hourly earnings are 100 percent of the male figure, both have certainly 
grown substantially, relative to those of males, since 1969 or 1972.
Is EPEV responsible for some or all of these changes in women©s 
relative pay? Based on informal inspection of simple time-series plots, 
several writers seem to think so (see, e.g., Gregory and Duncan 1981, 
p. 41 l;Haig 1982, p. 2; Miller 1985, p. 10; andMitchell 1984, p. 134). 
This need not necessarily be the case, however; in particular, the 
increase in relative award rates and average hourly earnings might 
merely be part of a long-term trend, rather than a phenomenon attributa 
ble to EPEV as such.
There appears to be only one formal econometric analysis of wage 
changes induced by EPEV (Pissarides 1987). In this study, Pissarides 
(1987; see esp. table 1, p. 13) analyzes quarterly data on the real 
product wage, w* (although not explicitly stated, the time period consid 
ered is 1966-86). This wage series, w*, is defined as the natural 
logarithm of (l + T)W/P, where W is the ratio of (i) average weekly 
earnings per employed person to (ii) a "centred, [five]-period moving 
ave[r]age" of average weekly hours worked; P is the price of domestic 
value-added; and T is the rate of employment tax. In the study, w* is 
regressed on several variables (the lagged value of w*, the ratio of labor 
force to population of working age, the change in inflation, etc.), 
including an "equal pay dummy" equal to unity for quarters between 
1974Q2-1975Q1 and zero otherwise.
Pissarides© results imply that EPEV raised the general level of real 
wages (as measured by w*) by a statistically significant amount, but 
only for a relatively brief period: "the effect of the policy on the system 
wore off quickly after 1975 and by the end of 1976 there were no 
significant effects left" (Pissarides 1987, p. 26; see also table 4, p. 25).
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However, the results are less than completely informative about the wage 
effects of EPEV. First, the "equal pay dummy" for 1974Q2-1975Q1 
covers only part of the period during which EPEV was supposedly being 
implemented. This brief period might best be described a period not of 
"equal pay" but rather of "wage push," during which the government of 
the day hoped to raise wages generally, and to raise wages for low-wage 
groups (including not only women, but also other low-income workers) 
in particular. Second, whatever they imply about effects on the general 
level of pay (as measured by the w* of the analyses), the results provide 
no evidence on the effect of EPEV on female/male differentials in pay. 
Thus, although there seems to be general agreement that EPEV 
narrowed the female/male differential in both award rates and in earn 
ings, this view is based primarily on simple descriptive statistics (which 
are not adjusted for changes that might have occurred even in the 
absence of EPEV) rather than on formal econometric analysis. 
Pissarides© results (1987) suggest that EPEV may have raised the general 
level of wages albeit only temporarily but provide no evidence on 
whether it affected the relative wage of women.
Effects on employment
Most analyses of EPEV have been concerned with its effects on 
employment (including, in particular, female/male employment differ 
entials). These have generally assumed that EPEV raised pay (or award 
rates) of women relative to men, and then have considered the extent to 
which such an (assumed) increase in women©s relative pay would affect 
their relative employment level.
In general terms, the employment effects of EPEV hinge on whether 
labor demand elasticities are negative and relatively large. Most analy 
ses of the Australian labor market obtain negative elasticities, but the 
magnitude of the estimates varies. For example, one study (Bureau of 
Labor Market Research 1983, esp. pp. 141-148) considered pooled 
annual time-series data (for 1976-81) on employment and earnings, 
disaggregated by age and sex, for a cross section of 17 Australian 
industries. The estimated own-wage demand elasticities are negative
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and quite large in absolute value: they imply (e.g.) that, with other 
things (including output) remaining the same, an increase in the wages 
of adult women by 1 percent would reduce their employment by about 
2.25 percent. Taken at face value, these estimates would imply that even 
modest EPEV-induced increases in the relative pay of women would 
have substantial adverse effects on women©s relative employment. 30
Bonnell (1987) used the ORANI model (Dixon et al. 1982) to simu 
late the employment effects of EPEV. Although ORANI provides a 
wealth of industrial and regional detail, it does not permit explicit 
disaggregation of employment by sex, so Bonnell was forced to make a 
number of assumptions in using ORANI to gauge the effects of EPEV on 
male and female employment. For most industries, her simulations 
imply relatively modest declines of between five and seven percent in 
both female and male employment, with the former falling only slightly 
more than the latter.
Miller©s analysis (1985) is much simpler: he regressed relative em 
ployment (the ratio of female to male employment) on relative pay (the 
ratio of female to male wage rates) and a time trend term using annual 
data for 1960-80. Overall (for both public and private sectors com 
bined), his results imply an elasticity of relative employment with 
respect to the relative wage that is negligible in size and not statistically 
significant. However, this aggregate result conceals important differ 
ences by sector. For the private sector, his results imply an elasticity of 
relative employment with respect to the relative wage of  0.39; for the 
public sector, the elasticity is positive and equal to about 1.00. Hence, 
Miller concludes, "quantity adjustment on the part of public authorities 
appears [to] have been responsible for the small aggregate disemploy- 
ment response to the equal pay legislation."
Pissarides© more elaborate analysis (1987) of quarterly data for the 
aggregate economy for the period 1966-86 obtains a short-run elasticity 
of total employment (of men and women combined) with respect to the 
(overall) real wage of about -0.23 (f=8.05) (he does not present 
elasticities for each sex). Combining this estimate with his results on 
wages (discussed above), Pissarides calculates (1987, table 4, p. 25) 
that by the second quarter of 1975, EPEV had reduced total employ-
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ment by about 4.3 percent, but that the effects wore off quickly: his 
simulations also imply that, by the fourth quarter of 1976, total employ 
ment was only 0.6 percent less than would have been the case in the 
absence of EPEV (or, more precisely, the "wage push" component of 
EPEV).
Although all of these studies suggest that employment is negatively 
related to wages (particularly in the private sector), none has featured 
prominently in discussions of EPEV. The one analysis of EPEV to have 
attracted attention in the U.S. suggests, as do these other studies, that 
EPEV reduced women©s employment (relative to the levels that would 
have prevailed in the absence of EPEV). Ironically, however, many 
discussions of this analysis have generally asserted that it either (1) 
provided mixed evidence on EPEV or else (2) actually showed that 
EPEV had negligible effects on women©s employment.
The research in question, by Gregory and Duncan (1981), presented 
two kinds of results: first, simple descriptive statistics showing the raw 
or unadjusted time series of women©s relative employment growth rates 
and relative unemployment rates before and after EPEV; and, second, 
regression analyses aimed at isolating the effect of EPEV with other 
things (business cycle fluctuations and secular trends) held constant.
The simple time series show that women©s employment rose (relative 
to male employment) both before and after EPEV, and that the female 
unemployment rate fell (relative to the male rate) both before and after 
EPEV. 31 Gregory and Duncan put heavy emphasis on these simple 
descriptive statistics both in their original work and in subsequent 
discussion of their findings. For example, discussing the employment 
effects of the Equal Pay Cases, Gregory and Duncan (1981) summa 
rized their work as showing that "[substitution responses to relative 
wage changes appear to be very small" (p. 426); that "the level of 
measured female unemployment also appears to be largely unaffected 
by the change in relative wages [induced by the Equal Pay decisions]" 
(p. 426); and that, "[s]ince female employment continued to grow faster 
than male employment after the equal pay decisions, and since these 
decisions were translated into a large change in relative earnings, there
Comparable Worth in Australia 245
have been very significant changes in income distribution in favor of 
working females" (p. 427).
Similarly, testifying before a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission hearing on comparable worth, Gregory summarized the 
implications of his research with Duncan32 as follows (Gregory 1980, 
pp. 613-4):
In response to such a change in the wages of females, relative to 
males, [as was induced by the Equal Pay cases,] one would expect 
some employment consequences.... In fact, our history has been, 
since 1969, up until the last 12 months at least, that employment of 
females in the market place has continued to grow faster than male 
employment.
Furthermore, we have found that the unemployment of females 
relative to males has continued to fall, as it had been doing right 
throughout the sixties and seventies.
Likewise, in a paper prepared for a 1983 conference, Gregory et al. 
(1985, p. S306) asserted: "The Australian experience suggests that 
governments might implement equal pay provisions without serious 
relative employment effects for women, at least over a period of a decade 
or so." (See also Gregory et al. 1989; and Hutner 1986, pp. 34-41, 
quoting a talk given by Duncan on the Gregory-Duncan research.)
Numerous U.S. observers both proponents of comparable worth, 
and researchers apparently found these conclusions, and the simple 
descriptive statistics on which they were based, to be quite convincing. 
For example, the National Academy of Sciences/National Research 
Council report on comparable worth (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 
1981, p. 67, note 10) characterized the Gregory-Duncan findings as 
follows:
Gregory and Duncan (1981) investigated the relevance of labor 
market segmentation theory to Australia©s recent efforts to increase 
the wages of occupations filled mainly by women. They suggest that 
the wage increases did not negatively affect the number of women 
employed, in part because many employers of women were suffi-
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ciently insulated from competitive market forces to absorb the 
higher costs.
Similarly, Eleanor Holmes Norton, former head of the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (who chaired the 1980 hearings 
at which Gregory testified), described the Australian experience in these 
terms (U.S. Congress, House 1983, p. 44):
During a 5-year period beginning in 1969, Australia removed ex 
plicit differentials for pay based on sex. Using a combination of first 
equal pay and then comparable pay principles, Australia reduced 
the pay gap between full-time male and female workers from 58 
percent to 77 percent.
There are differences between wage setting in the U.S. and 
Australia, including wage minimums for all occupations in Aus 
tralia. But precisely because the Australian action affected the entire 
economy, it should be studied to see why dislocation and other 
disruptive economic changes regularly predicted when this subject 
is discussed here, did not occur there.
(For similar remarks from another U.S. proponent of comparable 
worth, see Ratner 1980.) The reaction of some researchers in the U.S. 
was similar. For example, Mitchell (1984, p. 134) summarized the 
Gregory-Duncan findings33 for a Brookings Institution survey of the 
Australian economy as follows:
Economists are prone to believe that significant changes in relative 
prices or wages will lead to important changes in resource alloca 
tion, and they have struggled to find symptoms of such effects after 
the equal pay decisions. Yet the gross numbers show that the propor 
tion of women in Australia©s labor force and in total employment 
kept rising in the late 1970©s, and that the ratio between unemploy 
ment rates for women and those for men did not rise (it fell). 
Researchers have had to "tease" the data to come up with any signs 
that the demand for women relative to men was reduced.
Some have noted, for example, that the ratio of female employees 
to total employees rose about 1.9 percent a year from 1966 to 1970, 
and that if that rate had been maintained, the ratio should have
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reached a little over 40 percent by 1982. Instead it reached only 36.7 
percent [footnote citing Gregory et al. (1985)]. Was the shortfall due 
to the relative wage effect, or was it due to other factors that slowed 
down the growth in employment rates for women?. . . Whatever the 
reasons for the slowdown [in women©s relative employment] in 
Australia, economists no doubt were surprised (disappointed?) that 
it was not larger.
Some attribute the employment pattern in Australia to change in 
industrial structure.... Others point to the segmented labor mar 
kets, arguing that, since men and women are not highly substitutable 
under current institutional arrangements, changes in their relative 
wage levels have little impact on their relative rates of employment 
[footnote citing Eccles (1980) and Gregory and Duncan (1981)]. In 
any case, the episode is likely to draw considerable foreign interest 
as word of it spreads.
Unfortunately, however, the simple descriptive evidence presented by 
Gregory and Duncan (1981) on which all of these remarks are based  
is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether EPEV adversely 
affected the employment or unemployment of women. By their nature, 
simple time series trends do not abstract from (rather, they incorporate) 
the host of other factors that might have affected female employment and 
unemployment, e.g., secular trends and business cycle fluctuations. For 
example, like most other developed countries, Australia has seen a 
substantial secular rise in female labor force participation. Thus it 
would hardly be surprising if female representation in the labor force 
and in employment continued to rise after EPEV. That this did in fact 
happen means only that, as a result of all the things that occurred during 
the relevant time period not only EPEV, but everything else, including 
cyclical fluctuations and long-run trends  female employment was 
higher after 1972 than before 1972, relative to male employment. 
Clearly, however, such simple descriptive statistics are not meaningful 
evidence on the effects of EPEV per se. 34
However, Gregory and Duncan not only presented simple descriptive 
statistics of this sort; they also provided a second kind of evidence on 
employment and unemployment effects, in the form of a set of regres-
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sion analyses for the Australian economy and various sectors thereof 
(e.g., manufacturing). In these analyses, the effects of other factors 
affecting female employment and unemployment trends business cy 
cle fluctuations and secular trends  were explicitly taken into account. 
The results of these analyses present a picture that is quite different from 
the one suggested by the simple time series. In particular, these analyses 
indicate that, other things being equal, EPEV reduced women©s relative 
employment growth and increased the female unemployment rate by 
sizeable amounts.
The first of the Gregory-Duncan regression analyses considered the 
relative growth of female employment (i.e., the difference between the 
rates of growth of female and male employment), abstracting from 
cyclical fluctuations (as proxied by the current and the one-year-lagged 
value of the adult male unemployment rate) and secular trends (a time 
trend variable) using annual data for 1948-78. This showed that, other 
things being equal, an increase in female (relative to male) award rates 
had negative, statistically significant and rather large effects on female 
relative employment growth. 35 Only for public authorities and commu 
nity services was the effect negligible. Gregory and Duncan (1981, pp. 
420-1) summarized the implications of their regression results as 
follows:
We estimate that over the six years during which equal pay was 
introduced [i.e., 1973-78] and the average growth rate of female 
employment was about 3 percentage points greater than male em 
ployment, the change in relative wages reduced the growth rate of 
female employment compared to male employment by 1.5 percent 
per annum.
In other words, the regression results indicate that the increase in 
relative award rates associated with EPEV reduced the relative growth 
rate of female employment from 4.5 percent per annum to 3.0 percent 
per annum, i.e., by one-third of the figure that would have otherwise 
obtained.
Gregory and Duncan also performed a regression analysis of the 
female unemployment rate (1981, pp. 424-5) using quarterly data for
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1964-1979. Its implications are essentially similar to those of their 
analyses of relative employment growth: the increase in relative award 
rates associated with EPEV raised the unemployment rate of women by 
about 0.5 of a percentage point (the actual female unemployment rate in 
August 1976 was 6.2 percent).
In sum, the Gregory-Duncan regression findings indicate that EPEV 
adversely affected both the rate of relative employment growth for 
women and the female unemployment rate that, in the absence of the 
rise in female award rates (relative to male award rates) associated with 
the 1972 Equal Pay decision, women©s employment would have grown 
faster relative to men©s employment, and female unemployment would 
have been lower, than was actually the case. Moreover, although these 
effects were not cataclysmic, they were also far from trivial: a one-third 
reduction in the female relative employment growth rate, and a one-half 
of 1 percentage point increase in the female unemployment rate. 36
A few writers (for example Ehrenberg 1989, and Killingsworth 1985, 
pp. 105-7) have noted that the implications of the Gregory-Duncan 
regression analyses are adverse. However, a surprising number of com 
mentators have continued to misinterpret the Gregory-Duncan analyses 
as indicating only minimal employment consequences of EPEV. For 
example, Hartmann et al. (1985, p. 14) assert,"... some (Ratner 1980; 
Gregory and Duncan 1981) argue that the policy had no deleterious 
effects, while others (Killingsworth, [1985]) argue that institution of the 
policy increased unemployment and decreased job growth for women." 
Similarly, Dex (1986, p. 897) refers to "disagreement between authors 
about whether the employment effects [of the Australian experience] are 
negligible or significant."
A recent paper for the Brookings Institution by Aaron and Lougy 
(1986, pp. 40-1) exemplifies the widespread failure to interpret the 
Gregory-Duncan findings correctly. They first quote another Brookings 
author, Mitchell (1984, p. 134), who relied exclusively on Gregory and 
Duncan in reaching his conclusion that EPEV had only negligible 
effects (recall note 33). They then declare (Aaron and Lougy 1986, p. 
41): "In contrast, Robert Gregory and Robert Duncan estimated that the 
Australian experiment with pay equalization had a perceptible impact on
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the growth of female employment and on the female unemployment 
rate."
6.3 Effects of Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: New Results
I now present new estimates of the wage and employment effects of 
EPEV. The framework used in the analyses is similar to that used in 
chapters 4 (for Minnesota) and 5 (for San Jose): I first analyze the effect 
of EPEV on wages, and then consider the relation between wages and 
employment.
Ideally, one would proceed by considering, first, the impact of EPEV 
on award rates (since it is award rates, not actual wage rates, that the 
Commission affects directly); then, the relation between award rates and 
actual wage rates (which are affected by overaward payments as well as 
awards per se); and, finally, the relation between wage rates and employ 
ment. Unfortunately, the available data do not permit a three-part analy 
sis of this kind: quarterly data on actual wage rates by sex are available 
only from the mid-1970s onward, i.e., after adoption of both EPEV and 
EPEW. Wage data by sex are available on an annual basis for a longer 
period, but using annual data (and moving the start of the analysis back 
to, e.g., the 1950s) would reduce sample sizes and raise questions 
(essentially unresolveable with annual data) about whether relationships 
prevailing in much earlier periods can reasonably be assumed to have 
continued through the 1970s and 1980s. Accordingly, the analyses 
discussed below use quarterly data, and consist of two rather than three 
steps: I first consider the relation between EPEV (and EPEW) and 
award rates, and then consider the relation between award rates and 
employment. In effect, the second of these is a reduced-form version of 
the latter two steps of the three-step analysis outlined above.
The data considered in chapters 4-5 were microeconomic panel data; 
in contrast, the data analyzed in this chapter consist of conventional 
macroeconomic time-series. Developing a formal model of the Aus 
tralian macroeconomy is well beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, 
I adopt the ARMA (autoregressive and moving average) approach used
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by many other researchers. As Ashenfelter and Card (1982, esp. pp. 
761-762) note, numerous alternative models of the labor market gener 
ate ARM A representations of the data, and relatively low-order ARM A 
specifications seem capable of representing most of the dynamics of 
macroeconomic labor markets in a satisfactory but parsimonious 
manner.
One feature of the ARMA process is particularly important in what 
follows. To illustrate, consider a simple ARMA process with no moving 
average ("MA") component, an AR(2) or second-order autoregression:
where y is a variable of interest, the b are coefficients, e is a random term 
uncorrelated with the y or its own prior values ("white noise"), and t 
subscripts index time. Letj,_ , =yt_ 2 = 1 for t=3 and (to simplify) et=0 
for all t. Then, by (6.1), the value ofy "today" (f=3) is y3 = (b l +b2). 
Likewise, by (6. 1) and the assumption that et=0 for all t, next period©s 
value ofy,y4 , is given by
y4=b ly3 +b2y2 =b l (b l +b2)+b2 (6.2)
That is, today©s value ofy, y3 , becomes tomorrow©s lagged value of y, 
which in part determines tomorrow©s value of y, y4 .
Data
Table 6.1 summarizes the variables used in the analyses, and indicates 
the source for each. In brief, the analyses use quarterly data starting in 
August 1967 and ending in August 1982. Employment data refer to 
February, May, August and November of each year, and so I use award 
rate data for the same months. My choice of starting date is dictated by 
the fact that August 1967 is the first date for which monthly data for 
women©s award rates are available. The series for award rates for both 
men and women were reweighted after August 1982, so that is the last 
date covered by the analyses. 37 It should be noted that the award rates 
series includes not only Commission awards as such, but also so-called
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"consent awards" negotiated by unions and employers to which the 
Commission consents at the behest of the parties.
As indicated in table 6.1, the award rates of pay used in these analyses 
are weekly award rates in current Australian dollars, i.e., weighted 
average minimum weekly rates payable for a full week©s work (exclud 
ing overtime). The labor demanded at these award rates might most 
appropriately be measured by employment of full-time, private-sector 
wage and salary employees, but published data for this do not appear to 
be available. Instead, I consider two different series on employment: (1) 
total full-time employment (including government employment); and 
(2) private-sector (i.e., nongovernment) wage and salary employment 
(exclusive of employers, the self-employed and household employees, 
but including part-time workers).
The effect of EPEV on relative award rates
Table 6.2 presents the results on relative award rates. For present 
purposes, the analysis of relative award rates (LNRWAGE) is primarily 
concerned with whether the Commission©s 1969 equal pay for equal 
work (EPEW) and/or 1972 equal pay for work of equal value (EPEV) 
decisions had an independent effect on relative award rates, over and 
beyond what might have been expected on the basis of secular trends, 
cyclical and seasonal factors, etc. In effect, the task here is to model the 
Commission©s behavior.
As shown in table 6.2, the model of relative award rates is a simple 
one: LNRWAGE as of quarter t is specified as a fourth-order autoregres- 
sion (AR(4)) with additional variables: a quadratic in time, seasonal 
dummies, and several "policy variables." In addition to equal pay 
variables (described presently), these policy variables include dummies 
for two periods: one during 1975 Q2-1980 Q4, when the Commission 
attempted to increase award rates in line with changes in consumer 
prices, WGINDEX; and the other during 1981 Q1-1982 Q4, when "all 
attempts to restrain wage growth were abandoned" (Pissarides 1987, p. 
20), WG_FREE.
Similarly, I use dummy variables to represent the EPEW and EPEV
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Table 6.1 Variables Used in the Analyses
Value as of
Name Description 02/73 02/79
DEQUALVA EPEV dummy, = 1 during 02/73-08/75 
EQUALVAL EPEV dummy, = 1 on or after 02/73 
POSTEV EPEV dummy, = 1 on or after 11/75 
DEQUALPA EPEW dummy, = 1 during 11/69-02/72 
EQUALPAY EPEW dummy, = 1 on or after 11/69 
WGINDEX "wage indexation" dummy, = 1 during
05/75-11/80 
WG_FREE "no wage restraint" dummy, = 1 during
02/81-11/82
WAGEj weighted average minimum weekly award rate 
payable for a full week©s work (excluding 
overtime), all industry groups, sex group s (s 
=/or m, for female or male), in current 
Australian dollars (source: see Note 2 below)
female: 
male:
LNRWAGE log of (WAGE/WAGEJ 
EMPLy employed persons of sex s (=/or m, for 
female or male), in thousands (source: see 
Note 4 below)
private wage/salary earners: female:
male:
all full-time workers: female: 
male: 
LNREMPL log of (EMPL/EMPL J
private wage/salary earners:
all full-time workers:
LNQRATI log of Tobin©s q ratio (source: Reserve Bank of
Australia 1986, table 1)
LNPEXPO log of implicit price deflator (1979-80= 100) 
for exports of goods and services (source: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1987a, table 
17; 1987b, table 44)
LNP_GDP log of implicit price deflator (1979-80 = 100) 
for gross domestic product (source: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1987a, table 17; 1987b, 
table 44) 
REALGDP gross domestic product at average 1979-80
prices (source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 


























Name Description 02/73 02/79
DEVLRGD residual from regression of log of REALGDP
on a quadratic in time, 08/66-11/84 
TIMEVAR time trend (increases by 1.0 per year:
01/70=0)
TIME_SQ square of TIMEVAR 
MONTH02 seasonal dummy: = 1 if during February
(reference=November) 
MONTH05 seasonal dummy: = 1 if during May
(reference=November) 









1. Numeric suffixes for LNRWAGE, LNREMPL, LNP_GDP, LNQRATI, LNPEXPO and 
DEVLRGD denote lagged values of these variables (e.g., LNRWAGES denotes the three- 
quarter-lagged value of LNRWAGE).
2. Figures for WAGE5 , LNRWAGE, EMPL, and LNREMPL are for February, May, July, August 
and November of each year. Figures for LNQRATI, LNPEXPO, LNP_GDP, REALGDP and 
DEVLRGD are available only for March, June, September and December of each year; they are 
treated as figures for February, May, August and November of the same year, respectively.
3. Sources for WAGE^:
08/67-05/68: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Wage Rates Indexes June 1965
to June 1968 (Ref. No. 6.21) 
08/68-05/72: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Wage Rates Indexes June 1968
to June 1972 (Ref. No. 6.33) 
08/72-05/76: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage Rates and Earnings June 1976 (Ref. No.
6.16) 
08/76-08/82: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage Rates Australia, monthly issues (Cat. No.
6312.0)
4. Sources for EMPL,:
private wage/salary earners: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Civilian Employees Australia,
July 1979, Table 1 (08/67-05/79) (Cat. No. 6213.0) 
all full-time employees: Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force Australia,
Historical Summary 1966 to 1984 (08/67-08/82) (Cat. No.
6204.0)
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Table 6.2 Regressions for Full-time Relative Award Rate 
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decisions. These dummy variables are of two kinds. One set of dummy 
variables, DEQUALPA and DEQUALVA, respectively, equals unity 
during dates when the relevant policy was being implemented. Thus, 
DEQUALPA (the dummy for EPEW) equals unity between November 
1969 and February 1972, and zero otherwise; whereas DEQUALVA 
(the dummy for EPEV) equals unity between February 1973 and August 
1975, and zero otherwise. 38 Note that these dummy variables in effect 
specify that the equal pay policies were shocks to the system whose 
immediate effects led directly to changes in relative award rates but 
whose effects at later dates, given the assumption of an AR(4) process, 
operated indirectly, through effects on lagged relative award rates.
The second set of dummy variables, EQUALPAY and EQUALVAL, 
respectively, equals unity for all dates during or after inception of the 
relevant policy. Thus, EQUALPAY (for EPEW) equals unity on or after 
November 1969 and zero otherwise; whereas EQUALVAL (for EPEV) 
equals unity on or after February 1973 and zero otherwise. Given the 
assumption of an AR(4) process for relative award rates, use of this 
second set of dummy variables amounts to an assumption that the equal 
pay policies not only acted as direct shocks to the system at all dates, but 
also operated indirectly (at dates subsequent to the policies© inception), 
via effects on lagged relative award rates.
By how much did EPEW and EPEV affect relative award rates? The 
first two columns of table 6.2 present results obtained using the first set 
of equal pay dummy variables, DEQUALPA and DEQUALVA. 39 Re 
gression (1) excludes, whereas regression (2) includes, lagged variables 
for the price level; the price level variables are not themselves statis 
tically significant, and so, not surprisingly, including them does not 
materially affect the results. (Similarly, in other regressions, not re 
ported here, none of four lags in the "output fluctuations" variable 
DEVLRGD is significant when added to regressions like (2), and their 
inclusion does not change the coefficient on DEQUALVA.) The coeffi 
cient on DEQUALVA in regressions (l)-(2) is positive (between about 
0.021 and 0.017) and statistically significant at conventional test levels. 
In contrast, the coefficient on DEQUALPA in regressions (l)-(2) is 
much smaller and is not significant at any reasonable test level. Thus, the
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results suggest that EPEV, though not EPEW, did in fact raise women©s 
award rates of pay relative to those of men.
As noted previously, however, the coefficients for DEQUALVA tell 
only part of the story. They indicate the direct effect on the current 
relative award rate with lagged relative award rates (LNRWAG01- 
LNRWAG04) constant. But since today©s relative award rate is tomor 
row©s lagged relative award rate, and since this is an AR(4) process, 
"turning on" EPEV also affects future relative award rates indirectly, via 
lagged award rates: the coefficient on DEQUALVA is only the initial 
effect of EPEV. To determine the long-run effect of EPEV, one must 
carry the calculations forward into subsequent years.
The column of table 6.3 headed DEQUALVA presents simulations for 
the effect of EPEV derived using the coefficients for regression (1) of 
table 6.2. Entries in this column are logarithmic differences (multiplied 
times 100 for ease of reading) in relative award rates simulated with and 
then without the EPEV coefficient, DEQUALVA. Since February 1973 
is taken as the first date on which EPEV was operative, and since all 
lagged relative award rates as of that date were (by assumption) un 
affected by EPEV, the entry in the DEQUALVA column of table 6.3 for 
February 1973 implies an initial increase in relative pay of 2.14 percent 
attributable to EPEV (=the coefficient on DEQUALVA in regression (1) 
of table 6.2, 0.0214, times 100). As just noted, however, at all subse 
quent dates, at least some (and eventually all) lagged relative award rates 
are affected by EPEV. Hence, entries in the DEQUALVA column of table 
6.3 for dates after February 1973 show the logarithmic difference 
between (1) relative award rates including not only the initial EPEV 
effect the coefficient on DEQUALVA but also its longer-run effect, to 
the extent that it shows up in lagged relative award rates; and (2) relative 
award rates calculated without any initial or longer-run EPEV effect.
The DEQUALVA column of table 6.3 indicates that the eventual effect 
of EPEV on relative award rates differed from its initial effect (as given 
by the coefficient on DEQUALVA in regression (1), table 6.2). Between 
February 1973 and August 1975, EPEV raised women©s award rates 
relative to men©s by about 9.9 percentage points. However, this effect 
wore off rapidly: the estimates imply that, by the end of the period
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DEQUALVA: simulation derived from coefficients for regression (1), table 6.2. 
EQUALVAL: simulation derived from coefficients for regression (3), table 6.2. 
Each column shows the difference, mutliplied times 100, between (1) the predicted magnitude of 
LNRWAGE in the presence of EPEV (as measured by the coefficient on either DEQUALVA or 
EQUALVAL), and (2) its predicted magnitude without EPEV. A positive (negative) entry shows the 
approximate percentage amount by which EPEV raised (reduced) LNRWAGE as of the indicated 
date. (See text for details.)
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considered (August 1982), the relative award rate was essentially what it 
would have been in the absence of EPEV.
Regressions (3) and (4) in table 6.2 use the second set of equal pay 
dummies, EQUALPAY and EQUALVAL (and either exclude or include 
lagged variables for the price level). Like regressions (l)-(2) in table 
6.2, which use the first set of equal pay dummies, regressions (3)-(4) 
imply that EPEV, though not EPEW, did in fact raise women©s award 
rates of pay relative to those of men. However, as shown in the EQUAL 
VAL column of table 6.3, simulation using the coefficients for regres 
sion (3) in Table 6.2 implies that EPEV led to a permanent increase in 
the relative award rate of about 5.9 percent, relative to what would 
otherwise have prevailed.
The contrast between the two sets of results (for DEQUALVA, regres 
sion (1), vs. EQUALVAL, regression (3)) in table 6.3 is stark. Which 
describes the data better? To address this question, consider regressions 
(5)-(6) in table 6.2. The difference between the DEQUALVA and 
EQUALVAL specifications of regressions (1) and (3) in table 6.2 is that, 
in the latter, EPEV is assumed to have a direct effect (in addition to any 
indirect impact that may occur via lagged relative award rates) at all 
dates after adoption of EPEV; whereas the former specification does not 
entail this assumption. To test this, one may simply break up the 
EQUALVAL dummy (which equals unity at all dates on or after Febru 
ary 1973) into two parts: DEQUALVA (which equals unity during 
February 1973-August 1975) and POSTEV (which equals unity at all 
dates on or after November 1975). As indicated by the f-ratios for 
POSTEV in regressions (5) and (6) in table 6.2, the coefficient on 
POSTEV is not statistically significant at conventional levels: there is no 
direct EPEV effect on relative award rates after August 1975.
In sum, the results in tables 6.2-3 indicate that although EPEV had a 
sizeable initial effect on relative award rates as much as 9.9 percent, 
by August 1975 this initial effect wore off fairly quickly. By August 
1982, the relative award rate differed little from the level it would have 
attained in the absence of EPEV. The basic reason for this is implicit in 
the results for regression (5) of table 6.2: there is no indication that 
EPEV continued to exert an independent or direct effect on relative
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award rates after August 1975. 40 Beyond that date, EPEV had only an 
indirect effect (via lagged values of award rates); and these indirect 
effects ultimately died out. 41
These results do not mean that EPEV had no effect at all: although the 
relative award rate eventually ended up at about the same level it would 
have attained in the absence of EPEV, EPEV did help it get there sooner 
than it otherwise would have. On the other hand, the results do not 
support the notion that EPEV induced a permanent increase in the 
relative award rate. Note the similarity between these results on the 
absence of any long-run EPEV effect on the relative female/male award 
rate and Pissarides© (1987) findings about the absence of a long-run 
effect of EPEV (or, more precisely, of the "wage push" segment of the 
longer EPEV period) on the general level of wages. 42
The effect of EPEV on relative employment
I now consider EPEV©s effect on relative female/male employment. 
Table 6.4 presents three vector autoregressions for each of the two 
employment series I have considered: private wage and salary earners, 
and all full-time workers. In the first (regressions (1) and (4)), relative 
employment (LNREMPL) is specified as an AR(4) process with four 
lags in wages (LNRWAGE) and prices (LNPEXPO). The second (re 
gressions (2) and (5)) adds four lags in Tobin©s q (LNQRATI), treated as 
a measure of the price of capital services. The third (regressions (3) and 
(6)) adds four lags in DEVLRGD, used as a measure of fluctuations in 
real output.
In several respects, the results for the two employment series are quite 
similar. As measured by the Ljung-Box statistic (see note 39), one 
cannot reject at any reasonable level the hypothesis that the residuals in 
the regressions for either series are white noise. The autoregressive 
component (lagged values of LNREMPL) in both regressions is signifi 
cant, and there is some indication (particularly for private wage and 
salary workers) that employment may be less than a fourth order 
process. As measured by the sum of the coefficients on LNRWAGE, 
relative wage effects on relative employment levels are negative and
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Table 6.4 Regressions for Relative Employment 















































































































































































































































































































































fairly large;43 adding variables (LNQRATI, DEVLRGD) raises the 
absolute magnitude of the estimated wage effects somewhat.
On the other hand, the results for the two series differ in some 
respects. In a nutshell, most effects seem to be "stronger" for full-time 
employment: wage effects (as measured by the sum of the coefficients on 
LNRWAGE) are larger in absolute magnitude and have higher f-ratios; 44 
the order of the autoregressive process appears to be longer; and the 
relation to both cyclical fluctuations (DEVLRGD) and Tobin©s q (LN 
QRATI) seems to be stronger. Finally, and perhaps most curious, the 
two series appear to be related to given sets of variables in rather 
different ways. For example, as measured by /-ratios, full-time employ 
ment is relatively strongly related to the one- and four-quarter lagged 
relative wage, whereas private wage and salary employment is related 
(at best, rather weakly) to the three-quarter lagged relative wage. 
Similarly, for private wage and salary employment, only the one-quarter 
lagged value of employment is significant; whereas, for full-time em 
ployment, the one- and three-quarter lagged values of employment are 
significant at conventional levels but neither the two- nor the four- 
quarter lagged values even approach significance.
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Despite these differences, the results for the two employment series 
have rather similar implications about the effect of EPEV on employ 
ment. This is shown in table 6.5, where I report simulations of the 
logarithmic difference (multiplied times 100 for ease of reading) in 
relative employment levels with and without EPEV. These simulations 
use (1) the wage effects of EPEV shown in the DEQUALVA column of 
table 6.3; (2) the coefficients on LNRWAGEn, n=l-4, shown for 
regressions (2) and (5) in table 6.4; and because these are AR(4) 
processes, in which the current employment level becomes the n- 
period-lagged level n periods later  (3) the coefficients on 
LNREMPLn, n = 1 -4, for the same regressions. 45 As shown in table 
6.5, the effects of EPEV on private wage and salary employment and on 
all full-time employment were quite similar: a negative (and not insubs 
tantial) initial effect that, however, wore off fairly quickly. The declines 
in relative (female/male) employment induced by EPEV were greatest 
as of November 1975 (6.9 percent for private wage and salary workers, 
5.2 percent for all full-time workers) but were negligible by the end of 
1977. Note that these results on the relative employment effects of 
EPEV resemble Pissarides© (1987) results on the effect of (the "wage 
push" portion of) EPEV on the level of employment, and are about what 
one would expect on the basis of the findings shown in table 6.2 for 
EPEV©s effects on relative wages.
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
These results on the Australian experience with equal pay for work of 
equal value provide something for everyone. U.S. proponents of com 
parable worth can take heart from the fact that EPEV had no lasting 
effects on female/male relative employment. Opponents can emphasize 
that EPEV©s initial relative employment effect was adverse and not 
insubstantial. The finding that EPEV did not induce a permanent im 
provement in female/male relative award rates will confirm the suspi 
cions of Australian feminists; it may also come as a relief to Australian 
employers (and perhaps the Commission). Had EPEV been maintained
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Private wage/salary employment: Simulation derived from coefficients for regression (2), table
6.4, and wage effects of EPEV in DEQUALPA column of table 6.3.
All full-time employment: Simulation derived from coefficients for regression (5), table 6.4, and
wage effects of EPEV in DEQUALPA column of table 6.3.
Each column shows the difference for the indicated group, multiplied times 100, between (1) the
predicted magnitude of LNREMPL in the presence of EPEV and (2) its predicted magnitude
without EPEV. A positive (negative) entry shows the approximate percentage amount by which
EPEV raised (reduced) LNREMPL as of the indicated date. (See text for details.)
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as a permanent policy, its effects might have been quite different. In the 
event, however, its long-run wage effects were negligible and so, too, 
were its long-run employment effects.
The Australian experience also provides some ironic lessons for 
attempts to implement comparable worth in the U.S. As noted in 
chapters 4 and 5, the employment effects of comparable worth in 
Minnesota state employment and San Jose municipal employment were 
not particularly large, but that was primarily because its wage effects 
were also not very large. In long-run terms, the same general remarks 
apply to the Australian experience.
NOTES
1 See Hancock (1979a, 1979b) and Perlman (1954) for discussion of the first 50 years© 
experience with the arbitration system.
2 Section 51 (XXXV). D©Alpuget (1977, p. 112) comments, ©This paragraph [and the concilia 
tion and arbitration system that grew out of it] has been the cause of more litigation than any other 
single provision in the Constitution and has provided the swimming pools and European holidays 
for generations of constitutional lawyers."
3 The Conciliation and Arbitration Act has been amended numerous times since its adoption in 
1904. The basic structure in effect during 1956-89 was substantially determined by amendments 
adopted in 1956, which divided the then Court of Conciliation and Arbitration into an Industrial 
Court and a Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Commission was responsible for 
preventing and settling industrial disputes about pay rates, working conditions, etc., and for issuing 
decisions "awards" on those disputes. The Industrial Court was concerned with interpretation of 
the Commission©s awards, enforcement and control of regulations governing federally registered 
organizations and the like (breaches of union rules, contested union elections, etc.). This chapter 
focuses on the Commission and analogous bodies at the state level. For further description of the 
industrial relations system, see Dabscheck and Niland (1981), Deery and Plowman (1985) and 
Yerbury and Isaac (1971). In 1989, Parliament adopted new legislation that (among other things) 
created an Australian Industrial Relations Commission which took over most of the functions of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Since this chapter is concerned with developments up to 
1989, references to "the Commission" in the text are concerned with the Conciliation and 
Arbitrarion Commission rather than its successor.
4 The Act is supposed to supplement, not supplant, bargaining between union and management 
(although critics of the arbitration system suggest that its modus operandi virtually ensures that 
many issues will go more or less directly to the Commission without first having been the subject of 
serious bargaining). Sections of the Act allow unions and employers to draw up their own 
procedures for dispute settlement. The Commission may also memorialize, by so-called consent 
awards and certified agreements, settlements voluntarily reached by the parties covering any and all 
matters previously in dispute. Finally, as noted below, the Commission only sets wage minima;
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most pay rates in excess of these minima ("overaward payments") are decided by the parties, 
without Commission intervention.
5 Employer associations such as the Confederation of Australian Industry and union associa 
tions such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions may also appear. (In major cases, advocates 
who nominally appear on behalf of relatively minor industry or union groups are in fact represent 
ing all employers, e.g., through the CAI, or all unions, e.g., through the ACTU.) Of course, state 
and federal government agencies are treated as "employers" in cases involving government 
workers.
6 Between the late 1950s and late 1960s the main union advocate was R. J. L. (Bob) Hawke, 
research officer for (and later president of) the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Hawke had 
earned a B.Litt. in social studies as a Rhodes Scholar at the University of Oxford (he later received 
an LL.B., but never become a member of the bar). He is now prime minister of Australia.
7 Seven shillings per day also turned out to be close to what "reputable" employers  municipal 
councils and public authorities in particular- were already paying, and had important emotional 
connotations: it was a "widely prevailing rate in the 1880s," abandoned during the depressed and 
conflict-ridden 1890s. By adopting it, Higgins could indicate to workers that he was willing to shift 
the balance of industrial power (Hancock 1979b, p. 131). Technically, Higgins© decision was not a 
wage award but a determination of whether International Harvester was paying a "fair" wage and 
was thus entitled to an excise tax rebate under the Excise Tariff Act. (Since Harvester was paying 
less than seven shillings per day, Higgins denied the rebate.) Although Australia©s High Court later 
struck down the Excise Tariff Act (The King v. fiarger (1908), 6 Commonwealth Law Reports 41), 
the Harvester decision nevertheless became precedent for awards under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. Higgins was a major force behind the Constitution©s provision for industrial 
conciliation and had a profound influence on its development; the arbitration system was truly the 
Eliza Doolittle of the antipodean Henry Higgins. He acquired an international reputation as social 
philosopher and innovator; the Harvard Law Review invited him to contribute several essays 
(reprinted in Higgins 1922), which, among other things, called for retraining programs and worker 
participation in industry. Like U.S. progressives such as Brandeis, Higgins was deeply interested in 
applying sociological and economic analyses to industrial law; for example, several of his decisions 
quote extensively from the works of Seebohm Rowntree and Beatrice Webb. (However, it seems 
unlikely that these authorities, especially Mrs. Webb, could have been entirely pleased with all of 
Higgins© conclusions; see "Female/male differentials," below.)
8 Pay of some employees under state awards might exceed that of their supervisors who were 
subject to federal awards an "anomaly" (Deery and Plowman 1985, p. 303). The Commission 
defined an inequity as a situation in which "employees performing similar work" similar "by 
reference to the nature of the work, the level of skill and responsibility involved and the conditions 
under which the work is performed," and "truly like with like as to all relevant matters" were "paid 
dissimilar rates of pay without good reason" (National Wage Case 1983, MD Print F2900, p. 51).
9 In industry cases, the national (and, to a lesser extent, the industry©s) "capacity to pay" has 
usually been deemed relevant. However, the Court and its successor, the Commission, have 
consistently refused to consider "singular profitability" that is, the profitability of individual 
firms in making pay rate awards.
10 Burton et al. (1987) analyze the operation of the Hay system at a college in South Australia. 
The informal attempts at work valuation that are more typical of the Australian system have 
sometimes produced such an impression on commissioners that the process has quite literally come 
to a halt. In one case, a union representing construction workers sought to demonstrate the 
dangerous conditions under which its members worked by having an on-site inspection atop a
Comparable Worth in Australia 267
building under construction. Unknown to union officials, the commissioner conducting the inspec 
tion suffered from acrophobia. "Once up top, he [the commissioner] couldn©t move," recalls an 
advisor to the union, "and we had to pry him off the girder he was clutching." In another case, this 
advisor says, a union sought to dramatize the arduous nature of its members© working conditions. 
One of the union©s more muscular members left his usual duties, went to a stiflingly hot boiler room, 
stripped to the waist, covered himself with grease and began hammering away at a large anvil. In no 
time, recalls the advisor, "his torso was gleaming with sweat," at which point union officials led a 
commissioner through the room as part of an inspection tour. "When he got to the room, the 
commissioner was awe-struck; like the other commissioner, this one simply couldn©t move. We 
finally had to drag him from the room before our man passed out from the unaccustomed exertion."
11 For some members of the Commission, adoption of the total wage was less a cause than a 
consequence of the push for equal pay. One commissioner later said that "we needed total wage to 
get equal pay," even though many unionists attacked the total wage as likely to lead to greater control 
over wage growth (D©Alpuget 1977, p. 228).
12 The previous year, the Commission©s Cattle Station Industry (Northern Territory) Case had 
abolished separate rates for Aborigines, declaring, "There must be one industrial law, similarly 
applied, to all Australians, Aboriginal or not" (113 CAR, p. 669).
13 The Commission©s President, Sir Richard Kirby, had been on the bench in the 1966 case on 
Aborgines (see note 11) and in the 1967 National Wage Case that called upon the unions, employers 
and government to consider the issue of equal pay. Kirby later said he "felt really pugnacious" about 
the equal pay issue and "wanted to have it treated in a similar way to the Aboriginal Stockmen.... I 
was particularly keen to be on the case because I knew that my closest buddy in the commission, 
Mr. Justice [John] Moore, did not quite think the way I did... in the way he looked at the 
technicalities of a case...." As it turned out, Kirby was unable to take part in the case for health 
reasons. A presidential member of the Commission later remarked that, had he been able to take 
part, Kirby "could have persuaded Moore to go along with him," to make a "leap in judgement... 
and go straight to the heart of the issue, disregarding technical obfuscations" (D©Alpuget 1977, pp. 
230-1).
14 That times had indeed changed is illustrated by a sidelight to the 1969 and 1972 decisions. In 
1969, as lead advocate for employers in his capacity as counsel for the Meat and Allied Trades 
Federation, James Robinson had argued against equal pay for equal work. In 1972, as a Deputy 
President of the Commission, Robinson concluded with his fellow judges that the 1969 decision 
was too narrow and should be enlarged to require equal pay for work of equal value.
15 In 1974, two further developments put the finishing touches on equal pay for work of equal 
value. First, the Commission awarded a single national minimum wage applicable to men and 
women alike (the first national minimum wage had been introduced in 1966 as a minimum for adult 
males); see National Wage Case 1974 (157 CAR, p. 299). Second, Australia ratified ILO Conven 
tion No. 100, advocating "equal pay for work of equal value."
16 As we have seen, neither the distinction nor the Commission©s reliance on the former, rather 
than the latter, concept in this first 1972 comparable worth decision was in any way novel (recall 
note 9). As we shall soon see, however, the Commission was to apply this language in an important 
1986 comparable worth decision in a novel way.
17 This represents all awards indexed as "equal pay cases" or "female rates cases." As Short 
(1986, pp. 324-325) notes, the true number of cases involving equal pay is undoubtedly larger than 
53, because (1) awards that, inter alia, make equal pay adjustments are not always identified as 
such, (2) some cases that may have raised equal pay issues are still to be decided; and (3) some 
awards that may have made equal pay adjustments, including several cases cited in the 1972 equal
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pay decision itself (!), have either not yet been published or else not been properly indexed. On the 
other hand, the figure of 53 equal pay awards contains an element of double counting: in several 
instances, the same case generated several awards (making technical corrections and the like to an 
initial award).
18 This view has been expressed to me by numerous academics, civil servants and union 
officials. For a published example of this view, see Brereton (1986), who suggests that the ACTU 
may have felt that aggressive pursuit of EPEV would destroy the bargain it had struck with the 
government limiting aggregate pay increases.
19 Whether the relationships between union and employer advocates and the Commission©s 
justices are as sinister as these remarks suggest, it seems clear that they have been very close. For 
example, D©Alpuget (1977, pp. 194-5) describes the association between Commission president 
Sir Richard Kirby (note 12), union advocate Bob Hawke (note 5) and employer advocate James 
Robinson (note 13) in the following terms: the "intense rivalry in court [between Hawke and 
Robinson] was matched by an equal camaraderie outside it, which Kirby encouraged. Through a 
common interest in sport Kirby was able to create a friendly, often playful, atmosphere for the 
proceedings. Robinson shared his fancy for horseracing and all three men were devoted to cricket. 
During the summer, notes concealed in legal books which were passed down from the bench to the 
bar, apparently containing instructions for advocates, contained the latest news on the [cricket] test 
scores. At other times they were the names of winners at Flemington [Melbourne©s racecourse]."
20 This is the state-level equivalent, in New South Wales, of the federal Commission.
21 Universities (Equal Pay) Case, Industrial Commission of New South Wales, Current Review 
B130 (September 1980), pp. 528-34.
22 Barry J. Maddern, who represented the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures before the 
Commission in the 1972 Equal Pay Case, was Commission president and senior member of the 
three-judge panel that decided the 1986 Nurses case.
23 Judge Winner said that comparable worth was "pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the 
entire economic system of the [U.S.]" (17 FEP Cases at p. 907).
24 Thus, the Commission allowed recourse to the Anomalies Conference only in cases in which 
rates had not already been adjusted pursuant to the 1972 EPEV decision. Unions may, however, be 
able to argue that so-called EPEV increases actually awarded to their members were not, in fact, 
properly determined and that further adjustments are required under the 1972 decision.
25 U.S. advocates of comparable worth often treat "of equal value to the employer" as syn 
onymous with "of comparable worth." However, as noted in chapter 1, this has simply been a slogan 
rather than a definition with operational content: in all situations in the U.S. in which comparable 
worth wage adjustments have been attempted or implemented, "worth" has in fact been defined in 
terms of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions the same basic factors considered in 
Australian work value assessments.
26 The Act was adopted in 1984; in the same year, the government issued a Green Paper on 
Affirmative Action, set up a pilot program on affirmative action and announced that it was 
considering further antidiscrimination legislation. To date, there has not been enough experience 
with the workings of the act to permit a meaningful assessment of it, but Deery and Plowman (1985, 
p. 442) suggest that it has only limited ability to tackle systemic discrimination of the kind often 
addressed in litigation under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act.
27 Recall from chapter 1 that comparable worth advocates have usually urged that all jobs- 
clerical, managerial, blue-collar, etc.  be evaluated using a common framework. However, when 
this has not been possible, comparable worth has been implemented piecemeal; for example, in San
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Jose, comparable worth was based on a Haypoint evaluation of nonmanagement jobs only 
(management jobs had been evaluated, and were kept, on a separate basis).
28 Proponents who have emphasized the relevance of the Australian experience to the compara 
ble worth debate in the U.S. include the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council 
report on comparable worth (Treiman and Hartmann, eds. 1981, p. 67, note 10) and Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, former head of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (U.S. 
Congress, House 1983, p. 44). Opponents include Robert E. Williams and Lorence L. Kessler of 
the National Foundation for the Study of Equal Employment Policy, an employer group (Williams 
and Kessler 1984, pp. 68-70).
29 See Short (1986, esp. pp. 320-321) for details. Wilborn (1986, p. 90) quotes Thornton 
(1981, p. 466) to the effect that "[i]n 1969, when the first equal pay decision was rendered, the 
formal ratio of female to male wages was 75 percent. In January 1981, the actual ratio was 66.5 
percent." Wilborn then concludes that EPEV has "proven to be an ineffective response to the 
problem" of the female/male pay differential. However, these figures refer to the overall ratio of 
female to male weekly earnings (not wages), which are not adjusted for differences in hours of 
work. They therefore shed no light on how EPEV affected earnings per hour of work, and confound 
effects on wage rates and effects on hours of work. (However, the figures cited by Wilborn and 
Thornton do highlight an important discrepancy between the behavior of hourly wages and weekly 
earnings, which in turn suggests that EPEV may have adversely affected female employment. For 
further discussion of this issue, see the next section.)
30 However, the study did not present estimates of EPEV©s effects on employment, because it 
was concerned with changes in the labor market for youths rather than with EPEV as such.
31 See Gregory and Duncan (1981, figure 1, p. 416, on employment; and figure 2, p. 425, on 
unemployment).
32 Gregory©s 1980 testimony was concerned with Gregory and Duncan (1981), which, although 
not published until 1981, was essentially complete by 1979.
33 Other than Gregory and Duncan (1981), Mitchell cited only two other research studies in his 
discussion: Eccles (1980) and Gregory et al. (1985). However, neither of these presents any 
independent evidence on the employment and unemployment effects of the Equal Pay decisions; 
they merely cite the findings of Gregory and Duncan (1981).
34 To put the point differently, the unemployment rate of women in Australia more than doubled 
while the 1972 Equal Pay decision was being implemented (it rose from 2.7 percent in 1973 to 6.2 
percent in 1976). On the basis of this simple time-series trend, would it be appropriate to conclude 
that Equal Pay had a severely adverse effect on women? Only if it is appropriate to ignore all the 
other factors that might have contributed to the rise in the female unemployment rate.
35 See Gregory and Duncan (1981, table 3, p. 418). That is, the elasticity of female relative 
employment growth with respect to female relative award rates (the one-year-lagged difference 
between the change in female and male award rates) was  0.27 (r= 1.97) for the "other services" 
sector,  0.65 (f=3.54) for manufacturing and  0.30 (f=2.96) for the economy as a whole. In 
addition to the relative award rate variable, the regressors in each case were the current and lagged 
adult male unemployment rate and a time trend term. "Employment" was defined as wage and 
salary earners in civilian employment (and thus did not include employers or household 
employees).
36 Because of data limitations, Gregory and Duncan (1981) had to analyze effects in terms of 
numbers of employed persons rather than in terms of person-hours. Some researchers (e.g., 
McGavin 1983a, 1983b; Snape 1980) have argued that this may have understated the full effect of
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the 1972 Equal Pay decision on employment of women, although Gregory and Duncan (1981, p. 
421-2; 1983) disagree.
37 As indicated in table 6.1, data for private wage and salary earners are available only for 
August 1967-May 1979, making a total of 48 observations. Data for award rates and full-time 
employment are available for the entire period (August 1967-August 1982), making a total of 61 
observations for each of these two series. Since the regressions in table 6.2 (for the relative award 
rate) and those in table 6.4 for full-time employment adopt an AR(4) specification, a total of 61  4 
=57 observations is used in each of these regressions, with the first referring to August 1968 and 
the last to August 1982. The regressions in table 6.4 for private wage and salary earners also adopt 
an AR(4) specification, so here a total of 48 -4=44 observations are used, with the first referring to 
August 1968 and the last to May 1979.
38 The 1969 Equal Pay Case, decided in June 1969, called for introduction of EPEW in four 
stages, from October 1969 to January 1972 (127 CAR, p. 1159). The 1972 Equal Pay Case (decided 
in December 1972) called for introduction of EPEV in three stages, from December 1973 to June 
1975 (147 CAR, p. 180). Thus, construction of DEQUALPA and DEQUALVA (and their counter 
parts, EQUALPAY and EQUALVAL, discussed below) in effect assumes a lag of about one quarter 
between the issuance of each decision and the start of its implementation.
39 In table 6.2 (and also table 6.4), entries for D-W refer to the Durbin-Watson statistic. Entries 
for L-B refer to the Ljung-Box (or Q) statistic, defined as N(N+2) times the sum of the first lvalues 
ofp?/(N—i), where N is the number of observations andp, is the /th estimated residual correlation. 
(See Box and Pierce 1970; Ljung and Box 1978; and Vandaele 1983, esp. pp. 106-109.) Under the 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the residuals, the Q statistic is distributed approximately as Chi- 
square with K degrees of freedom and provides a test for whether the data generating the 
autocorrelations are random (white noise). Entries for L-B in Tables 6.2 and 6.4 give the Ljung-Box 
statistic and, immediately underneath in parentheses, its marginal significance level for K=6. For 
K=6 (and also for higher values, e.g., #=12 or 24), the hypothesis that the residuals for the 
regressions in tables 6.2 and 6.4 are white noise can never be rejected at conventional test levels.
40 The results do not, of course, indicate the reasons why EPEV ceased to have an independent 
effect on relative award rates after about 1975. There are, however, various possibilities: alleged 
lack of union enthusiasm for EPEV, preoccupation on the part of the Commission with other issues 
such as inflation control, the qualifications and constraints in the 1972 EPEV decision itself, etc. 
Note also that the relative award rates series analyzed in the regressions in table 6.2 includes not 
only awards made by the Commission on its own initiative, but also consent awards negotiated by 
unions and employers and simply consented to by the Commission: since the mid-1970s, unions 
and employers may have used consent awards to circumvent EPEV (just as it has been argued that 
consent awards have been used to evade the Commission©s incomes policies).
41 To see this in intuitive terms, note from the discussion of equations (6.1)-(6.2) that if the 
coefficients b in an autoregression are fractions (and sum to a fraction), then  in the absence of time 
trends, innovations such as the e of (6.1), etc.   later values of a series y will tend to be smaller than 
initial values. The coefficients on lagged values of the relative award rate in table 6.2 are all 
fractions (some are actually negative), and the results there also imply no "innovations" in relative 
award rates via EPEV after 1975. Hence, the initial impact of EPEV eventually wears off.
42 In regressions not reported in table 6.2, I tested for a wage push effect during 1974Q2 
-1975Q1 (the period examined by Pissarides 1987) by adding a dummy variable, DWAGPUSH, to 
regressions (l)-(2) and a dummy variable, WAGEPUSH, to regressions (3)-(4). DWAGPUSH was 
equal to unity during 1974Q2-1975Q1 and zero otherwise; WAGEPUSH was equal to unity during 
and after 1974Q2 and zero otherwise. In no case did either DWAGPUSH or WAGEPUSH have a t-
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ratio in excess of unity. Hence, there is essentially no evidence of a greater effect on relative award 
rates during the wage push subperiod than there was during the longer EPEV period.
43 The sum of the coefficients on LNRWAGE in table 6.4 is -0.26, -0.32, -0.31, -0.40, 
 0.51 and  0.51 in regressions (l)-(6), respectively.
44 For all fulltime workers, the wage coefficients in table 6.4 for regressions (4)-(6) are jointly 
significant (as measured by a conventional F test) with marginal significance levels of 0.0103, 
0.0071 and 0.0105, respectively. In contrast, F tests for the joint significance of the wage 
coefficients for regressions (l)-(3) for private wage and salary workers have marginal significance 
levels of only 0.4233, 0.4058 and 0.5712, respectively.
45 The specifications underlying the regressions in table 6.4 imply that EPEV affects relative 
employment via lagged relative wages (LNRWAGE/i, n= 1   4). Since EPEV is assumed to have 
been "turned on" starting in February 1973, May 1973 is therefore the first date on which EPEV 




To some analysts, comparable worth is a solution in search of a problem. 
In this view, observed sex differences in pay even those obtained in 
careful statistical analyses that take into account sex differences in 
characteristics such as education and work experience are measures 
not of discrimination, but rather of our ignorance. The extent of labor 
market discrimination is probably seriously overstated by such analy 
ses; properly measured and analyzed, sex differences in pay may even 
be wholly attributable to factors other than labor market discrimination. 
In this view, to require equal pay for jobs of comparable worth would be 
to address a problem that may not exist and, in any case, would entail 
serious and unwarranted interference with the workings of the 
marketplace.
To other analysts, comparable worth is a natural and obvious solution 
to a serious problem. Empirical studies of sex differences in pay lead 
inexorably to the conclusion that labor market discrimination accounts 
for a substantial part of the female/male pay gap a conclusion that is 
reinforced by repeated findings that pay of jobs is lower the more 
"female" they are. It is both natural and appropriate to expect that, in the 
absence of discrimination, jobs of comparable value would pay the same 
wages. It is equally natural and appropriate to conclude that it is 
discriminatory for predominantly female jobs to receive wages that are 
lower than those paid for predominantly male but comparable jobs. 
Requiring equal pay for jobs of comparable worth is simply basic 
fairness. Although it may not be the whole solution to the problem of 
labor market discrimination, comparable worth is at least part of the 
answer.
This monograph challenges both views. On the one hand, as noted in 
chapter 3, the available evidence on sex differences in pay does indeed
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provide considerable support for the conclusion that discrimination by 
employers is a problem of substantial magnitude. Not all employers 
discriminate, and to a considerable extent the observed female/male pay 
gap is attributable to factors other than discrimination. But careful 
statistical analyses of the pay gap are virtually unanimous in indicating 
employer discrimination as a major reason (though hardly the only 
reason) for sex differences in pay.
In this view, the basic difficulty with comparable worth is that it is an 
ill-conceived solution to a serious problem. First, the rationale for 
comparable worth is fallacious. Second, viewed in purely pragmatic 
terms, comparable worth is a two-edged sword, capable of imposing 
costs as well as benefits on its intended beneficiaries. Third, in instances 
in which it has actually been implemented, comparable worth has been 
"the lion that squeaked": it caused less damage than its opponents feared, 
precisely but only because it did less "good" than its proponents 
claimed. Finally, alternative policies provide means of addressing em 
ployment discrimination that are both more effective and less likely to 
entail adverse side-effects.
7.1 Conceptual Fallacies
The fundamental premise underlying comparable worth is that, in the 
absence of discrimination, jobs of comparable worth (as measured by a 
job evaluation) would receive the same wage. As noted in chapter 2, 
however, this premise is false.
Implicitly or explicitly, proponents of comparable worth assert that 
job evaluations can determine what wages for different jobs would be (or 
should be). This is logically equivalent to the notion that one can 
determine what different fruits would (or should) sell for by performing 
nutritional evaluations assessments of their caloric, mineral, vitamin, 
etc., content. 1
There is a major irony here. Many proponents and many opponents 
share a common perception of comparable worth as a novel challenge to 
orthodox analyses of the way labor markets function. Yet the intellectual
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roots of comparable worth go directly back to that pillar of orthodoxy, 
Adam Smith, whose naive version of the theory of compensating wage 
differentials is the grandparent of comparable worth. As noted in chap 
ter 2, the factors Smith enumerated as bases for compensating wage 
differentials among jobs  unpleasantness, the cost of acquiring the 
requisite skills, the degree of "trust which must be reposed," etc.  bear 
a striking resemblance to latter-day formulations of advocates of com 
parable worth: skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.
Thus, Smith argued, for example, that butchering should pay rela 
tively high wages because it is a "brutal and odious business" (or, in 
modern-day parlance, has undesirable working conditions). The fallacy 
underlying this argument (and the naive analysis of compensating wage 
differentials from which it is derived) is a simple one: an assumption that 
all individuals have identical tastes. If this is not the case  if enough 
individuals do not mind or even enjoy the work involved in butchering  
then, as modern economists have noted, (even) in a nondiscriminatory 
economy it will be possible to fill all available butchers© jobs without a 
compensating wage differential for such work (Rees 1976, p. 340).
Just as Smith©s discussion of butchers© wages suffers from a fatal flaw, 
the faith of comparable worth proponents in job evaluation as a tool for 
detecting discrimination and ensuring "equity" in wages is misplaced. In 
both cases, the fallacy is the same: unless everyone has the same tastes 
and job preferences and evaluates job attributes (e.g., skill, effort, 
responsibility and working conditions) in the same way, neither Adam 
Smith©s notions about what good jobs are nor their modern-day equiv 
alent the results of a job evaluation  will necessarily provide any 
useful information about what wage differentials would be, or should 
be, in the absence of discrimination by employers.
Many comparable worth proponents appear to agree that "[o]nce 
unequal pay [for jobs of comparable worth] is understood as sex-based 
wage discrimination, even arguments that redress would be costly or 
might lead to some unemployment won©t hold up against the basic issue 
of fairness and the importance of removing discrimination" (Hartmann 
1986, p. 175, emphasis original). However, both the premises and the 
conclusions in this assertion are untenable. Unequal pay for jobs of
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comparable worth is not necessarily discriminatory. Requiring equal 
pay for jobs of comparable worth is not inherently fair, and need not 
remove discrimination. 2 Moreover, as shown in chapters 3-6, to the 
extent that comparable worth raises wages (particularly for women), it 
will indeed have adverse effects on employment (particularly of women) 
that should certainly be considered seriously.
7.2 Costs and Benefits of Comparable Worth
As noted in chapter 3, comparable worth is a two-edged sword. There 
will certainly be winners from comparable worth; but there will also be 
losers.
The main purpose of comparable worth is to raise the pay of persons 
(both women and men) in predominantly female jobs. Precisely to the 
extent that it suceeds in meeting this objective, however, comparable 
worth will also raise the cost of employing persons in such jobs. Other 
things being equal, then, comparable worth will reduce employment in 
such jobs; but it will not create new opportunities in so-called "non- 
traditional" jobs. Indeed, to the extent that comparable worth raises 
overall labor costs, it may also reduce employment in other categories, 
e.g., predominantly male or "integrated" jobs.
In sum, adopting comparable worth wage increases is akin to levying 
a tax on employment of persons in predominantly female jobs and then 
giving the revenues raised under the tax not to the Treasury but, rather, 
to those fortunate enough to keep their jobs after the tax takes effect. 
Some workers in predominantly female jobs stand to gain. However, 
other workers both in predominantly female jobs and in other (e.g., 
predominantly male or "integrated") jobs may lose. To the extent that 
comparable worth wage increases are not paid for by employment 
reductions or other wage cuts (relative to levels that would have pre 
vailed otherwise), they will entail higher prices (in the private sector) or 
higher taxes and/or reductions in other programs (in the public sector).
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Table 7.1 Effect of Comparable Worth on Female/Male Relative Pay
Site, Units Studied Effect Remarks, Source
Minnesota: actual pay for ran- +9.9% 
dom samples of female and 
male employees present during 
Oct. 1981-April 1986
San Jose: rates of pay in pre- +5.8% 
dominantly female and pre 
dominantly male jobs in Hay 
job evaluation study
Australia: female and male
award rates of pay
short run (as of August 1975) +9.9% 
long run (as of August 1982) +0.0%
Cumulative effect of compara 
ble worth adjustments during 
July 1983-July 1985, table 4.7 
("time trend" model)
Cumulative effect of seven 
waves of comparable worth ad 
justments, July 1981-June 
1987, table 5.4, regression (11)
Table 6.3 ("DEQUALVA" model) 
Table 6.3 ("DEQUALVA" model)
7.3 Actual Implementation
Although theoretical analysis of the likely consequences of adopting 
comparable worth can be highly instructive, reviewing the effects of 
actual adoption of comparable worth can be invaluable. What were the 
consequences of the "real-life" comparable worth policies adopted in the 
three "test sites" Minnesota, San Jose, Australia examined in chap 
ters 4-6?
Effects on wages
Table 7.1 summarizes wage effects of comparable worth in the three 
"test sites" considered. The analysis of each of these sites was concerned 
with the "other things being equal" effect of comparable worth on pay  
that is, with the difference between what pay rates actually were (given 
the comparable worth adjustments actually implemented) and what pay 
rates would have been had there been no such adjustments, all else (e.g., 
underlying trends and cyclical fluctuations) remaining the same.
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As shown in table 7.1, the results for Minnesota and San Jose suggest 
that, other things being equal, the comparable worth adjustments 
adopted there raised pay of women relative to men by about 9.9 and 5.8 
percentage points, respectively. Equivalently, the analyses imply that, 
had comparable worth not been adopted but provided all else (e.g., 
trend and cyclical factors) had remained the same, female/male pay 
gaps in these two sites would be about 9.9 and 5.8 percentage points 
larger, respectively, than they actually are.
In one sense, these effects are clearly substantial. For example, in San 
Jose, between July 1980 and October 1988 the pay gap between pre 
dominantly female and predominantly female jobs narrowed by be 
tween about 10 and 8.3 percentage points, depending on whether one 
does or does not control for differences in Haypoint ratings of these jobs 
(see table 5.3). Thus, the 5.8 percentage point effect attributable to San 
Jose©s comparable worth wage adjustments constitutes between about 58 
and 70 percent of the total change in the sex difference in pay that took 
place over this period. Viewed in these terms, the effect of the Minnesota 
adjustments is even more striking. Between October 1981 and April 
1986, the difference in pay between female and male state employees 
narrowed by between about 6.2 and 8.0 percentage points, depending 
on whether one does or does not adjust for the Haypoint ratings of the 
jobs held by those employees (see table 4.2, dummies and standard 
regressors specification, with and without Haypoint variables). Thus, 
the 9.9 percentage point effect attributable to Minnesota©s comparable 
worth wage adjustments more than accounts for the change in the sex 
difference in pay that took place over this period. In other words, in the 
absence of the adjustments, the sex difference in pay in Minnesota 
would have been larger in 1986 than it was in 1981, rather than smaller, 
as was actually the case.
On first consideration, then, it would seem that the San Jose and 
Minnesota comparable worth pay adjustments were highly successful, 
at least as regards wages. However, some caveats are in order. First, the 
adjustments did not occur all at once. Rather, the wage effects shown in 
table 7.1 refer to the cumulative impact of the comparable worth
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adjustments, which took place over a period of years: July 1983-July 
1985 in Minnesota; July 1981-June 1987 in San Jose.
Second, the adjustments did not eliminate all sex differences in pay. 
For example, in October 1988, the pay difference between female and 
male jobs in San Jose was between about 10.2 and 26.1 percent, 
depending on whether one does or does not adjust for differences in 
Haypoint ratings of these jobs (see table 5.3). Similarly, in April 1986, 
the pay difference between female and male employees in Minnesota 
was between about 4.4 and 16.4 percent, depending on whether one 
does or does not adjust for Haypoint ratings of the employees©jobs (see 
table 4.2, dummies specification with standard regressors, either with 
or without Haypoint variables).
Finally, neither the San Jose nor the Minnesota comparable worth 
adjustments actually resulted in "equal pay for jobs of comparable 
worth." At best, the adjustments made pay for jobs of comparable worth 
less unequal. For example, in April 1986, women state government 
employees in Minnesota still earned about 4.4 percent less than men 
who had similar characteristics (age, years of service, etc.) and were in 
jobs with the same Haypoint rating (see table 4.2, dummies specifica 
tion for standard regressors with Haypoints); and pay in all-female jobs 
was 7.8 percent less than pay in all-male jobs with the same Haypoint 
rating (see table 4.3, "raw diffs. with Haypoints," results for mean pay). 
Likewise, in San Jose as of October 1988, pay in predominantly female 
jobs was 10.2 percent less than pay in predominantly male jobs with the 
same working conditions and Haypoint ratings (see table 5.3).
In sum, although the comparable worth pay adjustments in Minnesota 
and San Jose were not insubstantial, large sex differences in pay re 
mained even after they were implemented. Viewed as attempts to 
provide equal pay for jobs of comparable worth, the adjustments were 
clearly less than complete.
Australia©s 1972 equal pay for work of equal value decision provides 
the most striking example of the incomplete nature of the actual com 
parable worth adjustments analyzed in this work. Initially, the decision 
led to an increase in the award rates of women relative to men of almost
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10 percentage points (by August 1975). However, after that, the impact 
wore off rather rapidly. By August 1986, the end of the period covered by 
the analyses of chapter 6, the wage effect of the 1972 decision was 
negligible. That is, in the long run, award rates of women relative to 
men were about at the level they would have been (as a result of trend and 
cyclical factors) in the absence of the 1972 decision.
Effects on employment
Table 7.2 summarizes employment effects of comparable worth in the 
three test sites considered. Like the wage analyses, the employment 
analyses of chapters 4-6 are concerned with the other things being equal 
effect of comparable worth-that is, with the difference between what 
employment levels actually were (given the comparable worth adjust 
ments actually implemented) and what employment would have been 
had there been no such adjustments, all else (e.g., underlying trends and 
cyclical fluctuations) remaining the same. As noted in chapter 3.4, these 
employment effects can readily be derived by applying the appropriate 
wage elasticities of employment to the estimated wage effects shown in 
table 7.1.
As shown in table 7.2, the results for Minnesota and San Jose suggest 
that, other things being equal, the comparable worth adjustments 
adopted there reduced employment in predominantly female jobs rela 
tive to predominantly male jobs by about 3.5 and 6.7 percent, respec 
tively. Equivalently, the analyses imply that, had comparable worth not 
been adopted but provided all else (e.g., trend and cyclical factors) had 
remained the same, employment in predominantly female jobs relative 
to predominantly male jobs in these two sites would be about 3.5 and 6.7 
percent higher, respectively, than it actually is.
Although the Minnesota and San Jose comparable worth wage adjust 
ments therefore had a negative effect on employment in predominantly 
female jobs, it is unlikely that anyone in either site actually lost his or her 
job as a result of the adjustment. The reason for this is simple. The wage 
adjustments were phased in over a period of years; their magnitudes 
were moderate even in cumulative terms, and were more moderate still
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Table 7.2 Effect of Comparable Worth 
on Female/Male Relative Employment
Site, Units Studied Effect Remarks, Source
Minnesota: employment in pre 
dominantly female and pre 
dominantly male jobs
San Jose: Employment in pre 
dominantly female and pre 
dominantly male jobs
Australia: employment of 
women and men
short run (as of August 1975) 
private wage/salaried
workers
all fulltime workers 








Employment elasticities shown 
in table 4.8 ("time trend" model 
for mean In of wage rate)
Employment elasticities shown 
in tables 5.5 (female) and 5.6 
(male) for regression model (4)
Table 6.5 ("DEQUALVA" model)
-0.0% Table 6.5 ("DEQUALVA" model)
-0.0%
in any given year. In particular, the increases were small enough so that 
adverse effects on employment induced by them were offset by the 
underlying trend in employment growth.
As in the case of the wage effects, Australia provides the most striking 
example of small employment effects. As shown in table 7.2, the initial 
employment effects (as of November 1975) of Australia©s 1972 equal pay 
for work of equal value decision were adverse to female employment 
and rather large, as one would expect in view of the large positive initial 
wage effect of the policy. However, just as the initial wage effect wore off 
relatively quickly, so did the employment effect. By the end of the period 
considered (August 1982), relative female employment was about 
where it would have been (based on trend and cyclical factors) in the 
absence of the 1972 decision.
Thus, the adverse employment effects of comparable worth in Aus 
tralia, San Jose and Minnesota were small, but only because the effects
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on wages were also relatively small. Indeed, in all three settings the 
adverse employment effects induced by comparable worth were small 
enough to be offset by long-run trends. On balance, female relative 
employment was higher after the comparable worth adjustments than it 
was before they were implemented even though in Minnesota and San 
Jose it would have been higher still in the absence of the adjustments. 
The reverse side of this coin is that, in all three sites, the comparable 
worth pay adjustments did not result in "equal pay for jobs of compara 
ble worth." The adjustments did make pay for jobs of comparable worth 
somewhat less unequal. Substantial sex differences in pay remained 
after the adjustments, however. More vigorous application of the princi 
ple of equal pay for jobs of comparable worth will certainly lead to 
greater increases in women©s wages, greater reductions in the female/ 
male pay gap, and greater equality of pay for jobs of comparable worth. 
However, the cost of these changes will be greater adverse effects on 
women©s employment.
7.4 Alternatives to Comparable Worth
Even if it were necessary to choose only between comparable worth 
and doing nothing about labor market discrimination, the faulty concep 
tual premises underlying comparable worth and the adverse side effects 
likely to flow from it should raise serious doubt about its desirability. Yet 
there are numerous alternatives to comparable worth.
The main alternative is the "old-time religion": equal employment 
opportunity legislation as embodied in (for example) Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act. Unlike comparable worth, which makes it more 
expensive for any employer (whether discriminatory or not) to employ 
persons in predominantly female jobs, equal employment opportunity 
laws make it more expensive for an employer to treat differently men and 
women who have the same qualifications and job preferences. Unlike 
comparable worth, which focuses only on pay of predominantly female 
jobs, equal employment opportunity laws can be used to attack discrimi-
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nation in any aspect of an employer©s practices: hiring, assignment, 
promotions, transfers, pay, etc.
Another alternative to comparable worth, which to date has received 
little attention but deserves serious consideration, is application and, if 
necessary, amendment of the antitrust laws to attack "deliberate under 
payment of predominantly female jobs" via anticompetitive arrange 
ments (e.g., collusive wage fixing agreements in the nursing labor 
market).
As comparable worth proponents quite rightly point out, neither 
existing antidiscrimination measures nor possible extensions (e.g., use 
of the antitrust laws) have achieved, or would achieve, quick results: the 
wheels of justice can often turn exceedingly slowly. But the tacit conclu 
sion that one can expect comparable worth, however misguided, to 
achieve results more quickly is untenable. Some employers, primarily 
state and local governments, have voluntarily (and relatively quickly) 
adopted comparable worth wage adjustments. Others, however, have 
voluntarily (and with equal speed) adopted equal employment oppor 
tunity plans and other remedies for discrimination typical of the "old- 
time religion." Given numerous court rulings that existing law does not 
require employers to pay workers on the basis of a comparable worth 
standard, new legislation would have to be enacted before unwilling 
employers could be compelled to adopt such a standard; and such 
employers can certainly be expected to oppose such legislation (and to 
oppose claims made under such legislation, if adopted) with just as 
much vigor as employers now frequently litigate charges of discrimina 
tion brought under existing law.
All things considered, then, adopting comparable worth as a solution 
to problems of discrimination is akin to adopting prohibition as a 
solution to the nation©s problems with alcohol abuse. Each is addressed 
to a serious problem, but the costs and difficulties of each are quite 
substantial so much so as to warrant adopting other solutions instead. 
It is unrealistic to expect perfect solutions to the problems of an imper 
fect world; but however imperfect, some solutions are clearly preferable 
to others.
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NOTES
1 This is not entirely far-fetched. At congressional hearings some years ago, Nancy D. Perlman 
of the National Committee on Pay Equity stressed the equivalence of comparable worth and 
nutritional evaluations of fruit (U.S. Congress, House, 1983, p. 69). It nevertheless seems unlikely 
that orange-growers would be able to persuade Congress to peg the price of oranges to the price of 
apples even if these two fruits were found equivalent in a nutritional evaluation.
2 In a bizarre (but perhaps not entirely unexpected) twist, the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, 
granted substantial comparable worth wage increases to its police after the state adopted legislation 
requiring comparable worth in local government. (See Evans and Nelson 1989, esp. p. 156.) Once 
they learn how to "play the system," othc- workers in jobs not normally regarded as either 
underpaid or predominantly female may follow the lead of the St. Paul police.
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